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**NATIONAL CASE STUDY: MUSLIM YOUTH IN GERMANY. FOCUS ON YOUTH OF
TURKISH ORIGINS**

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Introduction

This conference addresses the situation of Muslim youth in Europe and their relationship to the wider society. It is also concerned with gleaning insight into the extent to which “the religious factor” influences (or not) this interaction and the different forms of behaviour to be found. The contributions written for this conference have been drafted at a moment in history overshadowed by international events. This escalation of emotions attached to feelings of belongingness is also identified with the polarisation of religious belongingness.

This paper argues that political and academic discourse has been concerned about the future of Turkish youth as Muslims in Germany¹ since their first visibility in the early 1970s. German unification, the ideological discourse surrounding citizenship rights and the waves of violent racism throughout the 1990s, in particular the fire bombings of the homes of long time resident families from Turkey in the cities of Mölln and Solingen in the West of Germany, intensified the response to this condition. Needless to say, the aftermath of September 11th, the search for Islamic terrorists in this country and the events surrounding the war in Iraq and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have added fuel to the need to reflect on identities and auto- hetero-stereotypes.

Today youth emanating from Muslim communities are viewed and cannot avoid seeing themselves within the wider context of the image and perceptions of terrorism and transnational Islamic networks. A frequent hypothesis is that Muslim youth are experiencing a “re-ethnisation” or “Islamisation”.

In this debate organisations of the Islamic Community and Mosque Associations are at the centre of attention (Gesemann & Kapphan 2001). Interpretations of experts about the role they play in the Islamisation and politicalization of especially the Turkish immigrants in Germany differ greatly. Some experts find that they are responsible for an “Islamic Ghetto” a breeding place for fundamentalism (Tibi 2000), others that Islam and the community around the local Mosque can serve a bridge to integration into the wider society (Jonker 1999). Recently, Schiffauer (2003) sketched three ideal typical orientations to be found amongst young Muslims of Turkish origin² in Germany, at a conference organised by the Berlin “*Verfassungsschutz*”³:

- One group that demands recognition with the right to difference in the majority society;
- Another group that retreats to an ultraorthodoxe position preparing a revolutionary upheaval in Turkey, and
- A third group⁴, taking advantage of Islam in a democracy, begins to initiate a strategy similar to that of the movements of the disabled and lesbians and gays, i.e. to stretch our understanding of the standards of “normality” in the majority society.

It is plausible that each of the above interpretations has its own truth for a certain level of interpretation and for different actors. These issues will be explored in the following paper.

My task is to describe what is meant by Muslim youth in Germany and then to analyse the situation of these youth, hopefully shedding some light on the questions raised by the conference organizers. In this process I will also try to respond to the questions raised by the conference organizers with respect to the description of these youth and their socio-economic and ethno-

¹ At that time it was the Muslim culture and less the identification with the Islamic religious or political movements.

² Implicit is that this refers to youth active in the Islamic Community.

³ *Verfassungsschutz* means defense of the constitution. The organisation is more like an intelligence agency.

⁴ Schiffauer suggests that this group is most represented among the younger members of Milli Görüs, a statement that received much scepticism from the representatives of the intelligence agency. (Küpper 2003)

cultural and religious backgrounds and orientations. Questions have also been raised about the spectrum of religious practices among Muslim youth, interactions with non-Muslims and the political involvement and mobilisation patterns or initiatives at a local, national and European or international level. Studies are practically non-existent on these latter issues.

My paper will look at some official statistics and a number of studies that provide some indicators to help us reply to these questions. The primary focus will be on the numerically most important group among Muslim youth those youth originating from Turkish families. The argumentation in this paper addresses the issue of the impact of the “religious factor” within the context of the conditions of being an immigrant in Germany, the experiences Muslim youth of Turkish origins have had and the impact of the dominant discourse on their own ethno/ religious orientations.

It cannot be the task of this paper to resolve this debate nor to give exact percentages on membership in organisations or the dominance of a specific system of belief. For this reason the case study begins by defining who might be considered as Muslim youth in Germany. The following 5 main points will be discussed.

1. Who are Muslims in Germany?
 - 1.1 Size and definition of population: a focus on Muslims from Turkey
 - 1.2 Socio-economic situation
2. Structural and ideological segmentation
3. The spectrum of religious practices: identification strategies and religious orientation
4. Political involvement and alternative Identities
5. Summary and Conclusions

1. Who are Muslims in Germany?

1.1 Size and definition of the population of Muslim origins

According to the Islam Archive there are some 2,7 million Muslims in Germany.⁵ This figure is an approximation based on the number of citizens of countries with a predominantly Muslim culture. The majority of these persons originate from Turkey. In 2002 there were some 1,970,000 persons of Turkish citizenship in Germany. If one also take into account the potential number of persons who of Turkish origins who became naturalised in the last 30 years there may be some 565,000 additional naturalized immigrants from Turkey with German citizenship. For an idea of the number of naturalizations of immigrants from other Muslim countries of origin we would need the specific data on naturalization according to nationality. This is only available for some of the nationalities with the greatest number of residents in Germany. Some of these will be presented below in the discussion of naturalization and citizenship.

According to an official response of the Federal Government to a parliamentary question about Islam in Germany it is concluded that there are somewhere between 2.8 and 3.2 million persons of the Muslim faith in Germany, a country with over 82,500,000 (82 million, 500 thousand) inhabitants in 2002. Between 3.4 and 3.8% of the total population might be considered to be

⁵ This includes some 65,000 German muslims

Moslems. Nonetheless, not all persons coming from Muslim “countries” may be of the Muslim faith or even believers. In the Turkish case we need not only differentiate between Sunni and Alevi as Muslims, but there are some Christians as well as other smaller religio-cultural minorities such as the Yezidi. There are also secular Turks who may or may not consider themselves believers, who adhere to the principles of Ataturk and who argue for a strict separation of religion (Islam) and state.⁶

With the respect to the national origins of the Muslim population in Germany the overwhelming majority originate from Turkey. Turkish nationals account for the highest share of foreign residents in Germany (26%). Since the official data on the national origins of the foreign population includes only the numerically most important nationalities. The first table indicates citizens from countries of a Muslim background that have the highest numbers of persons residing in Germany. The second table indicates citizens of Arab countries for 2000 in Germany. This is only to give an indication of the relatively small proportion of persons residing in Germany originating from these countries listed. Nonetheless, one must note that much of the discrepancy between Table 1 and Table 2 (a smaller share of Moroccans in 2002 than in 2000). This is due to the naturalisation of Moroccans. The same would be true of the Turks and Iranians if we compared the previous absolute numbers with 2002. The percentages in Table 1 indicate the percentage of this population with respect to the total number of foreigners resident in Germany. The nationalities with the highest share of residents in Germany will be found in the appendix. Turkey continues to have the highest percentage among the foreign populations.

⁶ Germany is not a secular state, but considers itself a state built on the foundations of Judeo-Christian values / tradition. The official representatives of the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish religions have the right to instruct religion in the state schools. This has been a problem for Islam that does not have one organisation empowered to speak for all members.

Table1: Foreign citizens in Germany from selected countries with a primarily Muslim population in 2002

Country Citizenship	of Total	Male	Female	%
Turkey	1,912,169	1.032,296	879,873	26,10
Bosnia &Herzegovina	163,807	85,122	781.685	2
Iran	88,711	44,751	43,928	1,2
Morroco	79,838	48,206	31,632	1,1
Afghanistan	69,016	38.193	30,823	0.9
Lebanon	47,827	28,245	19.582	0,7

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2003

The data from the Islam Archive estimates that the majority of the Muslims are Sunnites and about 300,000 would be considered Shiites. In the case of the population from Turkey it has been estimated in the past that the population of Alevi origins to be around 20 –25 % of the total.

Taking into consideration those that have become naturalized in the last three decades, we might reach a figure of almost 500,000 Alevi-Shiites from Turkey among the total number of persons including both those naturalized as German citizens and among the remaining Turkish citizens in Germany.

1.1.2. Estimations of the size of the youth population of the various nationalities of Muslims in Germany

Exact information about the size and share of youth stemming from the various populations of Muslim origins in Germany is not currently available. With respect to age groups about 21% of the foreign population is under 18 years of age in 2000. About some 420,000 young persons under 18 were of Turkish citizenship in 2002 the last date that indicates nationality according to age.

Table 3 : Foreign Population and share in selected age groups in 2001

Foreign Residents		
Age Groups	Absolute	Percent of
In years	N	Age Group
	in 1000s	(%)
Under 6	453,2	6.1
6 – 14	736,1	10.0
14 – 21	669,3	9.1
21 - 40	1 970,6	40.6
40 – 60	1 822,2	25.7
60-65	282,8	3.8
65 and more	384,1	5.2
Total	7 318,3	100

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Migrationsbericht 2002

Table 4 Total Foreign Population according to age groups in 2001

Less than 21 yrs	25.0
21 – 40 yrs	40.0
40 – 60 Yrs	26.7
<u>60 & older</u>	<u>9.0</u>
Total	100

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Migrationsbericht 2002

The data from 1997 indicates that it is the population with Turkish citizenship that is on the average the youngest of the most important nationalities, 28% are less than 15 years of age, and 48.6%, or almost half of the persons with Turkish citizenship are less than 25 years of age.

The next youngest age group are the Yugoslavs with one fifth less than 15 years of age and almost 40.0% less than 25 years of age. Although the birth rates of the foreign population has been decreasing over the years, the citizens from Turkey and those from Yugoslavia have not decreased at the same rate as the German and other EU populations.

Table 5: Age Structure of Selected Nationalities in 1997 in %

	Age groups				
Nationality	Less 15yrs	18-25 yrs.	25-45 yrs	46-60 yrs.	60 yrs. +
Total Population.	16.0	11.0	32.0	19.5	21.8
Total foreigners	19.0	17.0	40.0	17.5	8.3
Turkish	28.0	20.6	32.0	14.9	3.5
Yugoslav	21.1	18.1	33.0	21.5	6.6
Italian	16.0	15.5	40.0	40.3	8.3
Greek	14.0	16.5	38.0	38.0	10.6
Spanish	7.5	11.7	37.5	24.8	16.2

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 1998

1.1.3 Naturalization of persons of Muslim origins

Citizenship rates have been increasing continually in Germany since 1994 with the exception of 1997. The rate of naturalisation⁷ per size of foreign population has also steadily increased reaching an average rate of 2.56% in the year 2000. In the year 2000, 247.693 foreigners became German citizens, this was the highest growth rate from one year to the next with an increase of 30% more naturalisations the previous year. This included some 40,821 children of foreign parents who could be registered for the first time with the right to German citizenship at birth⁸. Because of their size the highest absolute number of naturalisations were among Turks. However, due to the change in the citizenship and naturalisation legislation in 2000 we would expect the number of under 18 year olds citizens of Germany from families of Turkish origin to be much higher.⁹

In general the highest rates of naturalisation in the year 2000 were found to be among the Iranians (13.35%), the Lebanese (11,4%), citizens of Sri Lanka (9%), Afghans (6.6%), Moroccans (6.2%). Immigrants from Turkey (4.1%), Bosnia (2.5%) and Yugoslavia (1.5%) tend to have lower rates of naturalisations, although Turkey is higher than the average rate for the foreign population.

All of the nationalities with above average rates of naturalisation with the exception of Sri Lanka could be considered countries of mainly Muslim origins. It would seem that the major distinction between those nationalities that have relatively high rates of naturalisation and those with relatively low rates of naturalisation is the type of migration. The Iranians, Lebanese and the Afghans have primarily entered Germany as refugees or fleeing from civil war (Sri Lanka).

It appears to be that it is the larger populations of former “guestworker” origins that are less likely to become naturalized citizens.

Since those populations with the highest rates of naturalisation as well as those with the lowest are also from traditionally Muslim countries, evidently being from “a Muslim” culture is not sufficient reason for creating a social distance to choosing German citizenship.¹⁰ Instead the comparably low rate of naturalisations must be result from other influences. There are a number of findings in the literature that will be discussed in this paper that could give some insight into this situation. My argument is that in the case of immigrants from Turkey the low rate of naturalization is an indicator of the greater social distance between the collective of immigrants from Turkey and the members of the dominant society. The change of citizenship laws and the granting of a right to citizenship to children born in the country came after more than four decades of settlement accompanied with a controversial public discourse about the loyalty and ability of Turks to be integrated into German society (Wilpert 1991, 2003). One hypothesis is that the history and conditions of the immigration process and the mutual perceptions and judgements of immigrants from Turkey and the members of the dominant society about each other that contribute to this social distance and low relatively low rates of naturalisation.

⁷ Naturalisation rate in this context represents the share of naturalization cases for the per national group yearly.

⁸ Source:Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen – “Daten und Fakten”.

⁹ Since the year 2000 children born in Germany of at least one since 8yrs legally resident parent have a right to citizenship at birth.

¹⁰The low rates of naturalization from the former Yugoslavia created the exodus of a number of refugees from Bosnia and Yugoslavia (Kosovo). These refugees have faced legal restrictions to settlement in Germany and the majority have returned. Here is the case of a former labour recruitment country where families with networks in Germany could flee to Germany, but with little prospect of a permanent stay.

1.2 Socio-economic situation of young persons of Turkish origins

1.2.2 Educational Participation

Children of Turkish immigrants are particularly disadvantaged in the educational system. In 2002 almost one quarter of young men with a foreign citizenship dropped out of school without a school leaving certificate, but less than 11% of the Germans. This was true for almost 16% of the young foreign women, but only for 6% of the young German women (Jeschek & Schulz 2003). The young women with foreign citizenship are relatively more successful than their male counterparts. About 12,3% of the young foreign women achieve an Abitur (secondary certificate that permits access to the university.) This is the case for 29% of the German women, and 22% of the German men.

The most recent data and research in Germany about the educational opportunities of the descendants of immigrants, demonstrates that especially the descendants of immigrants from Turkey are over-represented among the least successful in the educational system (von Below 2003). Moreover, children from Turkish families are more often than others selected to be sent to special schools for children with learning disabilities. Gomolla & Radtke (2002) demonstrate in their empirical study of the elementary school system of the city of Bielefeld how the school organisation uses ethnic difference as a criteria to systematically select these children out of normal classes and into special classes¹¹. The authors analyze the logic that is used to make these decisions and illuminate why a number of these processes directly discriminate the children of immigrants. In the majority of cases these are children of families originating from Turkey.

According to von Below (2003:100) being Turkish has a significant effect on the chance of obtaining educational success. In a study of over 3,600 young adults of German, Italian and Turkish origins the group of young Turkish pupils were under represented and disadvantaged with respect to the more valued school leaving certificates. This study concludes that educational success is to a great extent dependent on ethnicity/ ethnic origins.

This topic is not new and in the urban centres of Germany, such as Bielefeld (above), Berlin, Cologne, Frankfurt, Hamburg, etc. the issue of the educational “problems” of the descendants of immigrants from Turkey has been with us a long time. First, it is the issue of access to good educational opportunities, for instance, access to school forms that offer an educational future. Secondly, once having achieved a worthwhile school-leaving certificate, it is the issue of access to occupational training. Elsewhere I have written about and documented the problem of the transition from school to occupational training. Young women of Turkish background, although as a whole more successful in school than the young males, they still confront a number of barriers in the transition to a future oriented occupational training (Wilpert 1997, 1988). Due to gender segregation in the classical occupations available for a middle school certificate it is also difficult for young immigrant women of Turkish origins who have achieved a middle school certificate to find entry into relatively good occupations (von Below 2003). These young women tend to find apprenticeships in exactly those occupations that over-produce for the labour market and thus possibly face a future of unemployment, despite their educational and occupational training. (Wilpert 1997).

¹¹ The authors use the term “foreign pupils” as is found in the official statistics. They clarify, however, that for the city of Bielefeld, the category foreign pupils is the overwhelming majority, Turkish pupils. And, that in Bielefeld, the “foreign problem” is primarily perceived as a “Turkish problem” (op cit:97-98).

1.2.3 Occupational Opportunities

The future of traditional occupations trained in a dual system and standardized professional qualification is in transition. The lower secondary *Hauptschul* (High School) certificate was the traditional pre-requisite for entering the working class via the industrial labour force. Today the *Hauptschule* has lost its significance, for many it is a school without a future. And, the many are often young men and women of immigrant, primarily Turkish and Arab background. Today, a good future oriented apprenticeship is dependent on a good general education. And, the most sought after professions might even require the “*Abitur*”. This means that in the urban centres of Germany about two thirds of the young males and half of the young women of Turkish origins may not qualify for entry into a more secure occupational future.

The absolute number of apprenticeships has been decreasing since the mid-1990s (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung 2002). Generally, it has become increasingly difficult for young persons to find apprenticeships. But, it is twice as dramatic young persons of foreign origins, most frequently Turkish. In addition to the lack of the needed competitive school certificates, they also face discrimination entering into the labour market (Mourinho 1996, Raethzel/ Ulku-Sarica 1994). Even after completing an apprenticeship, a necessary prerequisite for occupational security, there is no guarantee that they will be employed.

A transition is occurring in the German dual vocational training system. Employers are less willing to invest in training young persons, i.e. employing young persons as apprentices. There is much debate about the need of more highly educated skilled labour than the classical dual system provides. Young men and women of Turkish origins are especially disadvantaged in competition for apprenticeships in future oriented skilled occupations (Hönekopp 2000, 2003).

1.2.4 Unemployment among immigrant Youth

Unemployment has been at least twice as high for foreigners than for Germans. In some urban areas, such as Berlin, the unemployment of foreigners has reached even higher proportions. The actual data on the unemployment of youth is not reliable. Since the data on employment and unemployment are based on the official records of the Federal Employment Bureau, which covers only those person who are officially registered as seeking a job, neither employment nor unemployment reflect the reality. Young persons who have never worked and have no expectations that they may find work may not be registered. It has been estimated that as high as 40% of the young immigrants with Turkish citizenship between 16 and 18 years of age are unemployed¹². My own estimations for the city of Berlin are closer to 50% or more.¹³ And, the school and occupational training statistics do not offer any indications that the situation for the 16-20 year old young persons of this background¹⁴ has improved since the early 1990s in Berlin (Wilpert 1997).

¹² Kumulus a youth counseling service in the West of Berlin has also estimated that about 45% of the young persons that came for advice and searching occupational training or jobs were unemployed.

¹³ This has been done on the basis of a comparison of the foreigners in the age group 16 to 20 years in the registered population with the same group in the official school, occupational training, (apprenticeships) and socially insured employed statistics, In 1991 the last date where that was possible 50% of the young foreigners between 16 and 20 years of age were not present in the above institutions, but 95% of the German population could be found in one of these above categories. Today it is impossible to make the same comparison, since due to unification and the changes in statistics as well as districts, etc.

¹⁴ This will apply as well to persons of other nationalities, for instance, some youth of Arab origins or Germans from the former Soviet Union, but not in the same numerical intensity.

Urban ethnic patterns of settlement, social class and ethnicity combine to create a case for an ethnic stratification of many cities in Germany. In the German context the descendants of Turkish migrants are the least successful in the educational system: They are most likely to become school drop outs; they have the highest share of attendance in special schools for learning disabilities, a low share of apprenticeships with an occupational future, high unemployment rates. As a whole at least 50% of the young persons of Turkish origins in the urban centres of Germany have a precarious socio-economic situation. Moreover, statistics show that more foreign families live under the poverty line than the average (Neu 1998, Huster et al 2003). In the past this might have been considered an “ethnic working class”, but the traditional working class of stable manual labour in the industrial sector has shrunk. Instead today it is closer to an “ethnic underclass” a group of young persons who have little future perspectives for stable work or occupational future. This is about socio-economic segmentation within the current young adult population and the ethnization of an underclass. The argument here is that this group of young persons forming an ethnic underclass is primarily non-German and of Turkish origins in the urban centres of Germany.¹⁵

There exist as well a certain share of persons from Turkish origins, 15-20% that are successful in the educational and occupational system including those who successfully complete university studies in Germany. These young adults are not necessarily involved in the socio-economic segmentation, nonetheless as will be seen below they are in the majority of cases do have a certain social distance to the dominant society.

2. Social Distance: Structural and Ideological Segmentation

The above socio-economic polarisation and possible creation of an ethnic underclass among young persons of Turkish origins in Germany must be seen in light of a number of other conditions. Some of these impinge, as will be seen later, on the experiences and perceptions of social distance among the more successful young persons of Turkish origins.

2.1 Structural Segmentation

2.1.1 Settlement and Housing patterns

“Little Istanbul” the name often given the enclaves of Turks in German cities are often interpreted as self-made ghettos and today as parallel societies. In Berlin these settlements often follow the pockets of city designed for urban renewal in the 1960s.¹⁶ Berlin had a high percentage of 19th century working class housing blocks earmarked for urban renewal. This situation made the temporary workers from Turkey very attractive clients.¹⁷ When families began to reunite after the recruitment ban at the tie of the oil crisis it was impossible to find adequate housing¹⁸. Even the state subsidized social housing restricted the number of persons to each room and would have been

¹⁵Except for the cities of the former GDR where the share of foreigner youth are low.

¹⁶ Similar patterns of concentration are found throughout the urban agglomeration where workers were recruited. But, to my knowledge, there have been few systematic historical comparisons.

¹⁷ Research conducted at the Wissenschaftszentrum in the mid 1970s documents that higher rents pro square meter for less amenities brought substantial profits to the absentee landlords (Freiburghaus 1974, Freiburghaus & Kudat 1974)..

¹⁸ Turks were the largest source of workers at the time of the recruitment stop. Firms preferred to higher homogeneous groups to simplify the issues of language and customs among the labour force. It was also expected that the Turks and Yugoslavs would be the most likely to return when no longer needed, since they did not have the same legal status as the EU Italians and the identified to enter the EU, Greeks, Portuguese and Spanish (Wilpert 1988).

too costly for the “guestworker” families who began to bring their families from rural areas to the German cities. The result has been that the families with the largest number of children were forced to live in these areas designed for a not realized urban renewal. Thus already in the mid-1970s it was clear that certain schools, playgrounds, youth centres, street corners were populated primarily by youth from Turkey. Even then some elementary and secondary schools began to be up to 60% attended by pupils who were Turkish nationals. This practice was enhanced by the policy of preparatory and national classes that were constructed in these heavily ethnic concentrated areas to not “over-foreignize” the German pupils. Living in neighbourhoods with a traditionally poor social infrastructure has influenced the quality of the educational experience and social interaction with the remaining, to a large extent, socially disadvantaged German population (Gitmez and Wilpert 1987). These conditions in many urban industrial regions have set the parameters for the life of migrants from Turkey as a minority group in Germany. It has had its impact on the aforementioned educational and occupational opportunities, as well as on mutual perceptions and evaluations of their different worldviews and collective, ethnic, religious and national belongingness. And, of all of this occurred in a political context of “not being a country of immigration” and three and one-half decades of denying a right to citizenship, or achieving a political will to venture to change naturalisation legislation to give a right to birth on German territory (Wilpert 2003, 1991). In the three decade “waiting period” for a new policy on citizenship by birth between some 70,000 to 100,000 children were being born yearly as foreigners throughout Germany (Wilpert, 2003, *Beauftragte der Bundesregierung* 2002:429).¹⁹ The majority of these children were descendants of families from Turkey.

2.1.2 Inter-ethnic relations and interactions with non-Turks²⁰ and non-Muslims.

The above situation of dense ethnic concentration in urban neighbourhoods has continued to characterize the lives, world-views and social interactions between immigrants from Turkey and the German majority. This has led to the condemnation of the behaviour of parents who are responsible for the fact that their children enter the first grade without speaking ability in German. Recent studies conducted on the national level can give further insights into the significance of ethnicity on social interaction and friendships for young persons in Germany. Prominent studies underscore that the most important factor influencing inter-ethnic contact for foreigners in Germany is the rate of success in participation in the educational and occupational hierarchy (Esser, 2001, Haug, 2003). Obviously opportunity structures, living in a mixed neighbourhood or attending mixed educational facilities also influence the likelihood for interaction with other ethnic groups and members of the dominant society. The empirical findings from the Haug (2003) study relevant for our question are primarily, that persons who identify themselves as very religious Muslims are the least likely to have social contacts with Germans.²¹

¹⁹ With the implementation of the new citizenship legislation in 2000 at least 50 % less foreigners will be born in Germany yearly.

²⁰ Being a Muslim is in certain contexts a common belongingness that might awaken solidarity. Social interactions remain however, influenced by language and national origins as we have indicated with respect to attendance at the Mosque.

²¹ There may be some problems of social desirability involved in this study with respect to the meaning attached to the issue of the nationality of friends.. In any case we may still conclude that it might not be assumed by a very religious Muslim that it is desirable to indicate that he/ she has German friends. This might be the case of naturalized Germans of Turkish origins who are not as religious. Here qualitative research on social networks could be useful as well.

The study cited above also points out that intermarriage was rare in the case of the parents of the young adults studied, only 5% of the descendants of Turks with German citizenship were from mixed marriages, i.e. their parents were first generation. This was the case for 36% of the Italians with German citizenship in the study (Haug 2003:101).

However, in a study restricted to the second generation, Strassburger (2001) found in an analysis of the data on civil weddings of Turkish nationals residing in Germany in 1996 that about 16% were German Turkish marriages in German registry offices, about 3% were Turkish-Turkish marriages in German registry offices, about 3% marriages with third country nationals and the rest, some 60% of marriages were measured by visas granted to persons residing in Turkey to join a Turkish resident as marriage partner in Germany.

The above studies, in summary, indicate that young persons of Turkish origins who are educationally successful, who have completed an occupational training certificate or who have become naturalized citizens are more likely to claim to have German friends than those who do not. Persons who identify themselves as very religious Muslims are less likely to claim to have German friends. The authors believe that this indicates that those persons of Turkish origins who have overcome educational barriers and institutional selection procedures have more opportunities to interact with Germans and may then be considered as more successful in their social integration. Being a religious Muslim could be a hindrance to this definition of successful integration. Here arises the issue of the definition of successful integration in a pluralist society and the role of religion. More attention will be given to this below.

2.2 Institutional and ideological factors that create distance.

2.2.1 Public discourse and identity strategies of Muslim youth of Turkish origins

Normative institutional conditions - legal traditions and institutional patterns - combine with the pre- and post migration experiences create the ideological basis for particular constellations of indigenous and immigrant ethnicity. Institutional conditions are founded on ideologies that influence attitudes and perceptions of acceptance and otherness on both sides.

Even in countries of immigration where the rights to citizenship are part of the overall immigration policy ethnicity is a normal process. Ethnic differentiation and ethnic identity persist alongside lengthy settlement and extensive processes of adaptation and acculturation. The understanding that citizenship and ethnicity can legitimately exist side by side, is not yet a normality in the German context. A great deal of the public discourse over decades has been directed at the population from Turkey as Muslim and culturally different and, thus, not capable of being “integrated” into German society (Hoffmann 1996, Wilpert 1991, 2003).

It is only recently that academic research begins to differentiate its approach to Islam, Muslim youth, youth culture in the larger society for the opportunities and self-perceptions of young persons of Muslim immigrant origins.

The assiduous work of Gomolla and Radtke (2002) offers an alternative and demonstrates in an empirical analysis how ethnicity has been used as a discriminating factor. They systematically study the construction of ethnic and institutional discrimination in the educational system exemplified in the case of Bielefeld. They are able to demonstrate how so called “intercultural education” is applied to fit the rhetoric and to give legitimacy to the selection criteria applied within the educational system. “Culture”, cultural conflict and cultural identity are used

consistently to explain the need for negative selections. This research conducted in a German urban educational setting illustrates how “cultural” difference is used to “blame the victim”.

Schiffauer, et al (2002) in a study of political socialisation among immigrant children (of Turkish background) in classrooms in four European countries (Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands) finds that in the context of the school in Germany, a common experience of negative ascriptions dominate the daily classroom discourse, stigmatising and frustrating the youngsters identified as Kurds, Turks, Muslims who experience themselves reduced to an ascribed “culture” or to experts for their “culture”. At the same time this process of hetero-stereotyping leads as well to auto-stereotyping and to a rigid ethnisation and a conscious strengthening of “otherness”.

This study finds that the pupils in all four national educational contexts had one message in common despite the differences in the political context. Pupils criticized the exclusion that resulted from the dominant tendency to construct them as “foreign” as “others”. They argued instead for inclusion in the imagination of the dominant society and for belongingness while (perhaps?) having a right to be culturally different. (Schiffauer, et al,2000:357)

Research conducted among young adults in Berlin in the late 1980s and 1990s found that identification as a Turkish minority influenced attitudes about Turkish identity and an orientation to less oriented toward return than those more likely to identify themselves as Turks. Youngsters who identified themselves as Alevi or whose parents spoke Kurdish were more distanced from Turkish identity and were less certain about return than youngsters identified as Sunni Turks. However, despite this distance to a “Turkish” identity these minority youngsters were not necessarily more identified with Germany and a German identity than the others. Minorities from Turkey may experience a relative “freedom” from the discriminatory functions negative ascriptions in the society of origin. And, they may through this experience have more resources and strategies to respond to new ascriptions and negative images in the country of immigration (Wilpert 1987, Gitmez and Wilpert 1987, Abschlußbericht 1990)

As discussed previously for some youth from Turkish background the issue of becoming a citizen, becoming naturalized in Germany may be also perceived as an issue of loyalty. Due to the polarisation of “we” and “they” viewed from both the dominant society and perceived by young immigrants from Turkey. Although there is every indication that the aforementioned minority youth are also perceived as “Turks”, they may have more distance to this categorisation than those self identifying as “Turkish” or a “Sunni” Muslim.

From another perspective Schiffauer (1999) argues that with respect to the question of citizenship the issue of loyalty may be avoided in some cases for some young Sunni Turks when they make the decision to choose to identify oneself as religious, as a member of an Islamic community. This is especially the case in a context of developing a strategy to stay in Germany and to negotiate that the German society recognize the right to religious freedom, i.e. to accept and recognize difference.

3. The Spectrum of Religious Practices: Identification Strategies and Religious Orientation

3.1 Methodological Note

We know very few absolute facts about religious practices among immigrant youth of Turkish origins in Germany. There are no studies that are representative for religious practices of the total population of Muslims of Turkish origins in Germany. Thus, when I cite empirical studies in this

report, they may give some indications of certain tendencies, but cannot be considered to be representative of either the entire population of young persons of Muslim origins in Germany, nor young persons originating from Turkey.

Difficulties of quantitative studies:

1) There is no representative research on young persons of Arab or other non-Turkish Muslims in Germany. This is certainly due to the relatively small number of persons involved and the diversity of their national-cultural origins, their very different regional/ urban settlement patterns in Germany.

2) But, even those quantitative studies that have the objective to study religious beliefs and practices that are reported on Muslims of Turkish origins suffer from methodological problems. This is the case for a telephone survey that is regularly conducted in Berlin by the office of the representative of the Public Administration for Integration and Migration²² identity may be perceived in this way.²³

For all of the reasons listed above, and more²⁴, a number of social scientists have questioned the reliability and the extensive interpretations of the findings of the Heitmeyer study. (Hoffmann 1997, Aliacacioglu 1999, Diehl & Urbahn 1999.)

It has been pointed out that Islam is seen practically exclusively in connection with fundamentalism in this study and as a result as a strict “refusal of modernity” (Frese 2002). Hoffmann (1997) argues that the tendency of the methodology, using attitudinal scaled forced choice questions, reproduces exactly the already well known images that the dominant society believes and finds negative about Islam. The categories employed illustrate the existing images about “the enemy”. This, in turn, provokes either extremist positions or a refusal to reply to the questions.

In contrast to the above the telephone survey undertaken by the Berlin Senate (Integration and Migration Office) religious practice is only one small area. Residents from Turkey in this case are not only seen as Muslims but also as co-citizens. For this reason and due to the reputation of the office it represents, it may be more reliable than the larger regional survey. Moreover, surveys

²² Formerly the Commissioner for Alien Affairs (Ausländer Beauftragte).

²³ Heitmeyer, et al (1997) have conducted the largest quantitative study of youth(15-21 years) of Turkish origins (Heitmeyer 1997) for the region/ state of North Rhine Westphalia. This study became very controversial exactly because it received a widespread reception in all forms of media. It substantiated a large number of popular beliefs in German society. The interpretation that Heitmeyer and his team gave to their findings fed into and provided proof of views expressed in the media and public opinion on the dangers of Islam and potential dangers of young Muslims. The authors interpret that at least one-third of the respondents could be considered endangered from militant Islamic fundamentalism and radical political ideas. These are identified as either an “Islamic centred superiority complex” or a “religiously based willingness to be violent”.

The reliability of this survey is considered highly questionable. Not only is it unlikely that a regional study can be representative of the Turkish immigrant population, but the methodology of this survey is seriously flawed. This was a 90 minute paper and pencil questionnaire given to 1,200 pupils in secondary school. Even if some of the above questions did receive an honest response, there is good reason to believe that the necessary trust in studies about Muslims and Islam could not be expected to be present in this population.

²⁴ Frese (2002) reports that trust was a major issue to be resolved in order to prepare his interviews with young men via Mosques and Islamic youth organisations in the city of Bremen and its surroundings. They were especially suspicious of social scientists. He also countered that much of what the science of religion circulates about Islam that is communicated in the media and in schools is in most cases wrong. These are also responsible for the numerous misunderstandings about Islam that occur within society.

repeated over time have the added value to at least provide some insight into changes overtime. Nonetheless, these responses can only be expected to reflect practices of Muslim immigrants from Turkey in Berlin and not necessarily those living in other urban settings.

Qualitative research, some of which is reported below, attempts to overcome the issue of validity by taking advantage of a small sample to contextualize the biographies and contexts of the sample, as well as to go into depth in an analysis of the meanings that the subjects themselves give to their religiosity and the logic they employ. Moreover, in some cases researchers have constructed typologies of backgrounds, situations or self-defined identifications that allows the researcher to differentiate and contrast positions among the youth in question (Karakasoglu-Aydin 2003).

Keeping the above methodological reservations in mind, in the following section briefly addresses some findings from surveys on the issue of religious practices.

3.2 Some findings about religious practice

Visiting the Mosque

According to a survey of the Office of the Federal Republic for Integration and Migration in the year 2000 it was found that about 24% of Muslims stated that they attended a Mosque once a week and about 8% more frequently in the week (Deutsche Bundestag – 2000:13). At that time 18% of young persons between 18 and 24 years of Turkish origins responded that they visited the Mosque weekly and 4% more frequently²⁵.

Telephone surveys in the city of Berlin in 1993 and 1999 found a higher share of the total (34% to 39%) quoted that they regularly attended the Mosque. This was higher for males (43%) than for females (27%). This survey finds that an increase in regular visits to the Mosque can be observed in this period for young men below 30 years of age. Here one can observe some regional differences between the survey cited above on a federal level and the local Berlin Study. While at the federal level only 18% of the young persons between the ages of 18 and 24 indicated visiting the Mosque regularly, in Berlin young men below 30 years of age were more than twice as likely to make weekly visits to the Mosque. These differences between two quantitative surveys taken at a similar point in time, may either mean that Mosques are more important in the lives of young Muslim men of Turkish origins in Berlin than on the national level, or that one or both surveys are actually not valid in their representation of the Muslim population from Turkey.

Islamic religious Instruction for children

In 2001 the same survey in Berlin finds that a little more than half of the respondents would like to send their children to religious instruction offered in the public schools. That is, 53% of the respondents would consider sending their children to Islamic religion courses organized by the

²⁵ These findings are similar to those reported in a large telephone survey of over 2,000 Muslims from Turkey in Germany reported in Sen & Aydin (2002):44-46.

Islamic Federation²⁶, but 38% would not²⁷. Currently these courses are offered in some 20 schools in Berlin.²⁸

Heitmeyer Survey in North Rhine Westphalia

This survey of secondary school pupils in North Rhine Westphalia (Heitmeyer et al 1997) investigates religious practices as well as attempting to measure Islamic Fundamentalism with attitude scales that reflect a number of the stereotypes held about the Turkish culture and Islamic religion. For all of the methodological reasons mentioned here there is good reason to be wary about the validity of a number of positions taken by the participating youngsters.

Nonetheless, it could be of interest to compare the more objective questions about religious beliefs and practices with the above findings. These are questions that do not necessarily reflect the negative images relating religion to Islamic fundamentalism used in the Heitmeyer study and commonly found in the dominant society. Here some of the responses with respect to questions, that inquire into personal religious beliefs or into behavioural issues such as the practice of religion will be presented. These are questions that could be asked of any member of a religious group or Church.

This survey indicates that almost one quarter of the sample considers themselves to be believers and to follow the teachings of Islam. About 17% stated that they were in their “personal way” religious, and 50% stated that they believed in God, but they did not consider themselves very religious. The remainder, about 8% were either not interested, indifferent, or didn’t respond. On the basis of the responses to this question one finds half of the young persons stating that they believe in God, but they are not strict in the practice of religion. Close to this are the young persons who reply that they are religious in their “own personal way”. It is the minority (one-fourth) that identify themselves as a “follower of Islamic teachings”.

Table: Religious Beliefs and Practices

I am a believer, I am a follower of Islamic teachings	24.7%
I am religious in my own personal way	16.7 %
I believe in God, but I am not strict in my practice	50.0%
I don't know if I am religious or not	2.3%
I am not religious, it does not interest me at all /	4.0%
No answer	2.3%

Heitmeyer, 1997:119

²⁶ The Islamic Federation is a local Berlin umbrella organisation of Mosques that gained recognition in 1998 after numerous attempts over 20 years as a religious organisation with the right to teach religion for Muslim pupils in Berlin schools.

²⁷ These findings are based on a telephone surveys in Berlin at the end of 2001 (Ausländerbeauftragte 2002)

²⁸ Recognized religious bodies (Catholics, Protestants and Jews) offer religious instruction on a voluntary basis to children of their faith in the public schools. The instructors are appointed by the religious bodies but the costs are to 90% covered by the State (Gesemann and Kapphan 2001:409).

Prayers

Similarly, almost 50%, when asked about religious practices, claimed never (22%) or rarely (27%) to pray. These seem to be consistent with the share of young persons above who reply that they believe in God, but are not strict in practice. Of the rest: 28% pray daily once or more often and 20% replied to pray only on Fridays. That is about almost half of the respondents replied that they either prayed on Fridays or one or more times daily (Heitmeyer 1997:258).

Visits to the Mosque

The same sample replied in this survey about their frequency of attendance at the Mosque. About one-third (31,3%) responded somewhere between a weekly or monthly visit: (once a week or more than once a month.) About one-fourth either claimed to go several times a year or on special holy days. Finally, one third either claimed not to visit the Mosque (23%) or did not respond (10%) (Op cit: 259).

Attendance at Koran school

Over one third (37%) of all respondents reported that they never attended a Koran school. A little less than one third (30.6%) attended Koran lessons for a year or two; and a little less than one-third from 3years to 6 or more (15% from 3 to 5 years and about 14%, 6 years or more) (Op cit:258).

In the same survey when asked about their own children, about half of the respondents stated that they would like their own children to go to Koran lessons. But, the other half were less interested (30% were not certain that they would want this and 16% refused the idea) (Op Cit: 258).

On the assumption that there may be some reliability in this kind of pencil and paper survey, one can conclude that about one-third of the young adults surveyed were to some extent actively practicing their religion. That aspect of these findings seem to go very much in the same direction of the above local survey in Berlin.

3.3 Socio-anthropological and qualitative research

3.3.1 The transformation of religion in migration

Schiffauer (1984) was one of the first to note the new meaning that Islam had for immigrants from Turkey in Germany and the connection between Islam and identity in the migration process. This research (Schiffauer 1984, 1988) reflects on the significance and transformation of the meaning of religion in the processes of urbanisation and migration of Turkish migrants to Germany. This process takes place within Turkey as well, however, the impact is more acute when migrating to work from Anatolian villages to the urban centres of Germany. Not only do social relationships change, but also, due to the non-status of Islam in Germany and its special status in Turkey, Islam takes on a new form and a new meaning. The unity of social relationships, religion and culture existing in the village is broken in migration. Schiffauer (1988:146) proposes that religiousness (indicated by ritual practice, the relationship between religion and the societal order, the direction of religious thought and the attitude to one's self) changes in migration as a result "of a restructuring of the religious community in a secular society."

The Muslim abroad who wants to express his religious identity has to organize his religious needs, to form a community, to establish a Mosque, to be more conscious about Islamic rituals and to seek the rights that will guarantee and protect these practices in the foreign setting. The founding of the Mosque must be based on the German law conditioning the rights to found associations. This has both advantages and disadvantages for Turkish Muslims in Germany. In the secular state of Turkey religion and many traditional Islamic practices have been under the control of the state or even forbidden. On the one hand, Germany offers in this sense also a new freedom in the establishment of Koran schools, or the wearing of the veil or beards and in this way permits the possibility to strengthen a previously controlled Islamic identity (Schiffauer 1988, Gitmez and Wilpert 1987).

On the other hand, other traditions, the slaughtering of animals, dietary requirements, respect for prayers during working hours, rights to Islamic religious holidays are issues to negotiate with German authorities. In this process religious practice becomes a conscious effort and is no longer a taken for granted style of life. It also transforms and institutionalizes Islam as a minority religion in Germany. Another important factor is the new perception of religion as a personal as well as a communal act. Some immigrants find a new meaning in prayer and religious education (Schiffauer 1988, 1999,2000)

Schiffauer's social-anthropological work (2000) on different Turkish Islamic sects places these movements both in the context of the history of suppression in secular Turkey as well as explainable by contradictory tendencies in the migration context. Schiffauer (1999) analyses a case study of a descendant of follower of Erbakan. In this particular case the young man in question attended the academic secondary Gymnasium and he joined the Kaplan community²⁹ with 15 years of age. This choice for a radical extremist form of Islam is interpreted as both an identity resource and the adaptation to the logic of the migration situation. This young man through his access to religious knowledge can claim a privileged status in the family and the community.

Particularly important is also the dynamics of the fight for recognition in German society, where hetero-stereotypes are used to ascribe the totality of persons identified as Turks. To "come out" as an Islamic "extremist" enables this young "Turkish" man to gain power by defining himself and not letting himself be defined by others. Schiffauer explicitly relates this "outing" to other social movements, such as lesbians and gays, that demand recognition and the right to be different. "...the confrontation with discrimination means that young Turks growing up in Germany are thrown back to the group they wanted to break away from...they are shown that they are not desired by the group they want to belong to. At the same time recognized as true and knowledgeable Muslim leader he gains status within the community while developing convincing strategies in dealing with discrimination in German society. And, in the end, he demands the recognition of difference as a German citizen and to negotiate the rights to practice these beliefs in Germany.

²⁹ The Kaplan community, known as the "Kalifstaates", was founded in the early 1980s in Germany with the objective of establishing the Caliphate in Turkey. The founder Cemaleddin Kaplan broke away from the Milli Görüs (National View) and the (Refah Partei) of Necmettin Erbakan with the intention of uniting Muslims in Europe in a grass roots movement to establish power and make an Islamic Revolution in Turkey. This also included the establishment of a government in exile and the self-appointment of Kaplan himself as the Caliph in 1994. With Kaplan's death his son became his successor. After much conflict and establishment of a counter movement whose leader was killed by a death squad in Berlin in 1997, the German government has banned this movement as a terrorist organisation.

3.3.2 Islam and the scarf among Muslim young women

Wearing the scarf has become the critical marker of identification for women of Muslim traditions. In Turkey the state forbade the wearing of the scarf in schools and at the university. First generation migrant women traditionally wore simple headscarves (bandanas/ kerchief) in their private lives, but rarely in their places of work. This practice has been challenged with the prolongation of immigration, where, at least initially, the respect for religious and cultural tolerance made it possible to wear scarves in the workplace or in school³⁰.

Nonetheless, the discussion on Islam in Germany has given much attention to the control of women via the scarf (Akkent & Franger 1987, Spuler-Stegemann 2002). Most observations assume that young women do not choose to wear the scarf of their own free will but are rather pressured by the religious tradition and fears of their parents. Not only does the headscarf symbolize an opposition to the development and emancipation of women, but today it has been identified as a marker of “politicised” Islam. Worn by young women of “the second or third generation” it is seen as a clear refusal of integration and an aggressive statement against the values of Western society.

This issue has become highly controversial in Germany especially following a decision of the Federal German Constitutional Court to leave the decision about the wearing of headscarves by teachers in the public school system to the Länder. Several Länder (states) (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Lower Saxony and Berlin, a.o.) are in the process of drafting new paragraphs to their constitutions that will forbid the wearing of the scarf for teachers in public institutions or in some cases for pupils in school. The interpretation and meaning attached to this for the young women in question has received some attention in qualitative research (Karakasoglu-Aydin 1998, Klinkhammer 2000 Nökel 1999), but almost daily attention in the press and other media. In these three studies cited the young women in question were characterized as being better educated than average, achievement orientated and critical of traditional Islam (Nökel 1999).

Karakasoglu (2003) focuses on female university students in the field of education. Between 1996 and 1999 the author studied the religiosity of 26 university students preparing to become teachers. The objective of the research is to investigate the quality of the religious orientation of these women students from families originating from Turkey. The religious orientation is then related to their educational philosophy with respect to their profession as educators and their family lives.

The interviewees are classified into 6 categories: atheist, spiritualist, Sunni laicist, Alevi laicist, pragmatic ritualist and an idealistic ritualist. Except for the self-declared atheist religiosity was considered an important factor for all of these young women students. The headscarved women were only to be found by the “pragmatic” and the “idealist” ritualists. None of the young women, however, considered themselves to be representative of a traditional form of religiosity.

Generally, this author agrees with a number of studies that find that a “certain share” of Muslim young women (Nökel 2002, Klinkhammer 2000l, Karakasoglu 2000) and men (Alacacioglu 1999, Frese 2001, Tietze 2001), who are in search of an authentic way of life take recourse to Islam. This is partially explained as a good way to share with their parent’s generation their joint adherence to

³⁰ Initially it was explained as being the impact of the Koran teachers on young girls that influenced some to begin to wear heads carves to the public school a practice well known to be forbidden at that time in Turkey (Wilpert 1983).

Islam³¹. It is especially satisfying because they are in the position through their mastering of an independent knowledge of Islam and its rites to assume the role of “the expert” status in the family and the community. Karakasoglu (2003) characterizes this as a kind of “soft” emancipation without any direct confrontation in the parent generation.

This is accompanied by the process of contrasting the “true” Islam, in which they have become experts in an almost academic learning process, and “traditional” Islam that relies on an unquestioning, automatic adherence to a rigid system (canon) of values (Karakasoglu 2003). The assumption is that “traditional” Islam is not compatible with what is required by the “modern” individual who is to be autonomous and rational. Several studies reach this interpretation and emphasize the “independent” search of young Muslims in their search for the “true” Islam; the significance of an Islamic orientation and life style for their development of an authentic personal Identity (Ich Identität). Most important here is that Karakasoglu emphasizes that this position is not seen by the young women as due to pressure from the parent generation. Instead these young persons aspire to live their Islamic identity in German society³².

Karakasoglu (2003) emphasizes that the “Islamic” orientation is very broad, ranging from a secular orientation that includes the internalisation of Islamic ethics often independent of an Islamic ritual and extending to what is called an ascetic approach (wearing Islamic dress) either with or without the pursual of Islamic ritual. Both Klinkhammer and Karakasoglu indicate a view of the religious situation of these female descendants of Muslim from Turkey as increasingly heterogenous. The objective of their research has also been to differentiate these young women.

Karakarsoglu (2003) finds, on the one hand, that the choice for the “true” Islam permits one to de-traditionalize and to free marriage of hierarchic relationships. On the other hand, the author remarks one should not underestimate the role of the use of symbols such as the wearing of the scarf for a “reification” of self (Selbstessentialisierung).

This position is that young Muslims are productively relating modernisation processes and religious development. Those who express their position in the symbol of the scarf disturb the surrounding society. For many of them, the author believes, that it is a search for recognition of different identities in the plural society. Through the process of maintaining themselves as being different integration is first possible. This is viewed according to Karaksoglu from an immanently social vision. These young women are primarily concerned about the plausibility of their religious behaviour vis-a-vis a non-Muslim world. They measure their own behaviour (choices) on the criteria of the dominant discourse of “individual freedom” and “rational behaviour”.

³¹ Nökel (1999) also emphasizes that wearing a headscarf (even in defiance of the parents at times) as a means of professing their own identity in response to the ascribed ethnic identity of “a foreigner” that blocks “their recognition as an individual” in this society (Nöckel 1999: 128).

³² This position is very close to Schiffauer’s explanation in the case study introduced above. His argument is that the position of some descendants of migrants from Turkey live actually in two polarized views of the world: their parent’s fear of the dangers of the “German” culture and life style for their children and the collective view commonly held in German society about “backward”, uneducated and lowly valued Muslims from Turkey. A key issue in this context is loyalty. Because of these strong images of “the other” in both communities even if a young person perceives that it is no longer a reality to return to Turkey. (Often they no longer speak the language, at least not adequately; they are judged to have a German identity; they may feel rejected there as well.)

Thus, it makes sense to plan for a future in Germany among like-minded. An Islamic, Muslim identity permits youngsters with these experiences to remain loyal to their family and community. Islamic loyalty also permits them to become a German citizen and negotiate for recognition and rights to difference in Germany.

Important for this study is that the young women studied find education to be the key to the development of their individual and independent personalities. Educational aspirations also require a well-founded knowledge about their own religion. This enables self-reliance, emancipation and a special relationship / separates them as experts / to the older generation and distinguishes them from the assimilative pressures of the majority society. It is through the strengthening of their cognitive abilities that these young women see their own independence (emancipation) and self fulfillment. Both the laicistic and the ritualistic oriented women find their own individual religious orientation in challenging their own religious education as well as the view of Islam in the dominant society.

The concept of the “true” Islam permits these young women to construe themselves as “modern” they desire to demonstrate their individuality (also their collective belongingness) to the outside world. The right to be themselves (to be different/ to identify with their collective) is insisting on the right to a self-defined integration. Nonetheless, these young women do not have one definition of which limits they set to integration, at what point compromises might be made. Their choices are very individual. One of the most important observations of all of the studies is that religion is a mark of difference. Young persons identified as Muslims or as Muslim Turks in Germany develop strategies to defend themselves against hetero-ascriptions. They are also involved in a struggle for belongingness and recognition.

3.3.3 Democratizing Islam – the human right to religious freedom

Frese (2002) goes a step further in his systematic study (interviews and group discussions) of 29 young men between the ages of 14 and 26 years of age active or participating in activities of the youth services of the Mosques in and around the city of Bremen. The majority of the young men active in the Mosque youth work are either university students or attending the academic secondary Gymnasium. And in most cases, they were born in Germany. That is, in terms of education, the “privileged” among the youth of Turkish background in Germany.

Frese’s objective is to understand how young persons who actively identify and participate in an Islamic religious context perceive Islam, Turkishness, being Muslim and Turk in Germany and in Turkey; their understanding of what a “good” Muslim should be and their image of the Islamic community internally as well as within the context of a secular / Christian environment. His analysis is that the majority of the young men participating in his in-depth discussion with all existing criticism of many aspects of the German society, believe in the democratic values and respect the value of the constitutional basic law of this society. They assume the opportunity to live their religion as a question of human rights and for this reason they vehemently argue for pluralism as a realistic constitutive element of society. Frese views the negotiated pluralism that these young men envision as steps in a process toward Islam becoming a religion of “civil society”, as steps toward emancipation. Frese observes that the majority of these young men are thirsting for a generational change within the Mosques and the Islamic Umbrella organizations.

This is accompanied, in his opinion, by the political institutional level that has developed its own dynamics. Umbrella organizations were constructed between a number of competing Islamic associations to fight for their recognition as associative bodies, to gain official status with the hope to influence the education of religion in the schools. In a conference of the Berliner Verfassungsschutz (Defenders of the Constitution an intelligence agency), as stated in the introduction, Schiffauer (Küpper:2003) made a similar argument with respect to the younger

representatives of Milli Görüs,³³. Exactly this strategy Frese (2002) claims as well that the young men he studied want to achieve, arguing for a truly pluralist society that recognizes difference and accepts the stretching of certain standards of “normality”.³⁴ Some critics evaluate this strategy as a sham, claiming that such umbrella organizations that negotiate with the outside on a democratic basis, but internally continue to condemn the values of this society (Spuler-Stegemann 2002).

4. Political Involvement and Alternative Identity Strategies

4.1 Political Involvement

4.1.1 Political involvement in Islamic organisations

The question about the political involvement of young Muslims is most likely intended to refer to their involvement in certain political objectives related to their religious or Islamic orientation. This could also mean involvement in transnational Islamic movements. The above studies about religious practice give evidence of the work of young men and women of Turkish Muslim background in Islamic Movements as well as in the local associations and activities of the Mosque. And, although it is known that the majority of the Islamic organizations organized by immigrants from Turkey in Germany have a transnational dimension, it is not possible on the basis of the data available to draw any conclusions as Schiffauer has done (2003, op cit, p.2 above) about the meaning of these organizations for Muslim youth from Turkey in Germany³⁵. Schiffauer has proposed, that there are three ideal typical modalities. These are reflected to a small extent in the work of Karakagolu (above) and Frese (2002) as well, that:

- a) there is a group of “second generation” young women and men who seek recognition and a right to be accepted as different in Germany society.
- b) another ultraorthodox group is oriented toward revolution in the country of origin;
- c) the third seeks to claim via democratic and human rights in a pluralist society the possibility to stretch the norm.

This picture may apply to those young persons associated with different kinds of organized Islam and active in Islamic movements. The second group might be considered to have a fundamentalist orientation, but with the objective to change Turkish society. The other two in this typology seek recognition in German society. This might be a fair picture of alternatives for young people with an active religious / political concern. It is possible, that these three ideal types reflect the alternatives seen and practiced by a leadership of the 35% of the young persons of Turkish Muslim background who may attend the Mosques more frequently.³⁶ There is absolutely no reliable data to give weight to participation other than what the organizations themselves claim about membership.

³³ The largest umbrella organization of Turkish Muslims and on the list of organizations under permanent observation of this intelligence agency

³⁴ The representative of the Berlin intelligence agency disclaimed recognizing this tendency in any wing of Milli Görüs (Küpper 2003.). Cf. Appendix I for a presentation of the different Islamic associations and their relative importance.

³⁵ To reiterate reports of the “Verfassungsschutz” (Küpper 2004), less than 1% of the population of Muslims from Turkey are considered to be active in extremist organisations.

³⁶ See the Appendix for a description of the alternative organizations that might be available to them.

4.1.2 Political involvement and civil society

Political involvement can also mean activities of young immigrants for their rights in civil society. A certain share of the increase in naturalization among immigrants from Turkey may reflect not only the ability to disdain the loyalty issue for those who have a positive Islamic identity, but also an orientation toward a life as a citizen in Germany. In each political party, i.e. the Greens, the SPD, the FDP and the CDU there are active members in fact in the first three also elected representatives with a Turkish immigrant background. The Greens have been pioneers and have some local and one national parliamentarian of Turkish background, similarly with the SPD. Here much more research is needed. Turkish immigrants are organized in numerous associations with special interests that are not restricted to religious organization. These could be seen as political interest groups, such as the Turkish parent's association or the Turkish association of interest groups in Berlin and Brandenburg, professional associations, such as the Association of Therapists, the National Association of the Community of Turks in Germany, etc. Turks have been extremely involved in the unions since entering Germany and active in a number of local community organizations³⁷. There are a number of studies of the kinds of associations and activities among immigrants from Turkey in Germany, but to my knowledge no comprehensive study of the extent of the participation of the "second generation" in these various initiatives.

A very recent quantitative study of 3,600 young adults, 18-30 years of age, compares the integration and participation of Italians, Turks and Germans (Glatzer et al 2004). Also this study does not have a simple answer to the political or religious orientation of the sample of Turks. Instead they develop a very differentiated picture of these young adults³⁸. Nonetheless, between 40 to 49% of all nationalities are neither active in associations or in political organizations/ activities. However, young persons from a Turkish context or dual citizens are more often members of one or more associations than the others. At the same time less than 10% of the young persons from a Turkish context claimed membership in a Mosque or a religious association. At the same time these young persons, as those from an Italian context are less likely to be involved in political activities. Dual citizens or Germans are more likely to be politically active. They conclude that there is hardly a major difference in the openness to informal and more formal forms of political participation among the young persons of foreign background and those of German background (Glatzer 2004:95). Instead they emphasize the complexity and diversity of the subgroups studied with no hard lines between these and the German group studied. Extremist positions are in a minority (Op. Cit.: 106).

4.2 Alternative Identity Strategies

In addition to the above ideal types related to a Muslim or Islamic identification other identity strategies have been found among young persons born and raised in Germany that have implications for political involvement and also give insights into the complexity of identification and identity strategies. These do not need to be strictly alternative to a Muslim or Islamic identification, but may

³⁷ There are hundreds of associations and of these certainly the Mosques may have the widest impact at the grassroots level, but the breadth of orientation of these organisations is very wide and at times very polarized (Gitmez and Wilpert 1987, Fiajalkowski, . & Gillmeister 1997)

³⁸ They have differentiated their sample into young persons from a Turkish context, naturalized young adults (either Turkish or Italian origins), dual citizens with both citizenships and bi-national with either one Turkish or Italian and one German parent. Germans are in this case the most homogeneous group.

be seen, in addition, as part of the multi-layered experiences and membership feelings of young men and women of Turkish Muslim origins living in Germany.

In addition to the above groups that signalize membership in an Islamic community through outward appearances of headscarves and veils, it is repeatedly observed that the social distance created by societal and ideological segmentation has implications for the self-identifications of young adults born and raised in Germany. There is a basic inability to call one self – “a German”, and hyphenated identities are not yet commonly accepted (a German-Turk or a Turkish-German) young persons who through a life lived in Germany find other solutions such as a territorial identity expressed as local urban belongingness –

→ Territorial identity: “I am a Kreuzberger!” ...”I am a Berliner.” Or,

→ Ethnization and territorial identity - “I am a Turkish Berliner” or

A “Swabian from Anatolia” or an “Anatolian Swabian” – Cem Özdemir, the Green politician in his political discourse.

Local and regional territorial identifications reflect the life lived in a context that is neither “German” in the ethnic sense involved in the political discourse nor “Turkish” in the retrospective sense of a pure monocultural identity.

4.3 A New Cosmopolitanism – “Glokal” – Transnational Identity

Kaya emphasizes the “Glokal” found in his work in Kreuzberg (2001) that ... “No youngster feels attached to either Germany or Berlin, but they are attached to Kreuzberg.” (Op.Cit: 139). He finds this a reflection of multilocality or “double consciousness”. His argument is that living in this enclave of immigrants from Turkey creates a diasporic identity for the youth who have been born and raised here, but this is not an essentialist identity but symbolic and situational. This experience is the basis for the transnational identities these youth favorize. Transnational identities do not need to be Islamic or fundamentally religious.

Kaya’s study on hip-hop youth culture in Berlin (2001, 2002) illustrates how these youngsters are not just reverting to the past, but transcend in their response the exclusionist policies of the German nation-state. They resort to both historical cultural resources and universalist elements.

Kaya (2002) finds that “German-Turkish youth are socially conscious and critical of increasing discrimination, segregation, exclusion and racism in society.” Some of the most well known rappers have as well a political message. Kaya argues that that hip-hop enables ethnic minority youths to use both their own ‘authentic’ cultural capital and global transcultural capital in constructing and articulating their identities. He sees the rapper as an intellectual “storyteller” (Walter Benajamin). The storyteller “wishes to mobilise his/ her local community” against the power of the hegemonic group. At the same time the Berlin rappers “Turkify” rap through a mixture of instruments, melodies, beats and lyrics. This is the result of their “double diasporic identity”. Hip-hoppers have developed a form of “cultural” nationalism and a syncretic ‘third culture’.

In the German context it is exactly the “between two cultures” approach that has been found in the 90’s to be turned around by the Hip-Hop youth of Turkish background into a “double diasporic consciousness” and thus into a cultural and political resource (Kaya 2001). This is brilliantly

exemplified in Kaya's recounting about the messages of several well known groups such as "Islamic Force" and especially the female singer Azize.

5. Summary and Conclusions

Research on Muslim Youth from Turkey in Germany does indicate that the majority are believers. Religion plays a role in their lives. In many cases religion has become a marker of belongingness. One distinction of belongingness exists between those identifying as Alevi or secular and those identifying as Sunni. However, in the latter category as well there are as well a great diversity of behavior and practices of religion among these young persons. Two different kinds of typologies of these young Muslims have been presented. As a whole it can be said that about one third of these young persons practice their religion, although the extent differs greatly and may be subject to the local context with respect to Mosques and patterns of migration and settlement. Very few young persons could be identified as fundamentalist or participating in a political Islamic movement.³⁹ This, of course, also is part of the nature of fundamentalist or extremist orientations; they reflect a small minority.

In fact there are very few indicators that young Turkish Muslims are active in religious organizations. The most recent representative study (Glatzer, et al 2004) find that less than 10% claim membership in a Mosque. When the youth and young adults participating in the activities of Mosques or those who assume a leadership position are studied as Frese (2002) has done, the majority also do not reflect an extremist position. Instead it is claimed that they for the most part are conscious of the values of a democracy and a pluralist society and want to sue this to achieve recognition, equality of rights and the acceptance of difference. In some cases as suggested above by Schiffauer with respect to Milli Görüs, the strategy of the new generation is to negotiate with the state and the dominant society to stretch what is seen as the norm.

For the purpose of understanding Muslim Turks in Germany, the most part being Muslim is also a part of their identity. But beyond that, there are quite heterogeneous with respect to the articulation and practice of their beliefs. One of the most important findings in this research review is that there exists a structural and ideological segmentation creating social distance between the majority of the members of the "second and third generation" of Turkish origins in Germany and members of the dominant society. This is explained by the recruitment history, the ideologies and public discourse underlying recruitment, migration policy and the debate around citizenship legislation, i.e. the views and collective truths perceived by Germans and Turks about each other. This process is also reflected in the everyday experiences in school, media and public life that immigrant young persons, Muslims and Turks experiences as being continually required to explain their different (inferior!) culture or religion.

These "cultural" differences are grounded not only in an ideological discourse, or mutual perceptions, but also used to systematically create institutional discrimination (Gomulla and Radtke 2002).

Much of the public discourse on youngsters of Muslim Turkish origins in Germany has been problem oriented focusing on their deficits, stemming from families of Muslim and rural origins who are seen as not ready or capable to prepare their children for education and training in

³⁹ Schiffauer speaks about the fascination of political Islam for the second generation, but he uses this text to reflect on the logic of the fascination and does not attempt to put forth any kind of statistical data.

Germany. Instead they create a parallel society. Parents, accordingly, do not integrate, do not make a sufficient effort to teach their children German. And, because of the circular migration system, i.e. the custom of marrying their children with partners from Turkey, especially families originating from Turkey are considered to perpetuate a traditional Muslim culture. In public discourse the view is that the traditional values and low educational background of Muslim migrants is considered to be responsible for the relative low ranking of young persons of Turkish background within the educational system. This in turn explains the high rates of unemployment and social welfare use of young descendants of migrants from Turkey.

The social distance that institutions, ideologies, policies and the urbanization process has created results in a danger of a perpetuation of an eth-class for those youngsters caught in the disadvantaged urban underclass without a hope for socio-economic integration or an occupational future with steady work. Indicators are that this could be as high as 50% of the urban youth in question.

Here, the work of Kaya (2001) is important for its insight into the socially conscious and intellectual involvement of hip-hoppers and rappers as part of a new different kind of transnational movement emanating from and reaching young Turks and Germans in Germany as well as in Turkey. The difference is that a great deal of the communication of the rappers music does have an intellectual message that goes beyond the boundaries of Germany and Turkey.

This indicates, as stated earlier even the other half including the “successful” can be considered to be marked by this discourse. But they have evidently very different resources. The responses are as a result, also very heterogeneous. A few are active in the political parties, some are active in religious organizations and others form an intellectual elite in the world of music, literature, film and theatre. Nonetheless, the share of professionals with a Turkish background in the field education as school teachers, present in the media or public administration is practicably negligible. On trying to summarize this paper and reach some conclusions, I cannot help but be reminded of a comment of Bruno Etienne, some twenty years ago at a workshop on Islam and Muslim communities in Paris. – “One can only see Islam in Marseille or none!” In our case (Germany) the “truth” is somewhere in between. In the case at hand it can not be considered a question of “re-ethnisation” or Islamisation. More qualitative research needs to be done on the wide variety of responses.

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Appendix I

The most important Islamic religious organisations are:

Milli Görüş (National View) – (Refah Partei) Necmettin Erbakan

Süleymanî (Association of Islamic Cultural Centres)

DITB (Turkish-Islamic Union of the Foundation for Religion) – Turkish State

The Islamic Federation (Berlin)

Kaplan Community (State of the Caliphate/ Islamic State of Anatolia)

Nurcu (Community of Light) (Intellectual role of Islam)

Clear data on the numbers active in the above associations or communities is not available. In Berlin where there were about 73 mosques in the year 2000 (Gesemann & Kapphan) about two thirds of the Mosques are affiliated with one or the other of the above communities (Umbrella Organisations). Less than half belong to the 3 major federations. Noteworthy is that the mosques are organized on a national or ethnic basis. In Berlin the majority are visited by persons of Turkish origins (58), 6 Arabic, 2 with Kurdish believers, 2 with a Pakistani membership, 2 German mosques and one each with Albanian, Bosnian or Indonesian communities.

According to the German “Verfassungsschutz” (FBI, Secret Service) there are some 30,000 Islamic Extremists in Germany and about 4,000 in Berlin about two thirds of these stem from Turkish associations primarily Milli Görüş or the Tugend Partei. Less than 1% of the foreign population in Berlin belong to extremist organisations.

In fact according to the same report of the Government to the German Parliament only about 10% of those immigrants of the Muslim faith are officially organized in these associations. As far as active participation in the religious community, one study in the city of Berlin in 1999 (based on telephone interviews) found that about 37% of the sample visited a Mosque regularly. Especially the participation of younger persons under 30 had increased since a similar study in 1993: this group rose from 28 to almost 38% in the 6 year period (Gesemann & Kapphan 2001).