Quality of life in Europe

Migration trends in an enlarged Europe

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Contents

Introduction

Migration has become a significant issue for the economic and social policy of the EU[1]. This study contributes to the policy debate on migration in the EU by presenting new empirical evidence on the potential extent and structure of migration from the acceding and candidate countries to the existing EU Member States. According to the European Commission (2002, p. 9), 13 million non-national citizens lived in the 15 EU Member States in the year 2000, nearly half of them bearing the nationality of other European countries. The net inflow of migrants into the EU reached, in the same year, 2.2 per 1,000 population, or 680,000 persons. Worldwide, migrants account for around 2.5% of the world population.

Flood of migrants after accession?

One factor fuelling the current debate on migration in the EU is the imminent enlargement of the EU, with 10 acceding countries[2], from central and eastern Europe and from the Mediterranean, due to join in May 2004. Many politicians and a significant part of the electorate expect a flood of economic migrants from the acceding countries into the existing Member States. Concerns are based on a large income gap of around 60% between the central and eastern European acceding countries and the existing Member States (Straubhaar, 2001a, p. 170). This income gap is significantly larger than in the previous southern enlargement of the EU[4].

In a recent policy statement, the European Commission addresses the concerns about labour mobility in an enlarged Europe. It predicts that, despite existing fears, 'the most likely scenario is one in which labour mobility will be moderate to limited and will after a likely short upsurge, just after the accession period…start declining again to fall below 100,000 persons per year before the end of the decade' (Commission of the European Communities, 2003, p. 6).

These fears find some confirmation in econometric studies, which estimate that between five and 50 million people could move to western Europe from the eastern European acceding and candidate countries within a period of 10 to 15 years (Zimmermann, 1996). Layard et al (1994) estimate a migration potential of around 3% over 15 years, equivalent to three million migrants from the eastern European acceding and candidate countries[7]. Baldwin (1994) estimates a figure reaching five to 10 million. In a newer study, the

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[1] An important contribution is provided e.g. by the Social Situation Report 2002 of the European Commission and Eurostat (2002, pp. 16-29), which puts a strong emphasis on this topic. The issue is also taken up in a recent report of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions and the European Commission (2003, pp. 61-88), focusing on the importance of migration issues in industrial relations. The report highlights in particular the involvement of social partners in national migration policy, the take-up of migration issues in collective bargaining and consultation processes at company level, as well as innovative labour market and anti-discrimination policies for migrants.

[2] There are in addition three other candidate countries: Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.

[3] This aspect is highlighted in a recent European Commission study on the impact of eastern enlargement on the labour market (Commission of the European Communities, 2001, pp. 23-30)

[7] The 3% estimate over 15 years is also confirmed by Straubhaar, 2001a.

European Commission (2001) predicts that the numbers of migrants from the eastern European acceding and candidate countries living in the existing Member States will increase from one to almost four million between now and 2030.

Report focus

Against this background, this study describes and analyses the potential to migrate from the acceding and candidate countries into the EU. It is based on individual survey data, which have been collected in the 13 acceding and candidate countries during the negotiation for accession to the EU in April 2002. The data collection was part of the Candidate Country Eurobarometer (2002.1), financed by the Director General of Employment and Social Affairs. The study contributes to the on-going policy debate by providing an analysis of the socio-economic conditions and of the motives of potential migrants from the acceding and candidate countries. The analysis highlights the heterogeneity of the potential migrants with a view to enable policymakers to develop targeted policy measures.

The analysis also raises the question as to whether the greatest social and economic problems will occur in the countries to which the migrant workers travel, or within the countries from which they come. The key concerns are around a possible 'brain and youth drain' in these countries.

In addition, the report tests the importance of income poverty, economic deprivation and their subjective perception for migration. Are these conditions drivers or barriers for migration?

Finally, the analysis examines the importance of existing levels of satisfaction with quality of life in the candidate countries. Is general dissatisfaction on its own a significant factor for migration? Or, does dissatisfaction with particular life domains trigger migration? How important is social policy related to existing health and social security provisions? All these questions, however, have to be seen in a wider EU policy context.

EU policy

The potential for legal migration will rise after accession, as one of the basic principles of the EU is the free movement of workers across the borders of its Member States. Therefore, possible migration from the acceding countries in the EU has played a significant role in negotiations in the preparatory phase of accession.

The new accession treaties stipulate restrictions on free movement from new into current Member States for all acceding countries, except Malta and Cyprus. For the remaining eight countries, transitional arrangements are in place for a period of up to seven years, broken into the following stages:
- A two-year period during which national measures will be applied by current Member States to new Member States. Depending on how liberal these measures are, they may result in full labour market access;
- After this period, reviews will be held: one automatic review before the end of the second year after accession and a further review at the request of the new Member State affected. The procedure includes a report by the Commission, but the decision on whether to apply the EU law is left to the current Member State;

- The transitional arrangement should come to an end after five years, but may be prolonged for a further two years in Member States where there would be serious disturbances of the labour market or a threat of such a disruption.

In general, each existing Member State can decide how liberal its national measures are. Austria and Germany are the key target countries and have the right to apply flanking measures to address serious disturbances in specific sectors of their labour markets, which could arise in certain regions from cross-border provisions of services. Three of the Member States have indicated their intention not to restrict the entry of workers from the new Member States after enlargement (Kok, 2003, p. 38)[8].

Specific concerns of 'old' and 'new' Member States

In some Member States, the likelihood of increased inward migration from the acceding countries has become an important issue for the internal political agenda. In the majority of 'old' Member States, EU enlargement is mainly discussed with regard to its possible impact on the governance of the EU and on the re-distribution of structural funds. In the countries that are geographically close to the 'new' Member States, three additional questions are important:

- How quickly will citizens from the acceding countries be allowed to take up jobs in the existing EU countries?
- How much inflow will this trigger?
- What are the possible economic and social impacts?

There are economic concerns that there may be a further increase of already high internal unemployment rates by crowding out local blue collar and unqualified workers with better-qualified but also cheaper employees from the acceding countries. The possibility of negative impacts on wages has been raised by some trade unions. Social fears are voiced with regard to possible abuse of the existing welfare system and increased competition for cheap housing in inner city areas. Other concerns are expressed about the possibility of increased crime levels and the negative effects of a multicultural society.

In the acceding countries themselves, the possible labour market effects of accession are seen as 'double-edged'. Acceding countries with high levels of unemployment and low economic growth rates benefit by the migration of their low skilled and unqualified workers. This reduces their labour force and leaves fewer people without a job. Also, the remittance payments of migrant workers back home have a positive impact on income, consumption and demand. The emigration of higher qualified people, however, may erode a country's long-term competitive position. It is agreed that such a 'brain drain' has negative repercussions on the developmental process of a country (Commission of the European Communities 2002, p. 15).

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[8] A summary of EU policy measures related to mobility and migration in the social policy field are summarised in the Social Situation Report 2002 (Commission of the European Communities and Eurostat 2002, p. 19).

Doubts about a large influx of migrants

Four main arguments are usually developed which question the likelihood of a significant inflow of migrants from the acceding countries into the EU. Firstly, it is argued that a significant proportion of the overall potential of migrants from the acceding countries has already arrived in the existing EU Member States before accession has taken place. The available figures show that this led only to a small increase in the population of the 'old' Member States. In 1998, the 15 EU Member States hosted less than 900,000 citizens of central and eastern European countries (Commission of the European Communities, 2001).

Secondly, the demographic situation in the acceding countries is similar to the demographic situation in the EU. Fertility in the acceding and candidate countries is even lower than in the EU and mortality has increased, with the consequence of a decreasing population trend in the next 30 to 40 years. As a result, the employment chances for younger and better-educated people will increase in the acceding and candidate countries. Based on this trend, Fassmann and Muenz (2000) predict a decrease in the potential for migration.

Thirdly, transfer of resources for economic development, increased international trade and massive inwards investment will accompany the accession process of the new Member States. This will accelerate the economic development process and will give the new Member States a positive growth differential in relation to the 'old' Member States.

In addition, contrary to the predictions of economic theory, European employees have reacted little to the opportunity of free movement within a common labour market. Straubhaar provides an explanation and notes, 'To an important degree, trade has replaced the economic demand for migration in the EU' (2001a, p. 170).

Framework of the research

Based on these political concerns, the study will begin with an assessment of the potential to migrate from the acceding and candidate countries to the EU. It distinguishes between a general inclination, a basic intention and a firm intention to migrate. It measures the potential for migration on different levels using 'softer' and 'harder' indicators of the intention to migrate. It aims in this way to achieve a higher predictability for actual migration behaviour. However, even a technically sophisticated construction of the potential for migration, based on individual survey data, has to consider a significant gap between the potential to migrate and actual migration behaviour. Consequently, the empirical results have to be interpreted with some caution.

The main research interest of this study is not to predict the overall potential to migrate at a certain point in time ('stock of migrants'), but to focus on the 'who' and 'why' of potential migration behaviour: Which groups show the highest propensity to migrate? Why do people want to migrate? Which objective conditions are conducive to migration?[11]

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[11] Often the opposite question, 'why don't people want to migrate?' is even more important, particularly for groups of people who would be predicted to have a high propensity of mobility. Inertia to migrate is one of the most important research subjects with important policy implications (Fischer, 1999; Kalter, 1997). To deal with this question is, however, beyond the scope of this study.

The possible causes of migration are analysed at different levels:
- What are the explicit motives for migration? How important are economic motives in relation to personal and social motives?
- Which socio-economic conditions have the strongest influence on migration?
- How important is personal experience of unemployment and labour market status?
- What is the gender breakdown – are increasing numbers of women migrating?
- Which are the most important restrictions that impede a willingness to migrate?
- How important is income level and what influence does material deprivation have? Are material conditions a driver or a barrier for migration?
- What impact does the family situation make on a decision to migrate?
- Does the level of dissatisfaction and satisfaction in the home country influence the propensity to migrate? Is general satisfaction important, or is the decision based on satisfaction specific to certain life domains?

By providing a causal analysis at an individual level, the study uses the particular strength of the available data to understand migration behaviour and provide relevant policy advice. This kind of analysis cannot be provided by traditional econometric analysis, which can lead to misleading conclusions due to the effects of aggregating data.

Nonetheless, the study has some significant limitations, not least due to the available data. This is a secondary analysis of a larger survey, which was intended to measure the quality of life for citizens in the acceding and candidate countries. Regional mobility was regarded as one factor contributing to quality of life. Intentions to migrate to the EU are only a minor aspect in the whole study. Hence, certain important information, which is usually collected in migration studies, is not available. For example, there is no information on the target countries for migration, the length of intended stay in the target country or on specific activities in preparing for migration (looking for accommodation, looking for a work permit). The study cannot, therefore, construct income and unemployment differentials between the country of origin and the target country in order to predict the intention to migrate. It also cannot distinguish between different forms of migration. These forms may be characterised at one extreme as long term, relatively permanent and unidirectional or, at the other extreme, as semi-permanent migration with multiple ties, where migrants commute frequently between countries.

Secondly, the explanation of the intention to migrate based on socio-economic factors has to be mainly limited to 'push' factors based on the socio-economic conditions of potential migrants in their home country, as the survey provides no information on the target country. This limitation can be partly compensated by indicators on 'pull' factors towards migration, which cover relevant conditions in the host country (e.g. career and income prospects, welfare system).

In its conceptual analysis, the study will include not only the traditional push–pull factors or the traditional economic rationale for migration but will also develop concrete hypotheses emanating from newer migration concepts, which are mainly based on micro theories of migration. This approach also seems more appropriate for individual survey data, which allow the testing of individual attitudes towards migration.

A note on the composition of the data is available in annex one.

Overview

Bearing these limitations in mind, the study will discuss the migration potential into the EU. Chapter one provides a construction of the dependent variables and a quantitative estimate of the expected migration potential. These results will be compared with the estimates of a recent econometric study of the European Commission.

The second chapter aims at an analysis of the socio-economic conditions for migration. Age, gender, education, employment and marital status will be discussed as five major influence factors. The motives for migration, as expressed by the potential migrants themselves, are the focus of chapter three. It presents traditional economic motives and motives related to the family and dissatisfaction with the actual place of living.

Chapter four focuses on the effect of income level, deprivation and perceived economic strain. This is followed in chapter five by an analysis of the relationship between subjective quality of life and intended migration. How significant are overall life satisfaction and satisfaction in certain life domains for the willingness to migrate into the EU?

Chapter six provides a multivariate analysis, including the various indicators used in the bi-variate analysis. This rounds up the empirical analysis. Chapter seven draws conclusions relating to policy.

Annex one outlines the basis of the data. For further reading, an overview of relevant concepts of migration is provided in annex two. It presents both well-known traditional economic and social concepts of migration, or the push–pull approach, and also newer concepts of migration, including approaches covering relative deprivation and the perpetuation of migration.

1. Migration into the EU

[14] Migration has always been an interdisciplinary subject with contributions in sociology, economics, demography, political science, ethnology, social psychology and other fields (Kalter 1997).

[15] In addition, the concepts have to be useful developing hypothesis for a specific kind of migration by focusing on attitudes towards regional mobility from the Candidate Countries towards the EU within a wider context of migration, which ranges from intra regional to intercontinental mobility.

[16] A good overview is provided by OECD (2001).

[17] This useful avenue of theoretical reflection on migration will be, however, excluded, as the existing empirical data do not provide any information on the relationship between expected utilities and costs of respondents in different target areas of migration.

[18] See for example Kalter (1997:15-16)

[19] The last question has attracted a lot of attention in micro theoretical contributions of migration as it provides a challenge to the dominating models of rational choice. "The biggest problem with the application of a cost-benefit-model to human migration many not be the crudeness of the actual calculation, but the fact that many people never make any calculation at all. A great number of non-migrants we interviewed appear to have never given any serious consideration to the thought of moving anywhere" (Speare, 1971: 130).

[20] One important objective in this context is to develop a general theory of migration and to integrate it into a general theory of human behaviour. Other approaches can be found in research on human ecology (e.g. Duncan 1959) and on world systems theory (Wallerstein 1974). In addition there are relevant contribution to migration from ethnology, demography and political science.

[21] Here, demand factors from developed economies as well as supply factors from peripheral economies are of importance for the explanation of regional mobility.

[22] It defines social actors as: Resourceful, Restricted, Evaluating, Expecting, Maximising, Man.

[23] SEU stands for 'subjective expected utility'.

[24] An excellent example is provided in the IOM study (1999).

[25] The standard model is the Harris and Todaro approach (1970).

[26] One empirical problem of the concept of neoclassical migration theory on the macro level is the asymmetric relationship between migration and wage level. As there is a clear positive statistical relationship between high regional wage level and emigration into an area, there is no clear-cut statistical negative relationship between low wage level in areas of origin and high immigration rates.

[27] Theories of relative deprivation were strongly supported by empirical studies on migration from Mexico into the United States (Stark and Taylor 1989). 'Controlling for initial absolute income and the expected gains from migration, the propensity of a household to participate in international migration was directly related to the household's initial relative deprivation' (Stark and Taylor 1991: 1163). One specific risk for a household using an income strategy to reduce its relative deprivation is a substitution of the community of origin as the relevant reference group by the host community. Under this condition households may fail to reduce relative deprivation, even if their relative income in relation to the income distribution of their community of origin has increased. Migration towards areas with strong social networks of sending countries may provide a barrier for such a reference group substitution.

[28] These pull effects in receiving countries are strongly underlined within the context of the dual labour market theory, which argues that migration is caused by a chronic and unavoidable demand for foreign workers of modern industrial societies. One important pull factor is based on a rigid notion about the relationship between occupational status and pay in EU labour markets. If there is a shortage of unqualified labour a wage increase in such labour markets would trigger a wage increase in the whole labour market in order to sustain existing wage differentials. Attracting native workers by raising entry wages of unqualified jobs is thus expensive and disruptive. A cheaper solution is opening up of this labour market segment to migrant workers, which accept the existing low wages without upsetting the current wage differential.

[29] The dual labour market theory predicts also a developing economic dualism with a capital intensive, high paid and high skilled and low unemployment prone primary sector and a volatile, low qualified and low pay secondary labour market. Due to the lack of career prospects and the higher unemployment risk it may be difficult to attract native workers under certain conditions into the secondary labour market. To fill these shortfalls companies may turn to immigrants in the Candidate Countries

[30] In theoretical terms the weakness of the model of Lee is the missing conceptual link explaining the precise relationship and order of importance between the four overarching factors and their individual components. It remains unclear, how an overall utility function is achieved.

Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of the potential to migrate from east to west in an enlarging European Union when the acceding countries (AC 10) join the European Union in 2004. It looks at migration from all 13 acceding and candidate countries (ACC 13). The focus is on voluntary migration rather than on enforced migration[39]. In addition, all predictions for a potential to migrate into the EU are based on the assumption of a free movement of persons, which is currently limited through the Accession Treaties for the new Member States and through additional restrictions for the remaining three candidate countries.

Within this remit, the chapter describes the construction of the dependent variables. This has to be seen against the background of five important conceptual dimensions: 1) the gap between intention and behaviour to migrate, 2) the use of 'softer' and 'harder' indicators, 3) the conceptualisation of migration as a process, 4) migration to the EU in the context of different target areas of migration, and 5) the existence of different forms of migration.

1. Gap between intention and behaviour

An important limitation of survey-based studies is the gap between observed intentions to migrate and actual migration behaviour. Kalter (2000, p. 463f) gives a brief overview of the theoretical and empirical research, which shows that, even though a strong intention to migrate is the most important factor in predicting actual migration, the many variations in migration behaviour are explained by external factors. Theoretical approaches to explain this gap refer, first of all, to the theory of 'reasoned action' by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980). This theory predicts, unsurprisingly, a direct relationship between the strength of a specific intention for action and the activity itself. The intention is determined on the one hand by an

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[31] Within his concept Wolpert also highlights the difficulty to evaluate conditions in the target regions. He assumes that factual migration into the target area may provide for the potential migrant a proxy to establish its place utility. An individual tends to move to places, with a higher perceived utility, if he can reduce at the same time the level of uncertainty. "Thus the flow of population reflects a subjective place utility evaluation by individuals"(Wolpert 1965: 162).

[32] That means this model is based like economic micro theory on a maximising rational choice model.

[33] Kalter (1997) rightly stresses the advantages of the SEU approach in relation to other micro theories of migration and suggests it should substitute the widely used push-pull-model. The SEU model is integrated in a general theory of social action and not just a specific theory for migration. It has the capability to integrate economic, demographic, social, psychological and other individual factors. It is also open for a multi-level approach integrating macro and meso data into the model.

[34] In a further development the SEU theory has to consider the phenomena of inertia, which seems to contradict the rational choice paradigm. The starting point is the widespread inertia, which is seen by some scholars as a given psychological factor in migration behaviour (Fairchild 1925, Lee 1972). According to Lee the importance of push and pull factors for migration have to be larger than the existing 'natural inertia' (Lee 1972: 119f).

[35] This relationship will be tested in a follow-up report.

[36] As far as hypothesises for migration are concerned the basic question is, if the same factors are influencing all steps of the process, or if the second step is more strongly influenced by general factors of dissatisfaction with the actual place of living and the third stage is more influenced by a comparative and wide ranging rational choice approach.

[37] There is also a declining risk combined with the development and structuring of a network. When networks are well developed, they make it virtually risk-free and costless to migrate. In this way migration is seen as a self-sustaining diffusion process.

[38] The wage differential is usually measured as difference in purchasing power.

[39] Enforced migration is based on political, social or ethnic discrimination, effects of wars or natural disasters.

attitude favourable to a specific action and, on the other, by the perceived social pressure in favour of a specific action.

To explain the gap, Ajzen (1991) enlarges his approach with the theory of 'planned behaviour', conceptualising with 'perceived behavioural control' a third set of indicators. These describe the subjectively perceived control of one's own behaviour. They include two components: internal factors directly related to planned behaviour (information, abilities, skills, emotions) and under full personal control; and external factors, defined by existing opportunities and dependency on others. The more behaviour that is dependent on external control, the larger the gap between observed intentions and actual behaviour. With this construct, it is possible to integrate external barriers and missing opportunities into the explanation of actual migration behaviour[40].

In addition, empirical research provides some justification, in particular the study of Gordon and Molho (1995). The authors refer to results from a 1980 British survey of actual and potential migration behaviour, which shows that at least 90% of potential migrants have moved within five years, half of them even within one year after the interview.

2. 'Softer' and 'harder' indicators

In order to narrow the gap between the predicted behaviour, based on survey data, and actual migration behaviour, it is useful to reflect on the type of indicators used and how they measure the 'strength' of the predicted migration potential. There is an implicit assumption of achieving a higher predictability by using 'harder' indicators. 'Softer' indicators regarding migration potential usually measure a general attitude or willingness to migrate.

A typical question is used in the Eurobarometer survey from April 2002: 'Do you intend to go to live and work – for a few months or for several years – in a current EU country in the next five years?' The answer categories are 'yes' and 'no'. The indicator covers an extremely wide field of different kinds of migration, provides a wide time span and permits different motives for migration. By providing a yes-no dichotomy, it lacks any graduation of strength. Predictions of actual migration behaviour based on such types of indicators have to allow for a high degree of uncertainty and vagueness.

An alternative approach uses 'hard' indicators, which measure a series of concrete activities preparing for possible migration. Strong indicators might be, have you: 'asked for a work permit' or 'sold property' in the country of origin. Indicators of medium-level strength include activities such as learning a foreign language and contacting people in the target country (IOM, 1999; Fassmann and Hintermann, 1997).

However, even such an approach has its limits, as pointed out by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 1999, p. 17): 'We cannot assume that everyone who expresses an interest in migration will actually migrate. We cannot simply multiply the responses to the survey by the population, to obtain a figure for likely migration. The responses… represent only an approximation of the interest to migrate'.

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[40] The following hypothesis can be deducted: the higher the barrier to access the labour and housing market, the larger the gap between intended and actual migration. Secondly, the higher the complexity of administrative procedures in the target country, the higher the gap.

3. Migration as a process

The use of different indicators also reflects the conceptualisation of migration as a process going through different phases[41]. The initial phase may be characterised by inertia against migration; a second phase as developing an inclination to migration by overcoming the 'natural inertia' and integrating the possibility of migrating into the potentially perceived alternatives of action. A third step is developing a concrete intention to migrate by comparing the different alternatives, e.g. within a rational choice model and giving a target area a higher usefulness than the existing place of living. Finally, there may be actual migration behaviour.

This study will identify indicators within the second and third phase by defining, on the one hand, a 'general inclination to migrate into the EU' (overcoming inertia) and, on the other, a 'firm intention to migrate into the EU' (defining a concrete target area) [42].

4. Migration into the EU, among other alternatives

Within the realm of the present study, the intention to migrate into the EU is measured within the context of other alternatives of regional mobility. It covers varying degrees of proximity: moving within the existing city or village, moving within the same region, moving to another region within the same country, moving into the EU, moving within Europe as a whole and, finally, moving abroad to another continent.

In addition, the study includes a separate indicator of moving into the European Union and moving into a country with another language. The present study is well aware of the possible interrelationship between the intended mobility towards different target areas. Mobility to another region or migrating outside Europe may in fact be a first step to moving into the EU. Therefore, comprehensive models explaining the reasons to move into the EU would have to control for those factors. This is, however, beyond the scope of this study, which will focus solely on the intention to migrate into the EU.

5. Different forms of migration

The construction of an indicator measuring the intention to migrate should consider the different forms of migration. Previously, migration was considered as a unidirectional and relatively permanent mobility towards a receiving country. The IOM (1999, pp. 15-16) distinguishes three main kinds of migration: traditional permanent migration, long-term temporary migration and short-term labour migration, which includes seasonal work, casual work and even cross-border commuting[43].

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[41] A good example for such an approach can be found in Kalter, 1997.

[42] The phases in this model follow a clearly defined sequential order. The time span between the different transitions is, however, variable. It is possible that a potential migrant decides quasi spontaneously to migrate and runs through these different phases in a small time interval, or it may take several months or even years to move from one phase to another.

[43] Other scholars refer to semi-permanent migration as 'transnational mobility' and 'transnational social spaces' (Faist, 2000; Kalter, 2003). Here, migrants keep multiple ties with their country of origin, 'sometimes commuting frequently between both contexts, thus organising their life in a bi- or multi-local respective transnational way. Transnational mobility goes hand in hand with an existence in two societies, which may lead to hybrid culture identity' (Fassmann, 2002, p. 31). Its ultimate aim is often not to leave but to remain connected to the country of origin. Unfortunately, the present study cannot provide such a distinction, as the Eurobarometer survey does not include this information.

Based on these five considerations, the key dependent variables of the study have been constructed.

Measuring the potential to migrate east–west

The study measures the attitudes towards migration into the EU at three different levels: 1) general inclination to migrate, 2) basic intention to migrate, and 3) firm intention to migrate.

A general inclination to migrate reflects a basic attitude towards migration to the EU. The questionnaire includes a direct question: 'Do you intend to go to live and work – for a few months or for several years – in a current European Union country in the next five years?' In order to control the validity of the answers to this question and to construct the indicator on the general inclination to migrate, positive answers to this question are combined with the results of two other questions, which measure intentions towards regional mobility in the next five years. In this respect, two questions are asked: 'Do you intend to move in the next five years?' and, if the answer is positive: 'In the next five years, do you intend to move to another city, town or village within the same region; to another region within the same country; to another country in Europe; or to live in a country outside Europe?' Respondents answering positively to the combined indicator can be regarded as having overcome their 'natural inertia' against migration and having a general inclination to migrate into the EU.

A basic intention to migrate provides a stronger indicator. It selects those who responded positively that they intend to migrate into the EU and who also chose the response option 'to another country in Europe' to the question regarding intended regional mobility in the next five years. The indicator identifies Europe as the specific target, thus narrowing the possible target area. Unfortunately, the question gives no indication about the intensity of the intention to migrate.

A firm intention to migrate to the EU provides the strongest measurement within this study. It should provide the highest degree of probability to predict actual migration behaviour by capturing, at least partly, the intensity of the intention to migrate. It has been measured with the help of four variables – three of them have already been used to measure the 'basic intention'. In addition, these answers are controlled by a fourth indicator, which measures the willingness to live in a country with a foreign language. The question was 'How willing would you be to live in another European country, where the language is different from your mother tongue?' To accept explicitly the challenges in migrating to a country with another language provides an indicator of 'medium level' strength of the seriousness to migrate. The response categories vary from 'very much', to 'some extent', 'not much' and 'not at all'. The indicator of a firm intention to migrate includes only those respondents who answered 'very much' to this question. This study aims to capture the strength of the intention to migrate by using a more sophisticated scale.

The study has opted for an inclusive approach covering all relevant indicators provided in the questionnaire. In moving from softer to harder measurements it is only partially using harder indicators but it eliminates logical contradictions between answers to different questions and identifies those respondents with the highest consistency as the ones with the

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[44] The dimension 'within the same city, town or village' has not been included.

highest probability of migrating. Unfortunately, the measurement of the intention to migrate within the Eurobarometer survey lacks important indicators of the strength of the intention to migrate, which have been used in previous studies.

The IOM (1999) approach to measure migration potential, for example, is twofold: first of all, it distinguishes the length of intended migration between permanent, long-term temporary and short-term temporary. This distinction is not possible and poses a serious limitation for the present study. Secondly, it measures the strength of intended migration by using concrete activities preparing migration. All in all, it encompasses eight indicators[46], meaning that, in methodological terms, it provides the most satisfactory approach.

The present study provides a prudent assessment of different strengths of intention for migration by combining and controlling different relevant indicators. It also provides information on a gradual decision-making process, as it distinguishes between overcoming a 'natural inertia' to migration and identifying more specific target areas in a later phase. However, it has its limitations as far as hard indicators for the intention of migration are concerned. The study cannot provide a distinction by intended duration of the migration period. It lacks a longitudinal dimension, a family focus on decision-making and a measurement of concrete preparatory activities for migration.

Indicators used to construct dependent variables

The previous section discussed the general construction of the dependent variables, based on five different indicators. This section provides a short description of the overall distribution of the five indicators, combined with a breakdown by groupings of countries. For statistical reasons, the study cannot provide a country breakdown of results. The following country groupings will be used (see note on data in annex one):
- Bulgaria and Romania
- Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia
- Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia
- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

Results for Turkey and Poland will each be displayed separately. The report will note when large disparities arise for specific variables within the various country groupings.

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[45] IOM (1999) identifies two short-comings of the Fassmann and Hintermann study as it provides no distinction in regard of the length of migration and no recognition of the family situation.
[46] These indicators are to: learn a foreign language, obtain qualifications, sell property, obtain information, apply for jobs, find somewhere to live, apply for permit and contact people.
[47] 'If you could improve your work or living conditions, how willing or unwilling would you be to move outside your country?' (five point scale)
[48] 'How important do you think it is to have lived in your own country for most of one's life?' (four point scale).
[49] ' How close to you feel to your country?' (four point scale).

Table 1: *% of persons expressing intentions of migration across countries*

	Intention to go to live and work in EU within five years*	Intention to move within five years**	Intention to move further than locally within five years***	Intention to move to EU in the next five years**** (as a % of population)	Intention to move to EU in the next five years (as a % of future mobility, second column)
Poland	16.4 (274)	17.2 (304)	8.8 (159)	1.8 (32)	11.5 (32)
Bulgaria, Romania	23.5 (324)	15.7 (251)	6.2 (117)	3.3 (60)	26.3 (60)
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	9.7 (163)	16.4 (273)	6.6 (125)	1.1 (19)	7.8 (19)
Turkey	34.0 (681)	26.9 (536)	9.6 (199)	0.8 (19)	3.3 (19)
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia	11.3 (268)	17.5 (425)	5.9 (168)	1.1 (35)	7.4 (35)
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	15.6 (395)	19.2 (490)	6.5 (206)	2.1 (63)	14.4 (63)
AC 10	14.1 (1,100)	17.4 (1,492)	7.4 (658)	1.5 (149)	10.1 (149)
ACC 13	23.2 (2,105)	20.5 (2,279)	8.0 (974)	1.6 (228)	8.9 (228)

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
* Q.67 in the questionnaire
** Q.59 in the questionnaire
*** locally = within the same city, town, village. Q.59 and Q.60.b to Q60.e
**** Q.60d in the questionnaire
Figures in parentheses indicate the actual number of respondents

The first information regarding migration is provided by the question on the intention to live and work for an unspecified time, between several months or several years[50], in one of the Member States of the EU. The first column in table one gives a breakdown according to the various country groupings. Overall, nearly a quarter (23%) of the interviewees show a general interest for regional mobility towards the EU. Between the different country groupings, the figures differ greatly. In Turkey, more than one third of the population (34%) is generally interested in migrating, whereas the interest in Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia (10%) is more than three times lower. Not surprisingly, considering the economic and social conditions, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia (11%) have also a lower general interest in migration. The only other countries which come close to the high figure for Turkey are Romania and Bulgaria with 24%. All other countries are in the range of between 15 and 18%. The results show a significant difference of 9 percentage points between the general inclination to migrate in the ACC 13 and in the AC 10 countries.

In the second column of table one, the general prospects of geographical mobility are presented. Overall, one fifth (21%) of the citizens of the ACC intend to move in the next five years. Again, the highest intention for mobility is in Turkey, where more than one quarter (27%) of the people want to move. This tallies with another result, which shows that 38% of all Turkish citizens have already moved in the last 10 years. On average, Turks move 2.26 times, well above the average in the 13 ACC. [51].

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[50] It intends to exclude short time migrants, who commute frequently.
[51] More details can be found in the Social Situation report, 2002 (Commission of the European Communities et al, 2002)

The second largest overall mobility can be found in the Baltic countries, at nearly 20%. Interestingly, Hungary and Slovenia are also at this same high level. All other country groupings are around 16%. At the other end of the scale, only 8% of the Maltese think that they will move in the next five years. In general, Malta has the lowest frequency of geographical mobility. Even among the respondents who moved in the last 10 years, the vast majority (nearly 90%) have only moved once in this period. The Maltese seem to have a consistently low ratio of mobility.

The third single indicator (third column) covers the intention to move outside the local area in the next five years. This indicator excludes those respondents who only want to move locally within the same city, town or village. This more specific measurement of regional mobility leads to a significant reduction in the propensity towards mobility in comparison with the first two indicators. Overall, 8% in the candidate countries and 7% in the acceding countries intend to move outside their local environment in the next five years. It is remarkable that the gap between the ACC 13 and AC 10 has narrowed to less than 1%.

Also, the ranking of the various country groupings is altered by this variable, which indicates the measurement of different dimensions than the previous two variables. Turkey remains the country with the highest propensity to regional mobility at nearly 10%. Poland follows in second place with 9%. The low propensity in Romania and Bulgaria is notable, giving it the second lowest value at 6%. This represents a strong change of order compared with the previous indicator, where Poland was the fourth highest and the Baltic countries were second highest. The pattern changes also at the lower end, where Hungary/Czech Republic/Slovakia have the lowest propensity for regional mobility.

The next step focuses on the intended mobility to another EU country within the next five years (fifth column of table one). Overall, 9% of the citizens in the acceding and candidate countries, who have a general inclination for regional mobility, intend to move to another EU country. The propensity for the AC 10 is slightly higher, at 10%. In comparison with column three, this leads to the following result: citizens in the AC 10 have a slightly lower propensity for regional mobility than in the ACC 13 but, if they are open for regional mobility, their intention is more directed towards the EU.

At a country level, the Romanians and Bulgarians have by far the highest percentage with 26%. Bulgaria itself has a value of nearly 40%, i.e. of the population in Bulgaria which is regionally mobile, four out of ten want to migrate to an EU country. In the Baltic countries, the proportion is less than half that, at 14%. Surprisingly, the lowest figure can be found in Turkey, with 3%. So it appears that Turkey has by far the highest regionally mobile population of all the 13 acceding and candidate countries but, of that regionally mobile population, it has the lowest percentage wanting to migrate into the EU. Turkish regional mobility seems to be directed more towards internal Turkish target areas inside or outside the same region. A strong hypothesis would suggest rather an intention to move from the poorer eastern parts of Turkey to the more affluent western parts of the country[52]. A lower proportion of generally mobile people aiming for the EU can also be found in Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia and in the three central European countries.

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[52] This needs to be investigated in a further research report.

This study relates the intention to move into another European country to the total population of each ACC. Together, 1.6% of the respondents of the 13 acceding and candidate countries have an intention to move (fourth column in table one). Countries in the AC 10 show the same propensity, at 1.5%. In Bulgaria and Romania, more than 3% of the population wants to migrate within the next five years. The second highest are the three Baltic countries, at just over 2%. The lowest figures, at around 1%, are in Turkey, Hungary/Czech Republic/Slovakia and in the two new southern Member States and Slovenia. The result for Turkey is obviously most surprising as it moves within the five indicators from a dominant first place to last place. This should be a clear warning against basing the estimation of migration potential on only one indicator.

A comparison of column four with column one also gives a clear indication of the reduced number of respondents when the questions move from more general indicators to more specific indicators. In column one, more than 2,000 respondents in the acceding and candidate countries and more than 1,000 in the acceding countries show a general interest in migration into the EU in the next five years. However, when it comes to the concrete intention for regional mobility towards the current Member States (column four), the number of respondents has fallen to around 150 for the AC 10 and to around 230 for the ACC 13.

Table 2: *Breakdown of persons by willingness to live in another European country (where the language is different from their mother tongue) across countries*

	Very much	To some extent	Not much	Not at all	All
Poland	8.6 (146)	29.2 (540)	17.4 (354)	44.9 (884)	100.0
Bulgaria, Romania	15.2 (224)	19.5 (328)	12.6 (264)	52.8 (1,146)	100.0
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	7.9 (135)	21.3 (379)	18.3 (320)	52.4 (1,104)	100.0
Turkey	19.4 (387)	19.5 (432)	20.2 (413)	41.0 (749)	100.0
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia	5.9 (154)	22.5 (685)	16.8 (557)	54.8 (1,552)	100.0
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	7.6 (196)	23.4 (664)	21.1 (613)	47.9 (1,377)	100.0
AC 10	7.4 (631)	25.8 (2,268)	17.6 (1,844)	49.2 (4,917)	100.0
ACC 13	13.2 (1,242)	22.3 (3,028)	17.6 (2,521)	46.9 (6,812)	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Figures in parentheses indicate the actual number of respondents

The last step describes the intensity of the willingness to live in another European country with another mother tongue, on a scale from 'very much', to 'some extent', 'not much' and 'not at all' (see table two). 13% of all citizens in the acceding and candidate countries have a high degree of willingness to move; nearly half (47%) have no intention at all and nearly a fifth (18%) say that they are 'not much interested' in living in another European country. All together, two thirds are relatively immobile and a third are more mobile. The AC 10 show the same overall result with one significant variation: only 7% have a strong willingness to live in another country. Half of the population has no intention at all to move.

Looking in more detail at the group with the highest intention, Turkey (19%) and Bulgaria/Romania (15%) are top of the list. All other country groupings have single digit figures between 6 and 8%. Looking at the other end of the spectrum, citizens from Cyprus and Malta show a high resistance to move. More than two thirds of respondents from those countries (taking out Slovenia from the aggregated 52% figure above) are not at all willing

to move to another European country. They are followed by Hungarians, Czechs and Slovakians with 55%. Even a significant part of the Turkish population is completely unwilling to move (41%). The conclusion is that, even in those countries with an average high mobility, significant parts of the population are extremely immobile.

The results in this section need some interpretation, as they show two different patterns of intention towards regional mobility related to two different sets of indicators. Direct questions measure the general interest to migrate into the EU in its own right; while other questions relate the regional mobility towards the EU with different types of alternative target areas. In the latter case, the intention of the question is to direct the respondent to compare different target areas for regional mobility. Those questions provide, therefore, a higher and more complex level of measuring the intention for future migration than direct questions that do not consider the contextual framework of the respondent.

This means, for example, that, if Turkish respondents are asked about their regional mobility towards the EU, they show an extremely high incidence for migration. If, however, the intention for regional mobility is measured within the context of a menu of alternative target areas, most Turkish respondents choose target areas within Turkey instead of the EU.

These results confirm also the need for prudence with regard to the construction of the three complex indicators for migration towards the EU. Questions 66 and 67 of the present Eurobarometer questionnaire cannot be taken as face value questions, but have to be systematically related to the range of questions measuring mobility towards the EU in the overall framework of regional mobility.

Comparing the dependent variables

Based on the empirical description of the five single indicators which have been used to construct the three dependent variables, this section will provide an overview of the three key dependent variables: the general inclination, basic intention and firm intention to migrate into the EU. As this study discusses migration in a broader quality of life context, the intention to migrate is calculated for the whole population of the acceding and candidate countries from 15 years of age onwards. The report considers not only labour market aspects but also a variety of other rationales for migration including personal reasons to be re-united with the family or poor housing conditions.

Table 3: *% of persons by various intention of migration across countries*

	General inclination	Basic intention	Firm intention
Poland	3.7 (63)	1.6 (27)	1.0 (16)
Bulgaria, Romania	5.0 (84)	3.2 (57)	2.0 (31)
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	2.1 (38)	0.8 (14)	0.7 (11)

[54] As in questions 59, 60b to 60e of the Eurobarometer questionnaire.
[55] As discussed in chapter 2 the reader has to be careful to make a direct extrapolation as far as the actual migration behaviour is concerned based on these figures.
[56] This approach differs from other studies, where a narrow labour market perspective has been chosen. Consequently, those studies base their estimate of migration potential on a population sample between 15 and 65 years of age. In order to allow comparability and to cover labour market aspects more in detail, the report will present those figures at the end of the chapter in table four.
[57] As the differences are relatively small, decimal figures are used to describe the results.

Turkey	6.2 (136)	0.8 (18)	0.3 (7)
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia	2.4 (59)	0.8 (26)	0.6 (17)
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	3.5 (112)	2.0 (58)	0.8 (25)
AC 10	3.1 (272)	1.3 (125)	0.8 (69)
ACC 13	4.6 (492)	1.5 (200)	0.9 (107)

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Figures in parentheses indicate the actual number of respondents

According to the first column in table three, 4.6% of citizens in the acceding and candidate countries have a general inclination to move[58]. This is reduced to 1.5% as far as the basic intention to migration is concerned, and further reduced to just under 1% (0.9%) for the firm intention to move from the ACC into the EU. This means that only one-fifth of the population that has a general inclination for migration is to be regarded as a 'hard core' group, where a higher probability of actual migration can be predicted. The AC 10 show a similar trend at a lower level. It is remarkable, however, that the difference between the two groups of countries is reduced from 1.5% with regard to the general inclination to 0.1% with regard to the firm intention to migrate. On the basis of these results, one can predict the same propensity to migrate in the acceding countries as in the acceding and candidate countries.

Not surprisingly, the highest general inclination to migrate is shown in Turkey with 6.2% and in Bulgaria/Romania with 5%. Bulgaria itself reaches similar levels to Turkey. The people in Malta/Slovenia/Cyprus have less inclination to migrate, at around 2%. Within this grouping, the Maltese are least inclined, at 1.3%. The Hungary/Czech Republic/Slovakia group has only a slightly higher migration potential (2.4%). This means, for EU policy in the pre-accession phase, that the larger groups of potential migrants are outside the 10 acceding countries. The highest percentages in the group of acceding countries are Poland and the three Baltic countries at around 3.5%, which is still a significantly lower migration potential than the candidate countries.

The basic intention to migrate to the EU is displayed in column two of table three. This indicator measures the respondent's intention to migrate to the EU within the context of all other relevant target areas for migration. Hence, it forces the respondent to make a clear choice. Overall, 1.5% of all respondents in the acceding and candidate countries have a basic intention to migrate into the EU. Bulgaria/Romania is the only country with an elevated figure of 3.2%. The three Baltic countries have a higher than average intention to migrate, at 2%. Three clusters of 0.8% each are found at the lower end. The only surprising result among these is Turkey, which is shown to prefer local migration, as has been already discussed.

The final indicator covers the firm intention to migrate by cross checking the basic intention to migrate with a high degree of willingness to live in another European country, where the language is different from one's mother tongue. In three country clusters, around 0.5% of the population has a firm intention to migrate into the EU: the southern European acceding countries and Slovenia, the central European countries and Turkey. Bulgaria/Romania are highest at 2%. The highest country result is in Bulgaria with 2.5% and the lowest in Malta and Turkey with 0.1-0.3%. At 1%, Poland has the second highest firm intention for migration into the European Union in the next five years.

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[58] As the differences are relatively small, decimal figures are used to describe the results.

The next step controls if these trends can be confirmed, if one focuses on the active labour market population. Table four displays the figures for the general, basic and firm intention to migrate for the age group 15 to 65. Looking at the overall results for the country groupings and for the three indicators reveals only minor changes. The general inclination increases by 0.6% and the firm intention remains nearly stable. The migration potential in Bulgaria/Romania rises higher than the relative increases for other countries, i.e. by 1.3 percentage points for general inclination and by half a percentage point for firm intention. In general, however, most countries show only small changes. Consequently, the results of this study can be used for comparisons with other studies, which focus exclusively on the labour market active population.

Table 4: *% of persons aged 15-65 by various intention of migration across countries*

	General inclination	Basic intention	Firm intention
Poland	4.3 (62)	1.8 (26)	1.1 (15)
Bulgaria, Romania	6.3 (84)	4.0 (57)	2.5 (31)
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	2.5 (36)	1.0 (13)	0.8 (10)
Turkey	6.3 (135)	0.8 (18)	0.3 (7)
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia	2.9 (57)	1.0 (25)	0.8 (16)
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	4.0 (112)	2.3 (58)	0.9 (25)
AC 10	3.7 (267)	1.5 (122)	1.0 (66)
ACC 13	5.2 (486)	1.7 (197)	1.0 (104)

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2000
Figures in parentheses indicate the actual number of respondents

In summary, the actual intention to migrate to Europe two years before accession, in May 2004, was relatively low in the AC 10 and ACC 13. Considering all sorts of measurement errors, which usually lead to an overestimation of the propensity to migrate on the basis of individual survey data, the present study shows a general inclination of between 3% (acceding countries) and 4.6% (candidate countries) with just 1.5% of the populations in the ACC expressing a basic intention and 1% expressing a firm intention towards migration.

Comparison with a recent macro study

A comparison can be made between the estimates for migration potential based on the Eurobarometer survey from 2002, as outlined in this report, and results from a recent econometric study of the European Commission (2001) on 'The impact of eastern enlargement on employment and labour markets in the EU and Member States'.

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[59] E.g. including various countries of Ex-Yugoslavia or the Ukraine.

[60] More standardisation and a better testing for reliability and validity seems advisable for the future

[61] This means, it covers not only migration towards the EU.

[62] According to the authors of the IOM (1999: 23) study these results show 'little permanent migration' and confirm only a 'certain amount of long-term migration'. However, compared with other available studies these results seem extremely high.

[63] Namely for Bulgaria and Romania.

[64] In addition one finds some country specific studies: Berencsi et al (1995) envisage for Hungary permanent migration of 1.3%, 2.7% of migration for several years and 3.8% to migrate for several weeks. These findings are in line with opinion poll results reported by Borjas (1999), in which 3-4% of Hungarians showed a willingness to work abroad and 1-2% wanted to emigrate. Aasland (1996) predicts, for Latvia, a migration potential of 3% of the resident population. Both individual country results are in line with the results of the present study.

Comparability is not easy as both studies use different methodologies. The present study is based on individual survey data, with all its advantages and disadvantages in predicting actual migration behaviour. This study predicts the possible increase in migration stock in the 'old' EU Member States within the next five years, i.e. by the end of 2006. Its key dependent variable are various estimated migration rates in the country of origin as a percentage of the population who are 15 years and older.

The study of the Commission uses a macro economic approach in order to estimate annual migration flows between 2002 and 2030[66]. Unlike the present study, the Commission only includes 10 of the acceding and candidate countries, leaving out the three southern states, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey. The coefficients for the estimation of the migration potential are based on time series data of the migration flows to Germany in the period 1967 to 1998. Its key dependent variable is the annual change in the ratio of the stock of migrants to the population in the receiving country. The theoretical assumptions are based on the human capital paradigm of migration. The empirical model follows mainly the Harris and Todaro model (1970) and the more recent British approach by Hatton (1995).

As independent variables, the Commission model uses the following sets of indicators: the difference of per capita purchasing power parity, the employment rate in the home and host countries, the ratio of the stock of migrants to the home population and other institutional variables. In addition, the model is estimated with the help of country specific effects to control for culture, policy, language, distance, etc (Commission of the European Communities, 2001, p. 96). For the dynamic analysis, two additional basic assumptions are made as far as the baseline projection is concerned: that the GDP gap between old and new Member States converges by two percentage points per year; and that the unemployment rates are stable.

Based on these assumptions, the study estimates an increase of the stock of migrants from 1.16 million in 2002 to 3.9 million in 2030. The annual flow figures decrease from 340,000 in 2002 to under 3,000 in 2030.

Due to the different methodologies, the two studies can only be compared on the basis of estimated changes in the stock figures in 10 acceding and candidate countries between 2002 and 2006. For this comparison, the following calculations have to be made for the Commission study: the predicted number of the stock of migrants is 1.16 million in 2002 and 2.25 million in 2006[67]. This results in a predicted increase of 1.1 million migrants in the time span 2002 to 2006 for the 10 acceding and candidate countries.

In order to make the present study comparable, it has to provide results for the three dependent variables for the 10 countries included in the Commission's study. The results are as follows:
- General inclination ACC 10: 3.7%
- Basic intention ACC 10: 1.8%

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[65] These are extensively discussed in chapter two.

[66] A critique of these kind of methodological approaches can be found for example in Fassmann and Muenz (2002, p.61f)

[67] The following calculation was used, based on tables 7.10 and 7.11 (Commission of the European Communities, 2001, pp. 104-105): 1.99 million (stock 2005) plus 0.25 million (flow; 2006) adds up to 2.24 million by the end of 2006.

- Firm intention ACC 10: 1.2%

In the next step, it has to calculate the population in the ACC 10 for the age groups 15 years and older. The total population for the ACC 10 on the first of January 2001 was 102 million (Eurostat, 2002). Subtracting the population under 15 years of age (around 19.5 million) provides a total number of 82.5 million inhabitants in the 10 acceding and candidate countries who are 15 years of age and older. Multiplying this basic figure with the three coefficients provides the following predicted increase in the migration stock, up to the end of 2006:
- General inclination: 3.05 million
- Basic intention: 1.48 million
- Firm intention: one million (990,000)

The result of the comparison is that both methods lead to similar results. They predict an increase in the total number of migrants from the 10 eastern European acceding and candidate countries of between one and 1.1 million people having a firm intention to migrate in the years up to the end of 2006 to the old Member States of the EU.

Conclusion

The measurement and the prediction of the volume of future migration into the EU from the acceding and candidate countries is a difficult subject politically and in methodological terms. The present study concurs with the results of most serious micro studies that the EU should not expect a tidal wave of emigrants from the ACC. All indicators point to a similar volume experienced following the southern enlargement of the EU in the 1980s.

It is remarkable that the present study also concurs with the recent econometric study of the Commission from 2001. Both studies predict an increase of around 1.1 million migrants from the east within the next five years. This study shows a wide migration potential towards the EU of between 1.8 and 3.7%, and a narrow potential of around 1.2%, excluding any return migration. These results are also in line with studies of Layard et al (1994) and of Straubhaar (2001b). They estimate, over 15 years, a gross migration rate of the home population of around 3-4% and a net potential of 1.5-2% from the eastern European acceding and candidate countries (excluding Cyprus, Malta and Turkey).

The differences in the volume of migration from different countries are important from a political point of view. According to this study, the highest migration potential within the ACC 13 is from Bulgaria and Romania. Turkey seems to be much less problematic, with a migration potential of less than 0.5%. The figures for all the larger acceding countries are around 1% in the next five years.

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[68] As far as the high projection is concerned, a precise comparison cannot be made, as the Commission study (2001) gives no precise figures. Estimates based on figure 7.6 (p.106 of the study) would suggest not more than a 10% increase, leading to around 1.2 million migrants from the 10 acceding and candidate countries studied by the end of 2006. This compares to a wider estimate of the Foundation of between three and 1.5 million.

However, the present study has serious limitations. It cannot predict the intended target country, or the intended length of stay of the migrants. Nor does it provide any indicators for the potential on cross-border commuting[69] and return migration.

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[69] Huber (2001) provides an interesting contribution on cross-border commuting.

2. Socio economic-conditions

This chapter discusses five important socio-economic variables: age, gender, education, employment and family status, each with regard to their interrelationship with intended migration to the EU. All five indicators are used in various concepts to explain migration behaviour. Competing explanatory models of migration often use the same indicators. The intention of this chapter is to provide a descriptive analysis of the main socio-economic characteristics of those respondents who express a willingness to migrate. This provides some additional insights in the conceptual debate, e.g. on the increasing numbers of women who migrate and the significance of unemployment as a driver for migration.

A second objective of the chapter is more political. The heterogeneity of the group of potential migrants has to be taken into account in designing relevant labour market and social policy measures and in coping with the increasing movement from the acceding and candidate countries to the EU. For policymakers, it is important to know if the majority of migrants have a higher or lower education, are younger or older, or are unemployed. 'It is therefore important that policies are designed according to the opportunities and constraints specific to different groups…as well as according to specific groups' transnational spheres of action.' (Nyberg-Soerensen et al, 2002, p.5)

Age

There is wide consensus in migration literature of a strong influence of age on migration (Fassmann and Hintermann, 1997; Kalter, 1997; Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999; Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2002). Younger groups are regarded as highly mobile, whereas, beyond the age of 40, there is a significant drop of intended migration. From an economic point of view, two main explanations are given. Younger groups usually have better labour market prospects in the receiving country, in particular when they are prepared to take up lower paid jobs, mainly in the service sector. They often increase their labour market chances in the receiving countries by accepting work beneath their actual level of qualification, thus providing local employers with a lower wage rate combined with higher productivity. The second economic argument comes from human capital theory, which suggests a better return on investment in migration for younger people. Older workers have a lower economic incentive to migrate, as the amortisation period for their investment is shorter (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999, p. 15).

Socio-economic models would suggest that younger people have a higher degree of dissatisfaction with existing conditions in their country of origin. Combined with higher levels of aspiration, this results in a strong feeling of relative deprivation and frustration. Consequently, younger groups develop a greater willingness to migrate. The specific place of younger people in the family hierarchy can also explain their stronger interest in migration. The older members of the family, in particular the head of household, remain in the country of origin in order to maintain the family, whereas younger members are sent abroad to earn additional money.

Table 5: *Breakdown of persons having general inclination for migration by age group across countries*

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[70] As it is predicted by the Dual Labour Market approach in chapter 2.6.

	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+	All
Poland	64.3	27.9	7.8	0.0	100.0
Bulgaria, Romania	61.5	21.7	16.0	0.7	100.0
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	39.8	42.8	13.0	4.5	100.0
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia	60.7	31.8	5.4	2.1	100.0
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	44.8	40.1	14.7	0.4	100.0
AC 10	61.0	30.4	7.9	0.7	100.0
ACC 13	50.9	34.5	12.0	2.5	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Looking at the general inclination to migrate, between 85% and 90% of the potential migrants in AC 10 and ACC 13 are under 40 years of age (see table five). In both groups of countries, the youngest group (15-24) has the highest intention to migrate. This tendency is, however, 10% higher in the AC 10 than the ACC 13.

Comparing general inclination with firm intention to migrate shows a structural shift in the AC 10 (see table six). The dominant group is now the 25-34 year old, who represent nearly half of the potential migrants. This is an increase of 20% compared to the general inclination. As far as the ACC 13 are concerned, the trend moves in the opposite direction. The youngest group increases by 6%, whereas the second youngest group increases only marginally. This reverse trend is explained by the figures for Bulgaria and Romania. Here, the share of the youngest group having firm intentions to migrate is extremely high, at 75%. This shows an increase of 15%, compared with the general inclination to migrate.

Table 6: *Breakdown of persons having firm intention for migration by age group across countries*

	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+	All
AC 10	45.6	49.3	5.0	0.1	100.0
ACC 13	56.8	32.4	10.0	0.8	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Analysing the general inclination of the youngest group to migrate in more detail (table five), Bulgaria/Romania, the two new southern Member States and Slovenia and the three Central European countries have a share of between 60% and 65% in this age group. The lowest share can be found in Turkey with around 40%. In every country, at least 40% are from the youngest age group[71]. These results differ from those of Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2002) for three countries (Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary), where the under 25-year-olds are shown to represent only a third of the expected migrants. In the present study, the results for these three countries are significantly higher, ranging from 52% to 65%[72].

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[71] The second youngest age group shows a different pattern. Turkey is the only country where this group represents the dominant age group. High percentages are also shown in Latvia and Lithuania. Looking at the oldest age group, Turkey (5%) and Slovakia (6%) have a significant share of older potential migrants.

[72] Fassmann and Hintermann (1997) estimate for the same three countries plus Slovakia a share of more than 40% for the youngest group. Drinkwater (2002, p. 16) confirms the strong positive relationship of age with willingness to migrate through a multivariate analysis.

In a next step, the focus is on the percentage of people willing to migrate from a specific age group (see table seven). For the AC 10 and ACC 13, one out of 10 of the youngest age group want to migrate into the EU. The highest tendency to migrate is shown in Romania and Bulgaria, where nearly one out of five want to migrate. Poland reaches nearly 12%. This has the potential of a massive 'youth drain' from these countries. Average figures of under 10% can be found in the remaining country groupings. Just 4% of the lowest age group in Malta have an inclination to migrate.

Table 7: *% of persons having general inclination for migration by age group across countries*

	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+
Poland	11.9	4.0	1.1	0.0
Bulgaria, Romania	19.1	4.7	3.3	0.1
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	7.1	2.4	0.7	0.1
Turkey	8.3	7.3	3.8	2.2
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia	8.3	3.2	0.5	0.2
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	8.3	4.9	2.1	0.0
AC 10	10.1	3.7	1.0	0.1
ACC 13	10.5	5.5	2.3	0.5

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Looking at the second youngest group, between 4% and 6% in the AC 10 and ACC 13 want to migrate. The highest percentage is in Turkey, where 7% of the 25-39 year old age group want to migrate into the EU.

A country specific analysis of the firm intention to migrate is not possible due to the small number of cases. The overall results, however, indicate that 2% of the youngest age group in the AC 10 and ACC 13 have a firm intention to migrate. For the second youngest age group, this figure is reduced for the ACC 13 to 1% and for the AC 10 to 1.5%. In Bulgaria and Romania, however, 10% of the youngest age group have a firm intention to migrate.

The results confirm the 'collective wisdom' that migration mainly happens in earlier life phases. The relative share varies, however, between countries, different points in time and in various studies. All studies concur that the extent of the intention to migrate above 40 years of age is negligible. The receiving countries of the EU can expect 'fresh blood' for their labour markets and can hope for a small improvement of their demographic structures. Some of the 'sending' countries, however, face the prospect of a major 'youth drain', which, in countries like Bulgaria and Romania, may lead to an outflow of 5% to 10% among the youngest age group in the next five years. This raises serious questions for EU developmental policy towards Bulgaria and Romania in the pre-accession phase before 2007.

Gender

Traditionally, the largest proportion of migrants have been male. Younger men were sent out to look for work to finance the remaining family through remittance payments back home, whereas younger women stayed at home, taking over family responsibilities. If

female migration occurred, it was family linked and was seen in policy terms as a secondary type of migration. Kofman (2003, p. 3) estimates that previously 65% of all female permanent migration into the EU was family linked.

According to several authors (Anthias and Lazaridis, 2000; Kofman et al, 2000; Kofman, 2003), this common assertion is challenged and international migration has seen increasing numbers of women migrants in Europe. One hypothesis is a reverse trend has been triggered by the increasing level of education for women in many candidate countries, the frequent loss of employment due to economic transformation, the search for new employment opportunities and a changing role model, which challenges the traditional male breadwinner model. This is, however, based on the assumption that higher educational attainment and changed labour market conditions in the acceding and candidate countries goes hand-in-hand with a higher propensity to migrate. In addition, female migration could be increased by better labour market opportunities for women in specific segments of the expanding service sector, e.g. in health care and household related services, of the receiving countries.

The hypothesis of a 'feminisation' of migration is supported by an overview by Nyberg-Soerensen et al (2002, pp. 4-5)[73]. They observe the emergence of new groups of migrants, which include young single women or female family breadwinners. An increasing number of women move independently rather than under the authority of older relatives or as part of a family strategy. Migration takes place more and more within female networks, which are separated from those of men. Female migrants differ with regard to their socio-economic background. Nyberg-Soerensen et al (2002) identify four groups: 1) women from rural backgrounds migrating on their own or as part of a family re-unification; 2) low-skilled women from urban backgrounds migrating due to divorce, increasing poverty and deprivation levels; 3) higher educated women motivated by the lack of appropriate job opportunities in the country of origin; and 4) women fleeing civil unrest in their countries[74].

Similar trends are identified by Morokvasic (1996) and Kofman (2003). They observe new forms of transient labour migration of women from eastern Europe, often based on a rotational system, enabling women to undertake domestic work, care, cleaning and trading, together with familial responsibilities in their home countries. This form of migration left behind family members and reproduced a pattern of separated families, which was quite common in the period of 'guest workers'. These authors also observe women increasingly as independent labour migrants, and sometimes as the main money providers for the remaining family members in the countries from which they came.

The hypothesis of an increasing feminisation of migration from the acceding and candidate countries is questioned by the argument that many women in those countries are more conservative than men. This concerns both traditional life styles and the inclination to less risk-taking in the labour market and in personal life. As both aspects are strongly related to the intention to migrate, the prediction would be an overall lower female propensity to migrate. It could also support a polarisation hypothesis according to different levels of risk-taking among different groups of women.

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[73] The study of the European Commission (1993, p. 15) on migration and labour mobility identified some evidence of an increasing feminisation of migration.
[74] Even though this type-casting is put forward for less developed countries, it can be transposed onto women from the candidate countries.

According to the authors, female migration is linked to global economic restructuring, and its effects on the labour market in the sending and receiving countries. European labour markets offer employment as domestic workers or in the broader service sector. A substantial minority of women enter the sex industry, many involuntarily through trafficking by prostitution networks. These conditions lead to a different assessment of the living conditions of migrant workers. While some authors see them as a new 'slave' labour force (Anthias and Lazaridis, 2000) in Europe, others stress their relative autonomy (Lisborg, 2001). All observers agree that diversity and polarisation is increasing. Most female migrants experience a high degree of deskilling. The relevant question for this study is to what extent these new trends can be found in the attitude towards migration in the acceding and candidate countries.

Table 8: *Breakdown of persons having general inclination for migration by gender across countries*

	Male	Female	All
Poland	63.6	36.4	100.0
Bulgaria, Romania	57.9	42.1	100.0
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	▮	▮	▮
Turkey	70.7	29.3	100.0
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia	35.9	64.1	100.0
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	52.0	48.0	100.0
AC 10	53.7	46.3	100.0
ACC 13	62.2	37.8	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

The gender breakdown of the general inclination for migration shows a nearly equal distribution between the AC 10, whereas, in the ACC 13, nearly two-thirds are men (see table eight). Within the 13 countries, there is a clear male dominance in general inclination to migrate in Turkey, Bulgaria/Romania and Poland. However, there is a clear female dominance in Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The Baltic countries and Malta/Cyprus/Slovenia are nearly 50-50.

A previous study by Fassmann and Hintermann (1997, p. 18), covering the four central European countries (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic), confirmed the results of the present study for Poland only, whereas the other three countries showed a lower female rate of between 34% and 40%. The question is whether there has been a structural change in those three countries between 1996 and 2002 towards a stronger feminisation towards migration, or if these increases are based on different methodologies[75].

Looking at the overall figures for a firm intention to migrate in the AC 10 and ACC 13 (see table nine), men have a higher intention to migrate than women with a difference of between 10 and 15%. However, the share of women is relatively high, at 40-45%. Based on firm intention to migrate, countries like Poland have now a female majority and the difference in Bulgaria/Romania has narrowed to 4 percentage points.

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[75] Further analysis should look, in particular, at the age, qualification and marital status of potential female migrants.

Table 9: *Breakdown of persons having firm intention for migration by gender across countries*

	Male	Female	All
AC 10	54.7	45.3	100.0
ACC 13	58.3	41.7	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 10 focuses on the percentage from each gender with a general inclination to migrate, as part of the whole population of 15 years of age and older. In the ACC 13, 6% of all men want to migrate; in the AC 10, this is reduced to 4%. Within the 13 countries, there are strong differences. In Turkey and Bulgaria/Romania, between 7% and 9% of the male population are mobile. At the other extreme are Hungary and Malta, where only 1% of the male population wants to migrate.

Table 10: *% of persons having general inclination for migration by gender across countries*

	Male	Female
Poland	5.0	2.5
Bulgaria, Romania	6.7	4.2
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	2.3	1.9
Turkey	8.6	3.7
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia	1.9	2.8
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	3.9	3.1
AC 10	3.6	2.7
ACC 13	5.9	3.3

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

As far as women are concerned, the country differences are less pronounced. Between 2% (Cyprus/Malta/Slovenia) and 4% of the female population are mobile, with an average of around 3% for the AC 10 and ACC 13. The highest share is in Romania and Bulgaria, at 4%.

The acceding countries show a higher than expected proportion of women as part of their mobile population. This seems to confirm the newer hypothesis of an increasing feminisation of migration. Results from some central European countries clearly point in this direction. There are also indications of an accelerating trend over time. Nevertheless, these results have to be interpreted with caution. They may be based on a measurement error due to the small number of cases. However, it could also indicate a structural change of the composition of the mobile workforce in the more developed acceding countries.

Migration policy should take these new trends into consideration. 'International agencies should therefore address migrants' gender specific concerns and make sure to follow up effectively on the gender awareness campaigns and programmes' (Nyberg-Soerensen, 2002, p.5). This is particularly important for females migrating back home. Unless they are assisted, they may lose newly gained freedom in gender relationships compared with men when they return to their country of origin.

Education

High educational attainment is regarded as a positive influence factor on migration. From a human capital perspective, it is assumed that higher levels of education offer increased income returns for specific segments of the labour market. It is also argued that higher levels of education provide a greater ability to collect and process information, which lowers the risk and increases the propensity of migration.

Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) develop the opposite hypothesis based on an analysis of several international studies of migration. They find an insignificant or even negative coefficient between levels of education and propensity to migrate. This can be explained by the prevalence of low-skilled labour markets for migrants in the destination countries, which makes migration for high-skilled individuals less beneficial.

Migration of students is seen by some observers as a form of migration of young and qualified labour. In several receiving countries, it has been easier to switch from a student to worker status than to migrate as fully qualified employee (SOPEMI, 2001; Kofman, 2003).

Table 11: *Breakdown of persons having general inclination for migration by age of completing education across countries*

	Primary (up to 15 years)	Secondary (16-19 years)	Tertiary (20+ years)	Still studying	All
Poland	3.2	28.9	15.4	52.6	100.0
Bulgaria, Romania	18.9	36.7	13.6	30.7	100.0
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	37.2	23.1	18.9	20.7	100.0
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia	6.8	32.7	17.1	43.5	100.0
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	2.8	31.9	31.4	33.9	100.0
AC 10	4.5	29.3	18.5	47.6	100.0
ACC 13	22.0	27.8	17.4	32.8	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

As far as the level of educational attainment is concerned, the AC 10 and the ACC 13 present completely different patterns (see table 11). Within the AC 10, nearly half of the potentially mobile population are studying, almost one in five has a third level education and less than 5% completed their education at primary level. Hence, the potential migrants from the AC 10 represent a highly qualified future labour supply for the EU[76].

The structure of the potential migrants from the ACC 13 is distinctly different. Those who completed their education at primary and secondary levels account for around a quarter each; 17% have a third level degree and a third are still studying. This group of countries has a 20% lower level of educational attainment than the AC 10. Consequently, the

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[76] Fassmann and Hintermann (1997) estimate for four Central European Countries that 12% of the wider migration potential had a third level degree.

integration into EU labour markets of those migrants may prove more difficult. This difference can be mainly explained by the Turkish results, where nearly 40% of the mobile population has only a primary education, while, in Bulgaria/Romania, the figure is around 20%[77].

The Baltic countries have a high proportion (over 30%) of potential migrants with third level education. For Cyprus/Malta/Slovenia, the figure is over 25%. Overall, 95% of potential migrants from the AC 10 and 78% from the ACC 13 have an educational attainment above primary level.

Comparing the results for the general inclination to migrate with the results for a firm intention to migrate confirms the overall trend (see table 12). Almost 100% of migrants from the AC 10 with a strong intention of mobility have more than a primary level attainment and 30% have a third level degree. Nearly 40% are still studying. Just over 10% of highly mobile migrants in the ACC 13 have only primary education; one in four have completed a third level qualification and one in three are still studying. This represents a difference of around 10% between the two country groupings.

Table 12: *Breakdown of persons having firm intention for migration by age of completing education across countries*

	Primary (up to 15 years)	Secondary (16-19 years)	Tertiary (20+ years)	Still studying	All
AC 10	0.1	30.2	31.0	38.7	100.0
ACC 13	11.5	30.3	24.7	33.5	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

An important question is what percentage might migrate among all respondents with third level education (see table 13). The ACC 13 are in danger of losing around 5% of those with a third level education. In the AC 10, the figure is slightly lower at 3%.

Table 13: *% of persons having general inclination for migration by age of completing education across countries*

	Primary (up to 15 years)	Secondary (16-19 years)	Tertiary (20+ years)	Still studying
Poland	0.6	2.5	2.7	13.3
Bulgaria, Romania	4.0	4.6	3.7	18.6
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	0.2	1.0	3.2	7.6
Turkey	3.6	7.4	15.1	11.6
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia	0.7	1.6	2.7	9.1
Estonia, Latvia,	1.3	2.6	3.0	8.9

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[77] A particularly low proportion of migrants with poor education come from Cyprus, Lithuania and Slovakia. Within the AC 10, Hungary is the only exception, with a relatively high share of migrants with a primary level attainment only (21%).

Lithuania				
AC 10	0.7	2.1	2.8	11.3
ACC 13	2.7	3.5	4.8	12.7

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

More serious is the potential loss within the student population. They are in danger of losing between 11-13% of all students in the next five years. This represents the prospect of a serious 'brain and youth drain' for those countries, leading to the risk of reduced economic growth and negative developmental consequences, as described by Myrdal (1956)[78], Wallerstein (1974) and Olesen (2002)[79].

At the country level, this pattern is even more pronounced. In Turkey, a remarkable 15% of all respondents with third level education have a general inclination to migrate. The next highest figure is 4% in Bulgaria/Romania. The greatest danger of a brain drain of students is in Bulgaria/Romania, at 19%. It seems that the current difficult economic and social conditions, combined with the delayed accession to the European Union, must have a negative effect. The figure is extremely high in comparison with Cyprus/Malta/Slovenia (8%) and Hungary/Czech Republic/ Slovakia (9%).

The extent of potential migration is, however, dramatically reduced if one considers the firm intention to migrate. In both the AC 10 and the ACC 13, around 2.5% of students and 1% of respondents with third level education have a serious intention to migrate into the EU.

From a European Union perspective, these figures should help to alleviate fears about the expected structure of inward migration. A large majority of potential migrants from the AC 10 are well educated. This provides more opportunities than risks for the old EU Member States. For the acceding and candidate countries, these figures mark a significant challenge to their internal economic and social development. The extent of the potential brain drain seems more limited, however, if one considers the firm intention to migrate. Many students have a general feeling that migration may be an option, but have invested little in making migration happen in the near future. The future will show if the envisaged accession for 2007 of Bulgaria and Romania, outlined at the Thessalonika Summit in June 2003, will change the attitude of graduates and students.

Employment status

Labour market theory emphasises income differentials as the strongest influence factors on migration and employment differentials as the second strongest. Some scholars reverse the order (e.g. Alecke et al, 2001). As income and employment differentials cannot be measured within the remit of this report, it concentrates instead on the employment status, which includes four dimensions: being in paid employment or unemployed, studying or having another officially inactive status in the labour market (housewife, pensioner).

The leading hypothesis is that unemployed people, particularly in countries with high unemployment rates, are more mobile than employed people. A counter argument is

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[78] More detail on the expected brain drain can be found in Carrington and Detragiache's report for the IMF (1998).
[79] Olesen (2002, pp.9-12) also analysed the potential of return migration, combined with a possible 'brain gain' for the originally sending countries.

developed based on socio-economic concepts, which stress the importance of a minimum of resources to provide the capability for migration as a realistic option. Both hypotheses suggest conflicting pressure on the intention to migrate for the unemployed, who may face the necessity but lack the resources for migration. The combined hypotheses would lead to a migration band: below the band, one is too poor to migrate and, above the band, one is sufficiently well-off not to need to migrate (Olesen, 2002, p. 14).

Economic concepts, focusing on search and information costs, predict that unemployed people have less constrained time budgets for preparatory search and information behaviour related to migration. This would suggest a higher propensity for migration by unemployed people compared with employed people.

Looking at the different groups which have an inactive labour market status, students are the most significant. Following the arguments put forward in relation to the importance of age and education, the study has already shown a high propensity among students for migration in the 13 acceding and candidate countries.

Table 14: *Breakdown of persons having general inclination for migration by employment status across countries*

	Employed	Unemployed	Student	Other inactive	All
Poland	18.9	26.2	52.7	2.2	100.0
Bulgaria, Romania	31.8	19.7	35.3	13.2	100.0
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	▮	▮	▮	▮	▮
Turkey	35.1	32.8	17.6	14.5	100.0
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia	42.4	8.2	49.0	0.5	100.0
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	46.0	20.7	26.3	7.0	100.0
AC 10	28.9	20.5	48.4	2.2	100.0
ACC 13	32.1	25.1	32.1	10.7	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

The general inclination to migrate, in relation to employment status, is shown in table 14. Overall, the ACC 13 and the AC 10 have different patterns. Among the ACC 13, migrants, about a third each are employed or are students and a quarter are unemployed. In the AC 10, almost 50% are students, with the two other groups covering around a quarter each. Hence, a strong difference occurs related to the relative importance of the share of students, as discussed in previous sections.

The proportion of unemployed respondents varies among the 13 countries. In Turkey, unemployed people represent one third and in Poland one fourth of all potential migrants. In the Baltic countries and in Bulgaria/Romania, they represent 20%. Those figures support mainstream neoclassical labour market concepts. However, in countries like Slovakia and Slovenia, only 5% of potential migrants are unemployed. This point will be taken up later on.

The relative share of employed people also varies significantly, between nearly 50% in Cyprus/Malta/Slovenia and in the Baltic countries on the one hand, and 19% in Poland on the other. Other inactive people represent a share of 10%, with the highest percentages in Bulgaria/Romania (13%) and Turkey (15%).

Table 15: *Breakdown of persons having firm intention for migration by employment status across countries*

	Employed	Unemployed	Student	Other inactive	All
AC 10	27.3	31.5	41.1	0.1	100.0
ACC 13	21.9	28.7	38.4	11.0	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Comparing the results of the general inclination with the firm intention to migrate shows some changes for the AC 10 countries (see table 15). The proportion of students with a firm intention is reduced to 41% from the 48% who had a general inclination. The same comparison for unemployed people shows an increase from 21% to 32%. The breakdown of all potential migrants with a firm intention is 41% for students, 32% unemployed and 27% employed. For the ACC 13, one observes a similar pattern, but with a lower percentage of employed people (22%); 11% of those with a firm intention to migrate are other inactive.

Table 16: *% of persons having general inclination for migration by employment status across countries*

	Employed	Unemployed	Student	Other inactive
Poland	2.0	7.1	14.4	0.2
Bulgaria, Romania	5.3	7.0	21.8	1.6
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	2.2	2.7	7.0	0.1
Turkey	7.1	12.1	11.6	2.1
Hungary. Czech Republic, Slovakia	2.1	2.5	9.9	0.0
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	3.2	6.6	7.7	0.9
AC 10	2.2	5.9	12.0	0.2
ACC 13	4.1	8.7	13.7	1.2

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

In comparing the relative share of mobile respondents in the group of all employed and unemployed (see table 16), nearly 9% of all unemployed people in the ACC 13 intend to migrate. This share is more than double the mobile respondents in employment (4%). A

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[80] This overall pattern is not confirmed at the country level. Five out of the 13 countries have a higher proportion of mobile people within the employed than within the unemployed: Cyprus, Malta, Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia. Due to the low number of cases, a cautious interpretation of these results is advisable.

[81] Table 16 shows some significant differences compared with table 13, in terms of the relative percentage of students with a general inclination to migrate. In Bulgaria/Romania, the figure is nearly 3% higher, in Poland it is 1% higher and in the Baltic Countries it is 1% lower. A statistical control explains the differences, which come from the fact that some students are working and some workers are studying, i.e. their education status is 'still studying'. The same phenomena occurs for retired people, some of whom are still studying.

similar difference can be found for the AC 10[82]. Many of the country groupings show a similar pattern, though, in the case of the three central European countries and for Cyprus/Malta/Slovenia, the difference between employed and unemployed people is only 0.5%.

The share of potential migrants among unemployed people also shows large variations among the 13 countries. In Turkey, 12% of unemployed people want to migrate. In Bulgaria/Romania, the Baltic countries and Poland also, unemployed people have a higher propensity for regional mobility (7%). The lowest mobility within the group of unemployed people is in the Mediterranean and the three central European Member States. These are countries with better current and future labour market conditions. Immobility may, under those circumstances, be a more rational option for unemployed people.

As table 16 indicates, the general inclination to migrate varies among the paid workforce of the ACC 13. In Turkey, it reaches 7%, whereas, in Poland, Hungary/Czech Republic/ Slovakia and in the new Mediterranean Member States, it is around 2%[83].

As far as firm intentions are concerned, only 2% of unemployed people want to migrate to Europe. The European Union's labour markets and social protection systems are not in danger of been swamped by unemployed people looking for jobs. Nonetheless, this figure is still four times higher than the firm intention to migrate of employed people. This figure gives some validation for predictions based on traditional micro economic labour market concepts.

Other studies provide none or limited information on the importance of employment status for migration (Fassmann/Hintermann, 1997; IOM, 1999; Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2002). According to Drinkwater (2002, p.29), unemployment has a small but significant positive effect on migration. This is in line with the findings of the present study.

This section confirms that unemployment has an influence on migration, but to a much lesser extent than predicted. Unemployed people have a stronger general inclination for migration, but this is significantly reduced when it comes to a firm intention. Indeed, in relative terms, students are a more relevant potential for migration than unemployed people. In comparison to employed people, however, the relative intention for migration among those who are unemployed is four times higher. Due to the low number of unemployed respondents, income and deprivation levels cannot be controlled. It appears that policy in the old Member States has to address a problem of high numbers of aspiring students than with measures to support a larger number of migrants who are coming from a situation of unemployment.

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[82] This overall pattern is not confirmed at the country level. Five out of the 13 countries have a higher proportion of mobile people within the employed than within the unemployed: Cyprus, Malta, Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia. Due to the low number of cases, a cautious interpretation of these results is advisable.

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Marital status

Sociologically based concepts stress the importance of social networks in the home and in the receiving country for migration. There is less propensity for migration where there is a strong integration in existing social networks in the sending countries and a low potential for social integration in the receiving countries, through existing formal and informal social networks. This study concentrates on push or retention (pull) factors in the home country. In this context, being married or cohabiting is seen as a prohibitive factor for migration, while being single is seen as an enabling factor. This is in line with socio-economic micro concepts, which predict a lower propensity to migrate where both partners work and a higher propensity for single people.

This hypothesis is also supported by concepts which underline the importance of decision-making within families on migration. Traditionally, mainly young unmarried men have been sent abroad, whereas the married head of the household remains at home, even though the household or its head is confronted with negative economic conditions (e.g. being unemployed). If this traditional pattern nowadays includes single women, this has to be controlled in future research. Further support for this reasoning is given by the empirical results in the previous sections, which indicate a high propensity for migration of younger respondents, many of them being students and probably single[84].

Looking at the potential migrants (general inclination) in the AC 10 and ACC 13, table 17 shows a distinct pattern, in which both country groupings have a majority of single people. In the AC 10, three quarters of the potential migrants are single and one fifth are married. The ACC 13 have a more balanced distribution of 56% single to 41% married.

As far as the percentage of single people is concerned, the country groupings vary significantly. In Poland, singles cover 80% of the general migration potential.

Conversely, in the Baltic countries and Turkey, single peoples make up only 45% of those expressing a general inclination to migrate. Two countries (Bulgaria and Turkey) have a clear majority of married and cohabiting respondents within the general potential for migration. This correlates with the results for age and employment status distribution in Turkey and Bulgaria.

Table 17: *Breakdown of persons having general inclination for migration by marital status across countries*

	Married/Cohabiting	Single	Widowed/Separated/ Divorced	All
Poland	16.3	81.2	2.5	100.0
Bulgaria, Romania	42.1	55.3	2.5	100.0
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	■	■	■	■
Turkey	52.7	45.5	1.7	100.0
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia	24.2	69.4	6.4	100.0
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	44.4	44.3	11.3	100.0

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[84] A detailed theoretical discussion can be found by Kalter (1998). The author also provides a good empirical analysis for Germany on partnership and migration.

AC 10	21.9	73.4	4.7	100.0
ACC 13	41.0	56.1	2.8	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

The group of widowed, separated and divorced people features with any significance only in the Baltic countries, with a share of 11%.

Comparing these figures with the firm intention to migrate (table 18) leads to a surprising result. The distribution for the AC 10 remains the same with only minor variations, while the distribution for the ACC 13 becomes much closer to the AC 10, as the share of singles increases to 72% and the share of married respondents is reduced to 27%. There seem to be other conditions, such as cultural and country specific factors, which influence a firm intention to migrate more than expressing a general openness to migration.

Table 18: *Breakdown of persons having firm intention for migration by marital status across countries*

	Married/Cohabiting	Single	Widowed/Separated/ Divorced	All
AC 10	26.0	70.4	3.6	100.0
ACC 13	26.5	71.8	1.7	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Overall, between 8% and 10% of all single people in the AC 10 and ACC 13 have a general inclination to migrate (see table 19). Romanians and Bulgarians have the highest percentages, where 16% of all singles want to migrate to Europe. In Poland, this proportion is reduced to 10%. In Cyrus/Malta/Slovenia, only 5% of all single people have a general inclination to migrate to Europe.

Table 19: *% of persons having general inclination for migration by marital status across countries*

	Married/Cohabiting	Single	Widowed/Separated /Divorced
Poland	1.0	9.2	0.8
Bulgaria, Romania	3.1	16.0	0.9
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	0.7	5.2	1.0
Turkey	4.9	10.4	1.9
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia	1.0	7.1	0.7
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	2.6	7.5	1.7
AC 10	1.2	8.2	0.9
ACC 13	3.0	10.1	1.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Looking at the married and cohabiting respondents, Turkey has the highest share of potential migrants, at 5%. In contrast, Cyprus/Malta/Slovenia, Poland and the central European countries all have a proportion of between 0.7% and 1% for potential migrants among married people.

Controlling these results to assess firm intention to migrate, the distribution for the AC 10 and ACC 13 is similar. Half of one percent of married people and 1.5% of single people

have a firm intention to migrate. Bulgaria and Romania stand out in the figures for single people. Here nearly 10% of all single people have a serious intention to migrate to Europe.

Around 70% of all potential migrants are single. It remains open to speculation whether this is mainly based on push factors in the sending country or on pull factors in the receiving countries. Future in-depth analysis should focus on the motivation of single migrants in order to answer this question. The concrete family context should also be an important subject for future analysis: are these single people living on their own or within an established family network? Lastly, further work should focus on the gender of young single people to ascertain whether single women show a similar migration behaviour as single men.

Conclusion

Within this detailed socio-structural analysis, key results of previous studies are confirmed. Migration from the acceding countries is mainly made up of young, better educated people, or students still in third level education, and single people. The relative share of these groups within the overall group of potential migrants or as a subgroup within each country varies among the countries, different points in time and the different studies. All studies concur that: 1) the extent of the intention to migrate is negligible above 40 years of age; 2) small minorities of migrants have only primary education; 3) unemployment has an influence on migration but to a lesser extent than predicted; and 4) married people are unwilling to migrate.

The breakdown of potential migrants allows a further reflection on the reliability of predicting actual migration behaviour based on reported intentions. Ajzen's theory of planned behaviour (1991) states that the difference between intention and behaviour is smallest in social groups with higher internal control and lower external dependency. One can therefore assume a higher level of confidence in predicting actual migration behaviour based on the observed characteristics of the group of potential migrants from the ACC 13 and AC 10. Better-educated, younger and single people have a higher degree of internal control in their personal life, than lower educated, older and married people. This effect is reduced by the higher proportion of unemployed people within the group of potential migrants, as being unemployed normally leads to a reduction in individual room for manoeuvre. Overall, however, it can be concluded that the breakdown of potential migrants as it has been outlined increases the probability of the prediction.

The receiving countries of the EU can expect a high quality labour supply, which should improve its short-term economic and its long-term socio-economic base with a more active demographic structure. This provides more opportunities than risks for the old EU Member States. It appears that policy in the old Member States has to address a problem of high numbers of aspiring students than with measures to support a larger number of migrants who are coming from a situation of unemployment. Extended pressure on existing social security systems in the old EU Member States should not occur in the short run.

Some sending countries in the ACC 13, however, face the prospect of a major 'youth drain', which, in countries like Bulgaria and Romania, may lead to an outflow of 5% to 10% among the youngest age group in the next five years. The potential youth drain is combined with a potential 'brain drain'. For the acceding and candidate countries, these figures mark a

significant challenge to their internal economic and social development. This raises serious questions for EU developmental policy to all ACC 13 and, in particular, towards Bulgaria and Romania in the pre-accession phase before 2007. The extent of the potential brain drain seems more limited, however, if one considers the firm intention to migrate. Many students have a general feeling that migration may be an option, but have invested little in making migration happen in the near future.

The present study seems to confirm newer hypotheses of an increasing feminisation of migration. In particular, some of the acceding countries show a higher than expected proportion of women as part of their migrating population. There are clear signs of an accelerating trend over time. This may indicate a change in the composition of the mobile workforce in the more developed acceding countries. Migration policy should take these new trends into consideration.

However, many important questions remain open and cannot be answered within the remit of this study. The next chapter will analyse in more detail the underlying motives for migration.

3. Motives for migration

Introduction

In describing and analysing migration, it is possible to measure the motivation of potential migrants based on a direct question to the respondent. Whereas the previous chapter provided an indirect explanation of the willingness to migrate through the use of socio-structural characteristics, this chapter uses a direct measurement of the explicit motivation expressed by potential migrants. Based on various micro economic and micro sociological concepts of migration, the different motives can be related to factors such as income, employment, relative deprivation, family and wider social networks, values and lifestyles, dissatisfaction with the place of living, and existing social security provisions.

Some authors classify these different influence factors within a push–pull model. The International Organisation for Migration (1999, pp. 27-28) distinguishes five pull and two push factors in motivation. The pull factors are: better living conditions and wages, other people's experience with migration, good employment prospects and more individual freedom. The push factors cover: ethnic problems and economic conditions in the country of origin.

In this study, five similar indicators are used. Three of them measure motives in relation to objective/material conditions: work, financial conditions and housing. Two are in relation to social conditions: family and private reasons, and wider social relationships in the local community. Obviously, there are overlaps and relationships particularly between the three indicators covering the objective/material motivation, as employment, income and housing are interdependent conditions.

In comparison with the IOM study, the measurement of motives in this study is less satisfactory. It provides less coverage of relevant dimensions, some ambiguity of measurement and a lack of perceived place of origin of the specific motives (receiving or sending country). Three indicators require certain restrictions in their interpretation. The indicator 'work reasons' is ambivalent, as it potentially not only includes employment conditions but also working conditions. The motive 'financial reasons' can indicate dissatisfaction with the actual income or expectations of a higher income in the target country. The indicator on 'family and private reasons' is also ambivalent in two ways: first of all, it includes the dimension 'private reasons', which is a vague 'catch all' category; secondly, family reasons may relate to unsatisfactory conditions in the home country or relate to the wish to be reunited with parts of the family who live abroad.

These comments point to a more general problem related to the three indicators on work, income and family motives. It is unclear whether these indicators are 'push' or 'pull' factors; do they refer to repelling factors in the place of origin or to attracting conditions in the place

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[85] More detail see in Chapter 2.

of destination? Both interpretations are possible. Only 'existing' housing conditions can be classified as an unambiguous push factor[86].

In the following sections, the motives for migration will be discussed in terms of general inclination to migrate and of firm intention to migrate. In addition, a section will look at gender-specific motivations for migration. Are men mainly driven by hard economic motives and women mainly influenced by social reasons, or do the potential migrants in the candidate countries show a convergence of motives between men and women? If feminisation of migration is occurring, one would expect an increasing number of women to be migrating for economic reasons and, overall, a similar motivation pattern for men and women.

General inclination to migrate

The first step in the analysis focuses on the general migration potential (see table 20). In the ACC 13, financial and work motives are of similar importance (each one third of the respondents). Family reasons are mentioned by 16% as a main motive. Dissatisfaction with current housing conditions and with wider relationships in the community is of less importance. In the AC 10, a higher importance is placed on family reasons than in the ACC 13, and a decrease of nearly 10% in the importance of financial reasons for migration[87]. This indicates that economic reasons are important but less so in the AC 10 than in the ACC 13.

Table 20: *Breakdown of persons having general inclination for migration by main motives across countries*

	Not satisfied with current home	Do not like people in area	Work reasons	Family/ private reasons	Financial reasons	All
Poland	12.7	6.7	42.7	18.4	19.5	100.0
Bulgaria, Romania	14.4	4.0	11.4	16.1	54.1	100.0
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia	▮	▮	▮	▮	▮	▮
Turkey	6.9	4.8	41.2	12.2	34.9	100.0
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia	11.7	2.5	31.6	27.1	27.1	100.0
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	13.0	2.9	31.3	20.1	32.7	100.0
AC 10	12.4	4.8	37.4	21.8	23.6	100.0
ACC 13	10.0	4.7	34.8	15.9	34.6	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Results standardised to 100%

Not surprisingly, the potential migrants in the 13 countries have quite different sets of motives. Financial reasons play a dominant role in Bulgaria/Romania (54%) and an important role in Turkey and the Baltic Countries (around 35%). In richer countries like Cyprus/Malta/Slovenia, they are of less importance. Labour market conditions are the main

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[86] For more specific policy conclusions, it would have been preferable to be able to give a more precise indication of the perceived origin of the rationale for mobility from the point of view of the potential migrant.
[87] Due to the standardisation of the different motives to 100%, the actual value has been slightly decreased without changing the proportional relationship.

rationale in Poland and Turkey, where more than 40% mention work reasons as key motives. Family is mentioned by more than a third of the potential migrants in Cyprus/Malta/ Slovenia. These results seems to confirm the hypothesis that increasing national wealth goes hand in hand with an increase in personal and family motives for migration.

Housing plays a minor role in all countries though, in Bulgaria/Romania, Poland and the Baltic countries, between 13 and 14% of potential migrants mention dissatisfaction with the current home as motive to migrate. This is a surprising result if one considers the overall poor housing conditions in many of the acceding and candidate countries in comparison with the average housing conditions in the EU. Even less importance is given to social relationships in the community. Only in Hungary did 10% of potential migrants see this as a major motive.

The different country results confirm a strong heterogeneity among the 13 countries[88]. Different combinations of motives can be identified.

- The first pattern sees economic, employment and family motives playing a nearly equal role (Slovenia, Latvia, Czech Republic). Within this model, a combined socio-economic rationale seems dominant.
- A second pattern emerges of countries where potential migrants underline a combination of mainly economic and financial reasons (Turkey, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia). Here, a clear employment and material rationale drives potential migration, in line with predictions made by neo-liberal micro economic concepts.
- A third pattern is strongly dominated by financial motives. Bulgaria and Romania as the two poorest countries are in this category.
- Two specific patterns emerge for the new Mediterranean acceding countries, which underline again their separate status. In Malta, potential migration is strongly dominated by family reasons; while in Cyprus, migration is prompted by a combination of work and family motives. However, both patterns must be interpreted with caution, as the number of cases is small in both countries.

How do these results compare with the IOM (1999) study? It uses as pull factors three objective/material conditions: better wages, better employment and improved living conditions. With the exception of Romania and Bulgaria, all other countries give improved living conditions as the highest priority. The Romanians stress better wages and improved employment as the main motives for migration. In Bulgaria, better wages and improved living conditions are of similar importance[89].

For the remaining five countries considered in the 1999 study, better wages in the receiving countries are more important than improved employment prospects. It can be assumed that most of the potential migrants are either in paid employment or students, and see migration as an opportunity to improve long-term employment-income goals.

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[88] This country analysis must be interpreted with caution due to the small number of cases in some countries.

[89] Interpretation of the results of table three in IOM (1999, p. 27) is difficult due to a lacking indication of the underlying sample of respondents. Does the table cover 'all' potential migrants or a specific group of migrants? A re-analysis of the data should control the variation of motives according to different types of migration.

The IOM study also offers the possibility of measuring a 'social network' effect. In Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania, between 70 and 85% of the respondents are motivated to migrate based on other people's experience in the receiving countries. This is not surprising, considering the results of the concepts of the 'new economics of migration' and of other socio-economic concepts[90]. In the remaining countries, at least one third of the respondents base their decision to migrate on positive experiences transmitted through social networks.

According to IOM, push factors are less important but significant. The most important push factor is the expectation of negative economic developments in the home country. On average, between half and two thirds of all potential migrants regard this as important. The only exception is the relatively prosperous Slovenia (33%). The second push factor is perceived ethnic problems, which is of particular importance in Slovakia (56%), whereas, in Slovenia and Bulgaria, it is of minor importance.

Overall, the IOM results provide a relatively coherent and comprehensive picture of the motivation pattern in seven central and eastern European countries. The only exception is the rather surprising results for Bulgaria, where, despite its great economic and employment problems, wages and living conditions abroad were not thought to be very important for migration (IOM, 1999, p. 28).

A comparison of the results of this study with the IOM results exposes first of all the limited approach of the present study, which is less comprehensive. Both studies concur on the high importance of objective/material conditions, such as wages and employment. However, each study indicates the relevance of additional factors. IOM stresses the improvement of overall living conditions and positive experiences within potential target countries transmitted through social networks; whereas this study underlines the additional importance of family and personal reasons.

Another dimension added by IOM is the superior influence of pull factors compared with push factors for migration. This supports the finding in chapter two of the limited influence of being unemployed on intentions to migrate. It is probably the combination of employment problems in the home country and the expectation of better employment prospects abroad that influences migration, combined with other more personal rationales.

One aspect, which has not been discussed in the remit of the IOM study, is the possible feminisation of migration. This is the focus of the following section.

Gender-specific motives

How do these overall results on motivation towards migration compare between men and women? Are the motives of an increasing number of potential female migrants orientated towards a traditional family rationale such as family unification, housing conditions or providing remittance payments to look after relatives back home[91]? Does their motivation pattern adjust to a family breadwinner model? Or, do these women move independently from their family, which would trigger a stronger labour market and financial orientation?

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[90] More detail can be found in annex two of this report.

[91] As mentioned by Nyberg-Soerensen (2002, p.5), who sees women as being subject to social pressure to look after their families by providing higher remittance payments than men.

Due to the small number of cases, the analysis will mainly deal with aggregate results. A clear pattern emerges for the ACC 13: work and financial considerations are top of the agenda with 30% each. 21% of potential female migrants mention family and personal reasons, and 14% are concerned with their housing conditions. Hence, one group of women has a predominantly economic agenda to migrate, but a second minority group emphasises substantial family and housing concerns.

The male–female pattern is also distinct: male migrants are more economically motivated with a greater than 15% difference to women. Economic motives account for up to 80% of men's inclination to migrate. Due to the higher degree of societal modernisation in the AC 10, one would expect a greater weight on economic motives among female migrants here. The higher education and stronger labour market orientation of women should induce a greater independence and, hence, a stronger economic orientation. Surprisingly, the opposite is the case. Potential female migrants in the AC 10 have a stronger orientation towards a traditional female rationale: more than 40% mention as main motives for migration family and personal reasons as well as bad housing conditions at home.

These differences can be explained by individual country results[92]: in Cyprus, Malta and the Czech Republic, family reasons are very important for women. Housing is high on the agenda of women in the Czech Republic and in Romania. For example, in the Czech Republic, 60% of women mention family and housing as key motives to migrate.

Adding up work and financial reasons given by women leads to the following country patterns: in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, women are very strongly motivated by economic reasons. Possible explanations are the specific labour market conditions for women, their higher qualification levels or their age profile[93]. The percentage for Turkey is also relatively high. Conversely, in the Czech Republic and in Romania, women have a much less pronounced economic orientation for migration. The three Baltic countries are more or less average.

However, a second glance at the individual country results, comparing male and female attitudes, suggests a need for caution in the interpretation of those results. As far as work reasons are concerned, the female percentage is higher than the male in three out of 13 countries (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia). Looking at family reasons, the male percentage is higher than the female in three countries (Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia). It can be concluded that men and women in the several countries have different patterns of motives to migrate. Expectations of a higher importance of family and housing motives for women compared with men are confirmed. However, female migration is increasingly dominated by an economic rationale. In Bulgaria and Slovakia, potential female migrants show the same level of economic rationale as the average migrant men in the candidate countries. Whether these figures, together with the increasing propensity of women to migrate, can be interpreted as new migration behaviour, needs to be tested by further research.

Firm intention to migrate

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[92] For technical reasons, these results are only available at the country level.
[93] This has to be tested by further research, which needs to bear in mind the small number of respondents.

A more in-depth analysis of the firm intention towards migration highlights the increasing importance of financial motives for migration, particularly in the ACC 13 (see table 21). More than 40% of potential migrants mention income as the main motive. The work motive remains in second place with around a quarter of the respondents. The main difference between the ACC 13 and AC 10 is related to the two material motives. AC 10 respondents give relatively more emphasis to employment, whereas ACC 13 respondents stress the financial motives. Within the 13 countries, financial reasons are very pronounced in Bulgaria/Romania (66%) and the Baltic countries (46%). Strong emphasis (more than 40%) on employment motives is expressed in Poland and Turkey.

Table 21: *Breakdown of persons having firm intention for migration by main motives across countries*

	Not satisfied with current home	Do not like people in area	Work reasons	Family/private reasons	Financial reasons	All
AC 10	15.7	2.7	35.1	17.8	28.7	100.0
ACC 13	14.7	1.9	26.0	16.2	41.2	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Results standardised to 100%

Comparing the motives for a general inclination and a firm intention towards migration (tables 20 and 21), the AC 10 group indicates only slight variations, with a 5% increase in financial reasons for those with firm intentions to migrate, and a 4% decrease in family reasons. Stronger variations can be found in the ACC 13: here, financial and housing motives increase by 5%, while work motives drop by 9%. In the ACC 13, housing reasons are almost as important for those with a firm intention to migrate as family reasons. Particularly in the Czech Republic/Hungary/Slovakia, insufficient housing becomes an important motive for migration (20%).

Conclusion

Overall, the present study concurs with IOM 'that there is no single explanation for migration potential but rather a combination of explanations, which depend upon the country under consideration and the kinds of migration which occur' (1999, p. 30). However, there are some overall trends. Employment and financial motives are the dominant rationales for migration, which is supplemented within the IOM study by the objective to enhance overall living conditions. Women have a similar, but less economically pronounced, motivation. Unsatisfactory housing conditions play a minor role, but gain an increasing importance for people expressing a firm intention to move and for female migrants. Family and other social reasons are not as important as employment or financial motives, but their relevance is increasing, particularly for potential female migrants of the richer acceding countries. This group is also strongly motivated by poor current housing conditions.

According to IOM, pull factors are more important than push factors. Hopes for the future with regard to better living, income and employment conditions are a stronger driver than mere dissatisfaction with present economic conditions. Finally, the IOM results give some indications for the relevance of social network effects. As predicted by Massey et al (1993), many potential migrants are stimulated in their decision to migrate by positive experiences

of friends and relatives in their chosen target area. In relative terms, this factor is, however, of less importance than employment and financial rationales.

As expected, the rationales for migration are highly diverse between the 13 countries. Patterns include a balanced social and economic rationale, a balanced employment and financial rationale, an overwhelming short-term financial motivation and a predominant family orientation. Higher economic development goes hand-in-hand with an enhanced importance of family and personal motives.

The gender pattern is complex: overall, women have a predominantly economic rationale in looking to migrate, but men have a stronger economic motivation. The potential female migrants in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia are particularly strongly economically motivated, even more pronounced than that for males in their country. In the majority of the remaining countries, women emphasise family reasons for migration. The female motivation pattern seems less connected to the general income situation in their country than the male pattern.

The next chapter will test the influence of economic conditions further by relating the objective material conditions of income and deprivation to the observed intention to migrate.

4. Effects of income, deprivation and economic strain

Concept

Chapters two and three have provided an insight into the socio-economic structure of the group of potential migrants and into their underlying motives on the basis of descriptive statistics. This chapter provides a first contribution to a causal bi-variate analysis by measuring the influence of objective and perceived material conditions on the willingness to migrate. It presents indicators on income, material deprivation and a subjectively perceived economic strain. The questions which are tested in this chapter are: 1) what is the influence of relative income poverty on migration? 2) has multiple deprivation an effect? 3) how important is perceived economic strain? 4) is there a difference between the influence of the objective and subjective factors with regard to migration?[94]

Chapter three highlighted the relative importance of financial motives for the willingness to migrate. The relationship between migration and financial conditions from the point of view of the respondent will be tested in this chapter by indirectly relating material conditions and willingness to migrate.

In mainstream micro and macro economic concepts, income or wages are regarded as the main drivers of migration[95]. The actual or expected wage/income differential between the country of origin and the target country motivates potential migrants. If the expected gains surpass, to a significant extent, the estimated costs, migration will take place. These important conceptual considerations cannot be tested within the remit of this study, however, as it is not able to measure income or wage differentials due to the lack of two points of information: a) an indication of the target country of the potential migrant and b) the relative income and employment condition in the specific labour market for each respondent.

Nonetheless, the effect of the relative income position in the home country can be tested. This is in line with the thinking of the 'new' economics of migration, which question the assumption made in mainstream economics that income is a homogenous good, having a constant effect on the utility for different actors across the socio-economic settings. Conversely, it assumes that migration is undertaken primarily to improve an individual's or household's comparative income position with respect to that of other individuals or households in the relevant reference group in the home country[96].

Another approach is provided by a wider notion of income poverty. Townsend (1979) sees income poverty as exclusion from society through a lack of resources. By emphasising participation versus exclusion in society as the key parameter, the concept of Townsend makes explicit the relative nature of an enlarged poverty concept. Within this concept,

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[94] It would be very interesting to control for the cumulative effect of objective and subjective indicators on migration. Due to the low number of cases, this is not possible here.
[95] See annex two.
[96] See for example Stark and Taylor (1991) and annex two of this report.

'falling below a relative poverty line is an indirect measure of exclusion from a minimal acceptable standard of living. The general rationale is that those falling more than a certain distance below the average are excluded from the minimal acceptable way of life of the society in which they live because of a lack of resources.' (Russel and Whelan, 2003, p. 2) As far as the intention to migrate is concerned, it can be assumed that the higher the relative income poverty, the stronger the relative deprivation and, thus, the higher the willingness to migrate.

This reasoning can be questioned in two ways: on conceptual and on methodological grounds. The conceptual argument is based on the observation that migration is an activity which needs a substantial amount of resources. These resources can be provided in three ways: 1) by social capital (family/friends/neighbours) either in the country of origin or the target country; 2) by human capital in the form of education, language knowledge or experience with mobility; or 3) by income or other financial resources.

This is in line with the belief that 'international migration does not stem from a lack of economic development but from development itself' (Massey, 1998, p.277). In developmental research, this points to the definition of a specific migration band. Olesen's observation was noted earlier: below the band, one is too poor to migrate and, above the band, one is sufficiently well-off not to need to migrate (2002, p.14). This leads to the hypothesis at the individual level that neither potential migrants in the lower or in the higher income quartiles show the highest intensity to migrate, but rather respondents in the medium income quartiles.

On the methodological side, low income has to be regarded as an unreliable indicator for certain aspects of poverty, which are directly related to a lack of access to key resources to live in a society at a given point in time. Ringen, for example, (1987 and 1988) has shown that it fails to identify households experiencing distinctive levels of poverty. Scientific evidence is available to show that a substantial proportion of those on low income are not suffering deprivation while some households above income poverty lines are experiencing deprivation[97].

Therefore, this study uses the concept of multiple deprivations, which focuses on a multi-dimensional exclusion from the access of specific items at a given point in time[98]. One alternative option of behaviour for individuals is to try to overcome existing multiple deprivations by migrating. Therefore, the hypothesis is that the higher the lack of essential resources, as part of a concept of multiple deprivations, the higher the intention to migrate.

As before, in the discussion on relative income deprivation, an alternative hypothesis can be put forward that the lack of material conditions impedes necessary activities for migration. For example, a lack of a car, telephone or internet access can be a serious barrier for migration. Also the lack of household appliances can be an obstacle as it binds substantial time resources, which could be otherwise used to prepare for migration. Hence, the hypothesis that neither a complete lack, or a complete access to all necessary resources, leads to the strongest intentions to migrate. The greatest willingness to migrate will be

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[97] For more detail, see Russel and Whelan, 2003, p. 2 footnote 1.
[98] Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, the present study cannot focus on the aspect of cumulative disadvantage over time.

shown by the middle group of respondents, who have enough resources to organise for migration, but still perceive their lack of resources as an incentive to migrate.

In addition, this study will focus on whether there is a difference between the influence of objective and subjective economic factors with regard to migration. Results from previous studies dealing with other important social factors, for example social exclusion, suggest a strong influence of subjectively perceived conditions. The perception of conditions becomes sometimes more important than the objective conditions themselves. Another possibility is the reinforcement of the explanatory power by the combination of objective and perceived conditions (Whelan et al, 2001). In the remit of this study, the influence of the perceived economic strain will be measured as additional to the objective income situation and objective deprivation level. Before turning to the empirical analysis, the methodology to be used is described in more detail.

Methodology

Within this chapter, three indicators measure the material conditions: the relative level of income, multiple deprivation and subjectively perceived economic strain. Income has to be regarded as an important, though imperfect measure, of people's access to resources.

Based on the conceptual reflections, income will be measured in terms of the relative position of the household in the income distribution in each country. Hence, this study will not attempt to measure the influence of absolute income within or across countries. Instead, it focuses on the location of the household in the income hierarchy by using equivalent household income quartiles. This approach faces some reliability problems within the remit of the data provided by the Eurobarometer survey of the Candidate Countries, as the household income is only measured by one single indicator asked of one person in the household. Respondents were asked to locate themselves within a scale of 10 pre-coded income categories. Experience suggests that this leads to a significant under-estimation of income levels (Russel and Whelan, 2003, p.4). Reliability may also be reduced, as the actual respondent in the household may not have had the best knowledge of household income, which the head of the household would have provided. Also, response rates to this question are low in a number of countries[99].

Another technical adjustment considers the number of people living in the household and takes into account the economics of scale of household consumption. The result is captured by an equivalent household income measure. Lastly, the collected information has to be converted into euro to make it comparable. The relative income level is measured with the help of four individual income quartiles. These income quartiles use the relative income distribution in each country and classify the respondents accordingly.

The material deprivation is defined as a lack of specific resources. Research based on the European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP) has demonstrated the usefulness of taking into account not only household income but also more direct measures of deprivation. Therefore, a set of items has been included in the ECHP. Russel and Whelan (2003, pp.15-16) describe in detail how the items for the Candidate Countries questionnaire have been selected and how they relate to the standard ECHP questions. Respondents were

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[99]For more detail, see Russel and Whelan, 2003, pp. 4-5.

asked if they possessed a set of items and in each case, when they didn't, they were asked to indicate whether it was because they did not need or could not afford it. Only where an item was missing due to the lack of affordability was it deemed to constitute a deprivation. Nine items were selected: TV, video recorder, telephone, refrigerator, washing machine, dish washer, microwave, car or van and personal computer.

Based on this information, an index has been constructed. Each country has a relative definition of low, medium and high deprivation. For example, for Poland and Turkey the following was set as the definition of low deprivation:
- Poland: the % of low deprived are those who lack between none and one item on the above list.
- Turkey: the % of low deprived are those who lack between none and three items.

This means that Poland has a narrower definition of low deprivation than Turkey. As far as the definition of high level of deprivation is concerned:
- Poland: the % of high deprived are those who lack five to eight items.
- Turkey: the % of high deprived are those who lack six to nine items.

The third indicator measures perceived economic strain. It is based on the question: 'how do you get by with your household income?' It contains the response dimensions: 'with great difficulty', 'with difficulty', 'easily', 'very easily'. In the remit of the present study, the focus is on the group of respondents, who get by with 'great difficulties' in comparison with those who get by 'easily' or 'very easily'.

In order to provide a bi-variate analysis, the report faces the problem of the low number of respondents in the overall sample, within all 13 acceding and candidate countries, who have a willingness to migrate. Two approaches have been chosen to deal with this problem. First, the analysis will only focus on the 'general inclination to migrate' and will exclude any analysis of the 'firm intention'. This has some drawbacks, as the profile of potential migrants with a general inclination differs from those with a firm intention (see chapter two). Secondly, the study uses the over-sampling in Turkey and Poland (see note on data in annex one) for the more in-depth analysis in this chapter and in chapter six. In both countries, 2,000, instead of 1,000, interviews were conducted. Within a 13-country analysis, the effect of this over-sampling is lost in statistical terms, as the over-sampled cases are down-weighted in order to make the results representative for the overall country comparison. For now, the analysis uses the actual number of respondents in both countries. Unfortunately, this means that the results in this chapter will not be representative for all the acceding and candidate countries.

Income

The effect of income distribution is measured for Poland and for Turkey. Table 22 shows the results for Poland. Migration is highest in the upper income quartile (5.5%) and lowest in the second highest income quartile (2.5%). The lowest income quartile has, at 3.4%, one of the lower levels of willingness to migrate. These results seem to confirm, in a first instance, conceptual ideas which assume sufficient access to income as an important resource for migration. However, in statistical terms, the relationship is not significant.

Table 22: *Cross-tabulation of income distribution by general inclination for migration for Poland*

	No general inclination % (No.)	General inclination % (No.)	Total % (No.)
Bottom quartile	96.6 (345)	3.4 (12)	100.0 (357)
Second quartile	95.8 (293)	4.2 (13)	100.0 (306)
Third quartile	97.5 (308)	2.5 (8)	100.0 (316)
Top quartile	94.5 (328)	5.5 (19)	100.0 (347)
Total	96.1 (1,274)	3.9 (52)	100.0 (1,326)

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=4.228 n.s
Pearson's R=0.028
Figures in parentheses indicate the actual number of respondents

How does this result for Poland compare with the Turkish results (table 23)? In Turkey, a U-curve relationship exists. The highest willingness to migrate is in the highest and in the lowest income quartiles (8% each). The 4% range between highest and lowest values is relatively wide. The relationship is statistically significant.

Table 23: *Cross-tabulation of income distribution by general inclination for migration for Turkey*

	No general inclination % (No.)	General inclination % (No.)	Total % (No.)
Bottom quartile	91.9 (372)	8.1 (33)	100.0 (405)
Second quartile	96.2 (382)	3.8 (15)	100.0 (397)
Third quartile	95.7 (444)	4.3 (20)	100.0 (464)
Top quartile	92.0 (392)	8.0 (34)	100.0 (426)
Total	94.0 (1,590)	6.0 (102)	100.0 (1,692)

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=12.046, p<0.01
Pearson's R=0.000
Figures in parentheses indicate the actual number of respondents

The results for both countries support the hypothesis of a positive relationship between high income and high willingness to migrate. The results differ with regard to the importance of lower income levels for migration. In Turkey, this is confirmed; in Poland, it is rejected. No support is found for the hypothesis of a strong relationship between middle-income group and high willingness to migrate. In both countries, respondents in the second and third income quartiles have the lowest willingness to migrate.

Deprivation

The second objective indicator, measuring material living conditions, is the relative level of multiple deprivations in Poland and in Turkey. As explained in the previous section, the construction of the indicator for Poland takes into account the overall significantly higher standard of living. Many 'low deprived' in Turkey have to be regarded as 'medium deprived' in Poland, and many 'medium deprived' in Turkey would be 'highly deprived' in Poland.

Table 24: *Cross-tabulation of deprivation by general inclination for migration for Poland*

	No general inclination % (No.)	General inclination % (No.)	Total % (No.)
High deprivation	96.2 (901)	3.8 (36)	100.0 (937)
Medium deprivation	95.1 (467)	4.9 (24)	100.0 (491)

Low deprivation	98.2 (165)	1.8 (3)	100.0 (168)
Total	96.1 (1,533)	3.9 (63)	100.0 (1,596

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=3.244 n.s
Pearson's R=-0.013
Figures in parentheses indicate the actual number of respondents

Table 24 displays the relationship between deprivation and the general inclination for migration in Poland. The low deprived, who lack none or only one item, have by far the lowest propensity to migrate (1.8%). This seems to confirm the hypothesis that full access to affordable household items reduces the inclination towards migration. The reverse assumption is not confirmed, however, as the group with strong deprivation has, at 3.8%, a middle position with regard to willingness to migrate. The highest willingness to migrate is among those who are medium deprived, at 4.9%. Overall, it confirms a weak and statistically non-significant relationship.

The results on deprivation point to a certain paradox over the possible income effect, where command of resources is in line with a higher propensity to migrate. High income seems to be an enabling and/or encouraging device, whereas low deprivation, i.e. high command over material resources, has no supporting affect on migration.

Turkey has a different but linear pattern (see table 25). The group with the highest relative deprivation has the lowest willingness to migrate, at 5.2%, whereas the group with the lowest level of relative deprivation has the highest willingness to migrate (8.7%). The difference between the two extremes is 3.5 percentage points, showing that low levels of deprivation lead to a 40% higher level of willingness to migrate. However, the relationship is not statistically significant. Despite the non-significance, it is interesting to compare both Turkish results on objective material conditions. The fact that they go in the same direction indicates a relationship between high command of resources and a strong willingness to migrate.

Table 25: *Cross-tabulation of deprivation by general inclination for migration for Turkey*

	No general inclination % (No.)	General inclination % (No.)	Total % (No.)
High deprivation	94.8 (957)	5.2 (52)	100.0 (1,009)
Medium deprivation	93.9 (459)	6.1 (30)	100.0 (489)
Low deprivation	91.3 (231)	8.7 (22)	100.0 (253)
Total	94.1 (1,647)	5.9 (104)	100.0 (1,751)

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=4.589 n.s
Pearson's R=0.049
Figures in parentheses indicate the actual number of respondents

Economic strain

The third indicator measures the subjectively perceived economic strain: whether the potential migrants have 'some to no' difficulties to get by or whether they have 'great difficulties'. According to table 26, nearly 4% of the Polish respondents who perceive minor economic strains have a willingness to migrate. This percentage is reduced in the group with strong economic difficulties. Here 3.2% have a willingness to migrate. This relatively even distribution is not statistically significant.

Table 26: *Cross-tabulation of economic strain (as a %) by general inclination for migration for Poland*

	No general inclination % (No.)	General inclination % (No.)	Total % (No.)
Some to no difficulties	96.1 (1,138)	3.9 (46)	100.0 (1,184)
Great difficulties	96.8 (337)	3.2 (11)	100.0 (348)
Total	96.3 (1,475)	3.7 (57)	100.0 (1,532)

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=0.394 n.s
Pearson's R=-0.016
Figures in parentheses indicate the actual number of respondents

A statistically significant relationship can be found, however, in Turkey (table 27). The general inclination to migrate increases from 5.2%, for the group with minor economic problems, to 9% for the group with great difficulties. Perceived economic strain in Turkey leads to nearly a doubling of the general inclination to migrate.

Table 27: *Cross-tabulation of economic strain by general inclination for migration for Turkey*

	No general inclination % (No.)	General inclination % (No.)	Total % (No.)
Some to no difficulties	94.8 (1,306)	5.2 (71)	100.0 (1,377)
Great difficulties	91.0 (335)	9.0 (33)	100.0 (368)
Total	94.0 (1,641)	6.0 (104)	100.0 (1,745)

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=7.526 p<0.01;
Pearson's R=0.066
Figures in parentheses indicate the actual number of respondents

Conclusion

Overall the results are relatively inconclusive. Income and deprivation, as well as subjectively perceived economic difficulties, have no linear and coherent influence on migration. No clear indication is given with regard to the relative influence of objective and subjective conditions on migration. In addition, the pattern between the two countries varies significantly, providing statistically significant results only for Turkey.

Turkey shows a strong and significant influence of high and low income, of low deprivation and of high perceived economic strain on the willingness to migrate. There is a cumulative pattern of influence on migration, which combines objective and subjective factors. Polish respondents with high income and medium level deprivation have a greater tendency to migration, but not in statistically significant numbers. Economic strain is not shown to be important in Poland.

These results do not fit easily in any conceptual framework. Either the empirical reality is more complex than the theoretical predictions, or the quality of the underlying data is not sufficient to allow a serious empirical test. It would not be advisable on the basis of this data to transpose the non-relevance of objective and subjective material conditions in Poland onto all acceding countries, and the results for Turkey onto the other two candidate countries. The study will come back to those questions in the context of the multivariate analysis in chapter six.

5. Subjective quality of life and migration

Concept

This chapter deals with the influence of an additional aspect of quality of life on migration. Quality of life has objective conditions, which have been partly measured and analysed in relation to migration in previous chapters of this study. But it also includes the respondents' subjective experience of quality of life, which is called 'subjective well-being'[100]. The overarching question in this chapter is whether negative aspects of subjective well-being related to the current place of living are a driving force for migration.

Following Delhey (2003, p.1), subjective well-being can be conceptualised: 1) as positive or negative hedonic feelings ('worries'; 'happiness'), and 2) as a cognitive expression of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This study will focus on the latter. In conceptual terms, its relationship to objective conditions is often complex. Personal satisfaction partly reflects objective conditions, but these conditions are evaluated in the context of a person's own standards (norms, values, expectations), which can vary from country to country, from social group to social group, or even at the individual level (Delhey, 2003, p. 2).

Life satisfaction can be conceptualised in two ways: first, as a general life satisfaction and regarded as a complex indicator, which summarises satisfaction in various important aspects of life. The second approach focuses on several specific aspects of life itself or on 'life domains'. Delhey (2003, p. 12) suggests differentiating life domains according to the extent of individual control. Consequently, satisfaction with quality of family life is defined as a domain of close individual control, and satisfaction with the health system as a domain of public control. Within the remit of this study, seven specific life domains are included as well as an indicator of general life satisfaction. Health, family life and social life are defined as life domains of close individual control. The health care system, financial situation, employment and housing are seen as life domains influenced by market and state intervention.

Within this context, four main questions are at the centre of the present chapter:
1. Does individual dissatisfaction lead to the decision to relocate the household and to migrate into the EU?
2. How important is general life satisfaction for migration?
3. To what extent does satisfaction in specific life domains influence migration?
4. Has dissatisfaction with life domains, which are privately controlled, a stronger effect on migration than dissatisfaction in life domains outside the immediate control of the individual?

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[100] For conceptual approaches, see e.g. the concept of the Finnish scholar E. Allardt (1993), who defines quality of life with the formula of a summation of having, loving and being. In a recent study, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions put forward its definition of quality of life (Fahey et al, 2003).

[101] This relationship can also be described within the context of an RREEMM model as discussed in chapter 2.8 of the present study.

The relationship between migration and satisfaction has been developed by Wolpert (1965 and 1966). As a basic assumption, he regards migration as one possible adaptation strategy to perceived changes in people's environments. Wolpert underlines in his approach the importance of 1) subjective perception of objective conditions, 2) existing aspiration levels for good quality of life, and 3) resulting levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Higher levels of dissatisfaction can, but do not necessarily, lead to migration, as the individual concerned has the choice between different adjustment options[102]. Within the existing set of options, one adjustment strategy is migration.

Unlike mainstream economic and many socio-economic concepts of migration, Wolpert moves away from a concept where the rationale of behaviour is driven by maximisation and where decision-making is based on rational choice. He proposes, instead, a concept where behaviour is based on the rationale of 'satisfying'. Therefore, the individual is not choosing the best of all alternatives in a multi-layered decision-making process, but accepts conditions in a potential new place of living, if he/she is satisfied with perceived conditions higher than in the current place of living. Hence, in an ideal empirical setting, dissatisfaction with the current place of living should be compared with possible satisfaction of the new target place of living. Unfortunately, this goes beyond the information provided in the Eurobarometer survey[103]. The present study can only measure the level of satisfaction in the current place of living.

Empirical results will be presented in the following sections for Poland and Turkey only, for the same reasons as outlined in the previous chapter. The next section discusses the influence of general life satisfaction on migration. There then follows an analysis of the influence of life domains which are under close control of the individual. This is followed by the analysis of life domains which are more remote to individual control and strongly dominated by market forces or by the state.

General life satisfaction

General life satisfaction is measured with the following question: 'please tell me whether you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with your life in general?' This indicator is regarded by some scholars (Delhey, 2003) as the most comprehensive single indicator which covers people's subjective well-being. They believe it summarises the individuals' assessment of personal living conditions and their societal surroundings. As a single indicator, it also summarises people's satisfaction in various life domains within one single measurement. In order to deal with the low number of cases, the four dimensions on satisfaction are reduced to two dimensions 'satisfied' and 'not satisfied'.

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[102] Wolpert (1966) distinguished between adjusting needs, restructuring the environment and relocating.

[103] Wolpert (1966) also reflects on the selection process of possible target regions which are considered by the potential migrant. He develops the concept of an 'action space', which is defined by the considered alternatives. It is determined by individual needs, previous experiences including experiences in different forms of regional mobility, and personal networks. Choices between different target areas are also restricted by search and information costs.

Table 28: *Cross-tabulation of general life satisfaction by general inclination for migration for Poland*

	No general inclination	General inclination	Total
No. of respondents	938	43	981
Satisfied (%)	95.6	4.4	100.0
No. of respondents	593	19	612
Not satisfied (%)	96.9	3.1	100.0
No. of respondents	1531	62	1593
Total (%)	96.1	3.9	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=1.647 n.s; Pearson's R=-0.032

The results for Poland and Turkey are displayed in tables 28 and 29. Poland has a weak and not statistically significant positive relationship. Here, the general inclination to migration is highest in those groups of migrants whose overall life satisfaction is highest. Turkey shows a strong and statistically significant inverse relationship. A strong overall life dissatisfaction doubles the general inclination to migration from 4.3% to 8.9%. This leads to the conclusion that potential Polish and Turkish migrants have different patterns in how they react to general life satisfaction. For Turkish people, migration is perceived as a possible option to overcome existing negative experiences of subjective well-being, whereas, in Poland, dissatisfied people do not regard migration to the EU as a more relevant alternative than satisfied people do.

Table 29: *Cross-tabulation of general life satisfaction by general inclination for migration for Turkey*

	No general inclination	General inclination	Total
No. of respondents	1,107	50	1,157
Satisfied (%)	95.7	4.3	100.0
No. of respondents	541	53	594
Not satisfied (%)	91.1	8.9	100.0
No. of respondents	1,648	103	1,751
Total (%)	94.1	5.9	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=15.008 p<0.001; Pearson's R=0.093

Subjective quality of life in private domains

In the next step, the study turns to three single life domains, which are under relatively close control of the individual and which are regarded by many individuals to be of great importance for their subjective quality of life. It includes the domains of health, family life and social life[104].

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[104] The questions used have the same structure as the question on 'general life satisfaction'.

Table 30: *Cross-tabulation of health satisfaction by general inclination for migration for Poland*

	No general inclination	General inclination	Total
No. of respondents	1,040	54	1,094
Satisfied (%)	95.1	4.9	100.0
No. of respondents	489	8	497
Not satisfied (%)	98.4	1.6	100.0
No. of respondents	1,529	62	1,591
Total (%)	96.1	3.9	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=10.097 p<0.01
Pearson's R=-0.080

Potential migrants in Poland show a complex pattern (see tables 30-32). High satisfaction levels with personal health and one's own social life have a weak but non-significant positive effect on migration, whereas dissatisfaction with family life has a strong and significant positive effect on migration. In Poland, dissatisfaction with family life is a push or pull factor for migration, as it remains unclear if dissatisfaction is related to the existing family situation in Poland or the prospect of a family re-unification abroad.

Table 31: *Cross-tabulation of family life satisfaction by general inclination for migration for Poland*

	No general inclination	General inclination	Total
No. of respondents	1,311	44	1,355
Satisfied (%)	96.8	3.2	100.0
No. of respondents	207	17	224
Not satisfied (%)	92.41	7.6	100.0
No. of respondents	1,518	61	1,579
Total (%)	96.1	3.9	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=9.758 p<0.01
Pearson's R=0.079

Table 32: *Cross-tabulation of social life satisfaction by general inclination for migration for Poland*

	No general inclination	General inclination	Total
No. of respondents	1224	56	1280
Satisfied (%)	95.6	4.4	100.0
No. of respondents	277	7	284
Not satisfied (%)	97.5	2.5	100.0
No. of respondents	1501	63	1564
Total (%)	96.0	4.0	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=2.194 n.s
Pearson's R=-0.037

The Turkish results have a more homogeneous pattern (see tables 33-35), which is in line with the results for overall life satisfaction. Dissatisfaction with health, family and social life has a potential positive effect on the inclination to migrate. These effects are not very strong and not statistically significant.

Table 33: Cross-tabulation of health satisfaction by general inclination for migration for Turkey

	No general inclination	General inclination	Total

No. of respondents	1,310	76	1,386
Satisfied (%)	94.5	5.5	100.0
No. of respondents	335	27	362
Not satisfied (%)	92.5	7.5	100.0
No. of respondents	1,645	103	1,748
Total (%)	94.1	5.9	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=2.019 n.s;
Pearson's R=0.034

Table 34: *Cross-tabulation of family life satisfaction by general inclination for migration for Turkey*

	No general inclination	General inclination	Total
No. of respondents	1,465	90	1,555
Satisfied (%)	94.2	5.8	100.0
No. of respondents	181	14	195
Not satisfied (%)	92.8	7.2	100.0
No. of respondents	1,646	104	1,750
Total (%)	94.1	5.9	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=0.600 n.s;
Pearson's R=0.019

Table 35: *Cross-tabulation of social life satisfaction by general inclination for migration for Turkey*

	No General Inclination	General Inclination	Total
No. of respondents	1,052	57	1,109
Satisfied (%)	94.9	5.1	100.0
No. of respondents	586	46	632
Not satisfied (%)	92.7	7.3	100.0
No. of respondents	1,638	103	1,741
Total (%)	94.1	5.9	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=3.308 n.s;
Pearson's R=0.044

Comparing both countries leads to the surprising results that dissatisfaction with close personal circumstances has only a minor effect on inclination to migrate for Turkey and an ambivalent effect in Poland. Dissatisfaction with the family situation is the only joint influence factor in both countries. Overall dissatisfaction with personal circumstances is not regarded as a very relevant factor in making decisions on migration in both countries.

Subjective quality of life in state and market domains

Is there more direct influence of dissatisfaction in life domains which are strongly influenced by market developments and government decisions? Again, the Polish population has an ambivalent pattern. Higher satisfaction with personal financial situation is associated with a higher willingness to migrate. Those results confirm the conclusions in chapter four, which demonstrated the highest propensity to migrate in the highest Polish income quartile.

Table 36: *Cross-tabulation of financial situation satisfaction by general inclination for migration for Poland*

	No general inclination	General inclination	Total
No. of respondents	485	28	513
Satisfied (%)	94.5	5.5	100.0
No. of respondents	1,037	35	1,072

Not satisfied (%)	96.7	3.3	100.0
No. of respondents	1,522	63	1,585
Total (%)	96.0	4.0	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=4.372 p<0.05
Pearson's R=-0.053

The other three indicators on employment, housing and health systems all go in the opposite direction (tables 37-39), as higher degrees of dissatisfaction are in line with a higher propensity to migrate, but without any statistical significance. Following the results on employment status in chapter three, it is not surprising that dissatisfaction with one's personal employment situation leads to an increased willingness to migrate. That chapter demonstrated that the percentage of unemployed people in Poland who are willing to migrate is only half the size of the equivalent number of Polish students. In Poland, bad objective and subjective employment prospects are only a minor push factor for migration.

Table 37: *Cross-tabulation of employment situation satisfaction by general inclination for migration for Poland*

	No general inclination	General inclination	Total
No. of respondents	543	16	559
Satisfied (%)	97.1	2.9	100.0
No. of respondents	647	27	674
Not satisfied (%)	96.0	4.0	100.0
No. of respondents	1,190	43	1,233
Total (%)	96.5	3.5	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=1.187 n.s
Pearson's R=0.031

Perhaps surprisingly low is the effect of dissatisfaction with the health care system on migration. The situation within the health care system is, for the Polish respondents, the life domain with the lowest level of satisfaction (Delhey, 2003, p. 14).

Table 38: *Cross-tabulation of country's health care system satisfaction by general inclination for migration for Poland*

	No general inclination	General inclination	Total
No. of respondents	460	15	475
Satisfied (%)	96.8	3.2	100.0
No. of respondents	1,026	48	1,074
Not satisfied (%)	95.5	4.5	100.0
No. of respondents	1,486	63	1,549
Total (%)	95.9	4.1	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002;
Pearson Chi-square=1.452 n.s

The low influence of the housing situation is very much in line with the conclusions of the motives to migrate in chapter four, where housing was the second least important motive for migration in Poland.

Table 39: *Cross-tabulation of housing by general inclination for migration for Poland*

	No general inclination	General inclination	Total
No. of respondents	1,212	44	1,256
Satisfied (%)	96.5	3.5	100.0
No. of respondents	318	19	337
Not satisfied (%)	94.4	5.6	100.0

No. of respondents	1,530	63	1,593
Total (%)	96.0	4.0	100.0

How do the Turkish results compare? In a first instance, all four Turkish indicators point in the same direction. Higher degrees of dissatisfaction lead to a higher propensity to migrate. Strong and significant effects occur for dissatisfaction with the personal employment situation and the health care system. Dissatisfaction with the latter leads to a more than a 150% increase in the general inclination to migrate in Turkey.

Table 40: *Cross-tabulation of country's health care system satisfaction by general inclination for migration for Turkey*

	No general inclination	General inclination	Total
No. of respondents	275	7	282
Satisfied (%)	97.5	2.5	100.0
No. of respondents	1,366	97	1,463
Not satisfied (%)	93.4	6.6	100.0
No. of respondents	1,641	104	1,745
Total (%)	94.0	6.0	100.0

Personal dissatisfaction with employment doubles the willingness to migrate from 4 to 8% in Turkey. This concurs with the results in chapter three on the influence of employment status on migration. In contrast to Poland, in Turkey, 12% of all unemployed people have a general inclination to migrate, which is the highest percentage in relation to all other groups. As for Poland, the objective and subjective conditions of employment combine to a joint effect on migration.

Table 41: *Cross-tabulation of employment situation satisfaction by general inclination for migration for Turkey*

	No general inclination	General inclination	Total
No. of respondents	705	30	735
Satisfied (%)	95.9	4.1	100.0
No. of respondents	854	72	926
Not satisfied (%)	92.2	7.8	100.0
No. of respondents	1,559	102	1,661
Total (%)	93.9	6.1	100.0

The personal financial and housing situation in Turkey is less important than the previous two factors. These results concur with table 20 in chapter three, where financial motives for migration are less important than employment reasons.

Table 42: *Cross-tabulation of financial situation satisfaction by general inclination for migration for Turkey*

	No general inclination	General inclination	Total
No. of respondents	631	31	662
Satisfied (%)	95.3	4.7	100.0
No. of respondents	1,016	73	1,089

Not satisfied (%)	93.3	6.7	100.0
No. of respondents	1,647	104	1,751
Total (%)	94.1	5.9	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=3.009 n.s
Pearson's R=0.041

In addition, potential migrants in Turkey are not very strongly motivated to migration based on dissatisfaction with their current housing situation. Table 43 shows a very even distribution.

Table 43: *Cross-tabulation of housing by general inclination for migration for Turkey*

	No general inclination	General inclination	Total
No. of respondents	1,372	85	1,457
Satisfied (%)	94.2	5.8	100.0
No. of respondents	273	19	292
Not satisfied (%)	93.5	6.5	100.0
No. of respondents	1,645	104	1,749
Total (%)	94.1	5.9	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Pearson Chi-square=0.197 n.s
Pearson's R=0.011

Conclusion

Overall life satisfaction, and life satisfaction in specific domains, have only a minor influence on the intention to migrate in the two countries. Subjective well-being in the current place of living is not a very relevant factor. Out of 16 tested relationships in both countries, only five showed a statistically significant bi-variate effect.

The majority of significant effects confirm the hypothesis that dissatisfaction with the current place of living has a tendency to increase the potential for migration. In this respect, dissatisfaction can be regarded as a push factor. However, there is one statistically significant relationship pointing in the opposite direction.

Overall, specific domain satisfaction has a stronger statistically significant effect on migration than general life satisfaction.

Satisfaction/dissatisfaction with remote life domains influence migration more than satisfaction with personal life domains. However, there is no clear indication of the direction of influence. At the personal level, dissatisfaction with family life has a strong encouraging effect on migration in Poland.

Both countries show very different patterns, which should be a warning against hasty generalisations of results. Turkey has a more homogenous pattern: dissatisfaction increases the willingness to migrate for all eight indicators and the statistical relationships are, overall, more robust. It has a combination of significant relationships through overall life satisfaction and through specific remote domain satisfaction, including employment and health care. Poland is quite different. It has four positive and four negative relationships between satisfaction and willingness to migrate, creating a more heterogeneous pattern.

The analysis provides ample evidence that objective and subjective quality of life aspects in both countries move in the same direction. Results from the analysis on socio-economic

conditions, motives to migrate and various levels of satisfaction point, mostly, in the same direction.

In conceptual terms, the results give some weak support for a 'satisfying' approach. Due to the data limitations, these results have to be interpreted with great care.

From an EU policy perspective, the results confirm the heterogeneous pattern of subjective quality of life indicators of potential migrants. If higher levels of dissatisfaction are a strong driver of migration and, if higher levels of dissatisfaction are combined with higher levels of expectation, Turkish migrants may require greater integration efforts than less dissatisfied Polish emigrants.

This effect, however, may be mitigated by the higher qualification level of Polish migrants, which usually goes hand in hand with higher aspiration levels.

6. Multivariate analysis

Following the analysis of the socio-structural factors of migration and the possible influence of economic and material conditions on the basis of a bi-variate statistical analysis, this chapter provides a multivariate analysis using a logistic regression of odds ratios. In preparation, it is necessary to define, for each variable, a reference dimension which takes over the function as a comparator for the odds of the other dimensions. An odds ratio above the value of one indicates a positive influence, whereas an odds ratio with a value smaller than one indicates a negative relationship. All odds ratios are tested for their significance level. According to professional standards, only results higher than a significance level of 95% are deemed statistically significant.

Components of the models

The dependent variable which is used is the general inclination to migrate. As in chapters four and five, the analysis focuses only on Turkey and Poland in order to provide enough cases for an appropriate analysis. In order to identify country specific factors, the analysis is done separately for both countries.

For the multivariate analysis of the general inclination for migration, the study has identified the following set of important explanatory factors:

1. Gender
Gender is likely to have an impact on general inclination for migration. It compares male and female.

2. Age group
The study distinguishes four age groups: 15-24, 25-39, 40-54 and 55+. It compares the first two categories and the last one against the 40-54 age group.

3. Marital status
The study identifies three categories: widowed/separated/divorced, married/cohabiting, single. The last two categories are compared to the first one.

4. Employment status
The study distinguishes four categories: other inactive, employed, unemployed and student. The last three statuses are compared to the first one.

5. Education
The study makes the following distinction: those who finished education at the age of 15 or under, those who finished between 16 and 19 years, at 20 years or older, and those still studying. The last three categories are compared to the first one.

6. Position in income distribution
Individuals are categorised by equivalent household income quartiles position. It compares the lower three quartiles to the top income quartile.

7. Economic strain
This study distinguishes between those having great difficulties and those having few or no difficulties. The former is compared to the latter.

8. Multiple deprivations
The study identifies three categories of deprivation level, as outlined previously: those having a low deprivation level, a medium deprivation level, and a high deprivation level. The last two categories are compared to the first one.

Main results

The logistic regression of the general inclination to migrate supports results in previous chapters of different causal patterns in Poland and Turkey. This result reaffirms again the strong influence of country specific effects, which are also increasingly considered in econometric models of migration[105].

Overall, the Polish model includes only three significant causal relationships. None of these are surprising and are well argued in various concepts of migration. Men are more likely to migrate than women in Poland. In this respect, the Polish results do not support concepts predicting an increasing feminisation of migration. The youngest age group has a significantly higher probability to migrate than older age groups. This result is in line with human capital concepts and other empirical research in Europe. Lastly, unemployed people are significantly stronger motivated to migrate than other groups in the employment status category. Uncertain employment prospects are an important push factor.

Table 44: *Logistic regression of the odds of having general inclination for migration*

	Poland	Turkey
Gender	Ref	Ref
Female		
Male	2.377**	1.583 n.s
Age group		
Aged 40-54	Ref	Ref
Aged 15-24	4.782*	1.400 n.s
Aged 25-39	2.342 n.s	2.182*
Aged 55+	0.002 n.s	0.603 n.s
Marital status		
Widow/Sep/Div	Ref	Ref
Marr/Cohab	0.491 n.s	1.030 n.s
Single	0.958 n.s	1.217 n.s
Employment status		
Other inactive	Ref	Ref
Employed	1.369 n.s	1.161 n.s
Unemployed	7.131*	3.265**
Student	5.529 n.s	4.725**
Age finished education		
Up to 15 years	Ref	Ref
16-19	1.333 n.s	1.865*
20 +	1.290 n.s	3.554***
Still studying	0.913 n.s	-

[105] A good example is the latest study of the European Commission on migration (2001, p.96).

Income distribution		
Top quartile	Ref	Ref
Bottom quartile	0.481 n.s	0.721 n.s
Second quartile	0.827 n.s	0.499*
Third quartile	0.545 n.s	0.514*
Economic strain		
Little difficulty/easily	Ref	Ref
Great difficulty	0.942 n.s	1.391 n.s
Deprivation level		
Low deprivation	Ref	Ref
Medium deprivation	1.252 n.s	2.079**
High deprivation	0.315 n.s	1.368 n.s

*P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001

In Poland, neither higher education nor marital/single status has a significant influence. The non-significance of higher education is astonishing against the background of the conceptual debate, even though several authors have questioned the empirical effect[106]. It could, however, be interpreted as an indication of uncertainty about the comparative relative gains of migration just before accession takes place. In contrast to the results in many of the acceding and candidate countries, being a student in Poland is not a significant driver for migration.

As far as the influence of objective and perceived material conditions is concerned, the multivariate analysis confirms the results of the bi-variate analysis: that high income is a driver and that low income is a potential, but not significant, barrier for migration in Poland. Deprivation and perceived economic strain have no influence.

The Turkish model has eight significant influence factors and therefore fits previous conceptual debate better[107]. As in the bi-variate analysis on age, the second youngest age group has the highest probability towards migration. Different family structures in Turkey may be the reason for later migration during the life course. Another explanation could be that the young age effect is superimposed by the 'student effect'. Students, the majority of whom are between 18 and 24 years old, have a significantly higher propensity to migrate than other occupational groups in Turkey. This strong student effect is in line with the overall results for all ACC 13.

Unemployment is as important a driver of migration in Turkey as it is in Poland. Hence, basic economic thinking is confirmed.

Medium and, in particular, higher education strongly influences migration. Probably higher education is a pull and facilitating factor. It pulls potential migrants by prospects for improved income in the potential target countries. It also facilitates search and information behaviour.

The material conditions of potential migrants confirm an inconclusive, but statistically significant, direction of influence. The position in the national income distribution shows a U-curve relationship, as the lowest probability is in the two medium income quartiles.

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[106] See e.g. the collection of empirical studies by Bauer and Zimmermann (1999, pp. 27-28)
[107] This is in line with the overall results in chapters two and four.

Conversely, the deprivation level has an opposite U-curve effect, where medium level deprivation has the highest positive effect on the intention to migrate. For some groups of respondents, migration is pushed by lower income; for others, higher income and sufficient command of material goods (medium deprivation) provide the resources to consider migration as a serious alternative to the existing way of life and to support effective preparatory initiatives.

Marital status and subjective economic strain have no significant influence on potential migration in either country. The male influence on migration is evident is both countries; however, it is insignificant in Turkey. Unemployment is the only common influence factor in both countries.

The results of this multivariate analysis provide the last empirical input for the overall conclusions of this study.

7. Conclusions

This study provides the most recent and most geographically comprehensive analysis of the volume and structure of potential migration from east to west in advance of the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and before possible further enlargements covering additional candidate countries. The results contribute to the current political and scientific debate on the new east–west migration puzzle. This final chapter reflects and discusses implications of the empirical and theoretical findings of the study from a policy point of view and from a research perspective.

Policy perspective

From a policy perspective, three different angles have to be considered. Firstly, it is important to analyse possible policy implications for different political units. These are the 'old' Member States, the acceding countries, the three remaining candidate countries as well as an overall EU perspective. The central questions are whether the more serious economic and social consequences of migration occur in the receiving or the sending countries. Is there a difference between sending countries close to EU membership and sending countries whose prospects of membership are still uncertain?

Secondly, five important characteristics of the migration process are important for political reflections: volume, structure of migrants, type of migration, dynamics over time and regional distribution in target areas.

Thirdly, the main characteristics of the expected migration process need to be assessed within a specific policy focus on labour market, social cohesion/social inclusion and demographic issues[108]. In addition, overall political implications related to increasing diversity, xenophobia and a multi-cultural society are briefly discussed.

Relevant facts

1. Volume
The present study concurs with the results of most methodologically acceptable micro and macro studies that the EU should not expect a tidal wave of emigrants from the eastern and Mediterranean acceding and candidate countries. All indicators point to a volume similar to that experienced after the southern enlargement of the EU in the 1980s.

- The volume of narrow migration potential (firm intention) is likely to be around 1% of the population stock of 15 years and older from the ACC 13 and AC 10 in the next five years under the condition of free movement.
- The largest, but relatively unrealistic, migration potential (general inclination) is between 3% and 4.5% in the same time span.

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[108] Other relevant policy issues such as trade, capital movement, regional policy, agricultural policy are acknowledged but excluded.

- The predictions of the present study for 10 of the central and eastern acceding and candidate countries, excluding the three Mediterranean countries, concur with the latest results of an econometric study of the European Commission predicting a gross migration of around 1.1 million within five years.
- Considering existing legal barriers of free movement and their sequential reduction in the next three to seven years in the current Member States, the predicted gross migration will be significantly under one million up to the end of 2006.

The predicted volume between the 13 acceding and candidate varies significantly, however. According to this study, the highest migration potential within the ACC 13 is in Bulgaria and Romania. Turkish respondents were much less likely to be considering to move to Europe, with a narrow migration potential of less than 0.5% and a wide migration potential of 6%. The figures for all larger acceding countries in the narrow band are around 1% in the next five years.

2. Structure
The profile of likely migrants from the acceding countries is of people who are young, better educated or students in third level education and living as a single non-cohabiting person. Increasing numbers of potential migrants are female.

- The sending countries face the prospect of a major 'youth drain', generally in a range of 2%-5% of the youngest group. In Bulgaria and Romania, the outflow from the youngest age group may be nearly 10% in the next five years.
- The potential youth drain is combined with a potential 'brain drain'. The sending countries are in danger of losing between 3% and 5% of people with third level education and more than 10% of their students. The net results may be a 'brain drain' of around 2-3% in the ACC in the next five years.
- The study confirms newer hypotheses of an increasing feminisation of migration. Within the narrow migration potential, women make up on average a share of 40%-45%. In larger countries, such as Poland and Bulgaria, and smaller countries, such as Latvia and Cyprus, their share is clearly over 50%. There are signs of an accelerating trend over time.
- Unemployment has an influence on migration, but to a much lesser extent than predicted, and only in a limited number of countries.
- Overall, between 2% and 3% of unemployed people want to migrate.
- Married people are less willing to migrate. The majority of potential migrants are single.

3. Regional distribution
The Eurobarometer data from 2002 do not provide any information on the intended target region and therefore no indication on the expected regional distribution of potential migrants in the 'old' Member States of the EU. The Commission study (2001, p.105) gives the following estimates based on the existing structure of regional distribution:
- two thirds of migrants aim for Germany;
- more than 10% consider Austria as target country;
- less than 5 % consider Italy and the UK;
- around 3% opt for Sweden.

In essence, the EU faces a very uneven distribution, which affects Germany most, based on an extrapolation of existing models.

4. Type of migration
The IOM study (1999) provides the opportunity to distinguish between potential permanent migration and different types of temporary migration. The overall message is that, in the acceding and candidate countries, most people want to migrate temporarily in order to earn more money and that only a minority want to migrate for ever. According to IOM, the proportion of permanent migrants in the overall migration potential – excluding very short-term migration of some weeks – is between 21% and 45%, averaging around one third[109]. Transposed onto the migration potential in the present study, the volume of permanent migration in the 13 acceding and candidate countries would roughly be:

- narrow permanent migration potential of 0.3%;
- widest permanent migration potential of 1-1.5%.

Following this logic, the absolute increase in permanent migrants from the 10 eastern European acceding and candidate countries[110] would be between 1.3 million (widest potential) and 0.3 million for narrow potential.

5. Dynamic over time
The Eurobarometer-based analysis can only provide estimates for a stock increase over five years. The Commission's study from 2001 has a dynamic element. It predicts 340,000 migrants in 2002, below 150,000 within a decade and reaching less than 3,000 in 2030.

'Old' Member States

The overall volume of expected inwards migration after enlargement and from the remaining candidate countries is much less than predicted by some politicians and in the public debate. Most 'old' countries of the EU are hardly affected. In addition, two thirds of all migration is likely to be of a temporary nature. Therefore, the old Member States will experience, in the 10 years after accession, significant return migration if the economic and social conditions improve in the new Member States. Consequently, overall negative labour and housing market effects will be limited and will be concentrated in certain regions and on specific occupational labour markets. Negative effects on the housing market are mitigated by the high percentage of single migrants with less demand on larger accommodation. The positive demographic effect for the old Member States will be marginal, due to the relatively small increase in the number of potential migrants up to 2030 and the expected return migration, triggered by improved living and employment conditions in the new Member States.

A moderate quantitative increase was already an underlying assumption in the accession treaties, in which three current Member States sought no restrictions on mobility from the outset. The results of this study support the general rationale of the accession treaties, allowing for the largest possible flexibility for each Member State in the next three to seven

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[109] This figure has been calculated as follows: potential migrants are defined as those respondents who want to migrate for several months. The percentage is the share of the respondents who want to migrate for good in relation to the shorter-term migrants.
[110] The range between firm intention and general inclination is between 1.2 and 3.7%.

years. The results also underline that it was prudent to exclude Malta and Cyprus from any restrictions on mobility, as the rates of migration are particularly low from these countries.

The strong effect on inwards migration for Germany and Austria, especially for certain border areas, is, however, confirmed by the econometric study of the European Commission (2001). For these countries and those areas, flanking measures using instruments of EU regional and structural policy and temporary limitations of access to specific local labour markets are advisable. Any return migration should be actively supported.

Looking at the profile of potential migrants, the outlook is relatively positive. The receiving countries of the EU can expect a high quality labour supply of young, qualified and mainly unmarried people, which should improve its short-term economic and its long-term socio-economic base via an improved demographic structure. This would seem to offer more opportunities than risks for the old EU Member States. Policy in the old Member States has to cope more with a problem of high aspiring young people than with social policy measures to support a larger number of previously unemployed migrants. In the short term, extended pressure on existing social security systems in the old EU Member States should not occur. Targeted measures in labour market and social inclusion policy should reflect existing structural features.

These positive effects should not be overestimated, however, as some studies raise doubts about the quality of the human capital in some of the acceding countries. The Commission's study (2001, p. 215) bases its evidence on the results of the adult literacy survey, which was conducted in 1994 and 1996 in some of the acceding countries and several EU Member States. It shows that the population in Poland, Czech Republic and Slovenia lags behind EU average literacy levels, especially in understanding text and its analytical use. It also highlights that the ability of the adult population to communicate in a foreign language is lower than in the EU Member States. The importance of these overall results for the whole population could be questioned by arguing that younger groups and students, who are the majority of potential migrants, would have higher literacy levels. This argument is tested in the third TIMMS survey. It shows that younger groups have the same literacy problems as the older groups.

The expected profile of the potential migrants does not support any fears of higher than average levels of deviant behaviour, resulting in increased violence and crime. The relative low level of language knowledge, however, makes integration and social inclusion activities more cumbersome.

Acceding and candidate countries

Within the acceding and candidate countries, the possible labour market effects of accession are seen as 'double-edged'. Countries with high levels of unemployment and low economic growth rates may benefit from migration in the short term by reducing their labour supply and leaving fewer people without jobs. It is questionable whether the vast majority of potential migrants, who are younger and better qualified, would have serious employment problems in their home country. Therefore, the positive labour market effect in the sending countries is doubtful.

Also, the remittance payments of migrant workers have a positive impact on income, consumption and aggregated internal demand. However, if countries face emigration of higher qualified people, this may reduce their potential for economic growth and may erode their long-term competitive position. It is agreed that such a 'brain drain' has negative repercussions on the developmental process.

The empirical results confirm that the sending countries face the prospect of a major 'youth drain' in a range of 2% to 5% of the youngest group in the next five years. The potential youth drain is combined with a potential 'brain drain'. The sending countries are in danger of losing between 3% and 5% of people with third level education, and more than 10% of their students. The net results may be a 'brain drain' of around 2-3% in both groups in the next five years. As these figures cover only potential migrants to the EU and exclude potential migrants to other countries, in particular the US and other destinations overseas, the actual figure of younger and better-educated migrants may be closer to 3.5 or 4%.

For the acceding and candidate countries, these figures mark a significant challenge to improve their internal economic and social performance. The main motivations for migration of younger and better qualified people are hopes for a better quality of life and better income prospects in the 'old' EU Member States. This raises important issues for EU developmental policy for the ACC 13 and particularly for Bulgaria and Romania in the pre-accession phase before 2007.

The extent of the potential brain and youth drain seems more limited, however, if one considers the firm intention to migrate. Many students and single persons have a general feeling that migration may be an option, but have yet invested little time and effort to make it happen in the near future. A possible mitigating factor is the combination of emigration and immigration in many acceding and candidate countries. This may provide an opportunity for those countries to counterbalance a proportion of their potential brain and youth drain with incoming migrants from countries of the eastern and south-eastern border of an enlarged EU.

Another positive feature for the acceding and candidate countries is the expected return migration, combined with a possible 'brain gain'. The predicted dynamic over time of the migration process up to 2030 and previous experience with the southern enlargement of the EU in the 1980s support those expectations. An improved economic situation and a higher quality of life leading to better living conditions could be an argument to return to the country of origin, particularly for highly skilled people. In the years to come, initiatives of the new Member States and coordinated activities at EU level should promote and support return migration in order to maximise the possible brain gain.

EU level initiatives

Overall, EU initiatives should try to balance the interests of the 'old' and the 'new' Member States in relation to migration. The assessment in the two previous sections supports the conclusion that the new Member States may face a more serious challenge due to outwards migration in the years to come than the old Member States. The EU should provide appropriate regional and structural policy measures to stimulate growth and to encourage young and highly qualified employees to remain in their countries. If migration takes place, the Union has to integrate the interest of migrants into the European strategy to promote

social inclusion. Several national action plans already recognise the growing ethnic and cultural diversity and the high risks of social exclusion for migrants[111]. Also, the European employment strategy should positively support enhanced labour mobility in an enlarging European Union, if it is to be beneficial for both sides.

The effectiveness of these policy measures can be improved if policy design considers the socio-economic profile of potential migrants, and related opportunities and constraints specific to these groups. Labour market policies dealing with the causes of migration and social policies dealing with their consequences should also consider the feminisation of migration in their policy design.

The joint Industrial Relations Report 2003 of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions and the European Commission (2003, pp. 77-88) indicates the possibilities of involving social partners in the development of national level migration policies. In addition, the social partners can include migration issues in collective agreements, on-going company level consultation processes or unilateral activities such as political campaigns or personnel policy.

Research perspective

This study has taken a particular research perspective to base its empirical work on micro data. By providing a descriptive and causal analysis at the individual level, the study uses the particular strength of the available data to understand migration behaviour and provide indications for policy. However, as Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) and Kalter (2003) argue, international migration is empirically not sufficiently researched. This study has important methodological limitations and therefore uncertainties attached to the results.

In this final section, two main questions will be briefly discussed: 1) Do the empirical results of the study provide any significant contribution to the conceptual debate and existing empirical knowledge on migration? 2) What further possibilities exist to develop a research agenda on east–west migration?

Relevant results from a research perspective

The conceptual discussion in annex two provides a large variety of useful hypotheses. An integrated concept of migration is not yet in sight. The discussion suggests complementing the dominant economic concepts with socio-economic approaches covering, in particular, the social network, relative deprivation and family effects of migration. In addition, an application of sociological concepts of a general theory of action looks promising for the conceptual debate on migration.

This study is not testing an integrated concept of migration. It bases its empirical work on a comprehensive 13-country sample, but on a limited dataset on migration, collected in a broad omnibus survey. It examines the influence of major economic and social factors on the intention to migrate.

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[111] As mentioned in the social situation report 2002 (Commission of the European Union et al 2002, p. 19).

The results on age, education and unemployment are in line with mainstream research. In contrast to other studies, this report identifies students as a potentially strongly motivated group for migration. It also highlights the emerging feminisation of migration as an important research topic.

The results of the effects of objective and subjective material conditions on migration are inconclusive. They have no significant effect in one country (Poland) and a variation of direction of significant influences in another country (Turkey). Neither a material push concept of low income and high deprivation nor an enabling high-and medium-income effect is confirmed as a constant pattern. Also, a migration band effect based on a U-curve relation finds no support.

Subjective quality of life, defined as overall life satisfaction and life satisfaction in specific domains, has only a minor influence on the intention to migrate in the two countries. Subjective well-being in the current place of living is not a very relevant factor. The satisfying model of Wolpert (1966) does not find much support within the current study.

The overall results of the causal analysis lead to different patterns for different countries. The inconclusive Polish results may be based on the specific structure of the wider migration potential in Poland, where two thirds are under 25 years of age, male and have tertiary education, or are students. In addition, more than 80% are single. The results reaffirm the strong influence of country specific effects and are a warning against any simplistic generalisation of country specific results.

Further research

The results of the present study indicate avenues for further empirical and methodological developments in order to provide relevant and high quality research, which can inform policy-making at European and national levels.

One avenue is a more comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the Eurobarometer data from 2002. The following relevant influence factors on migration could be further researched:
- Reduction in information and search costs based on previous experience with mobility in general and with migration in particular.
- Additional rationales for migration related to better long-term labour market prospects (career), better welfare state provisions (social benefits and public services) and an improved social life in general.
- A more in-depth analysis of the unemployment effect on migration by analysing past experience with unemployment, its frequency and duration.
- Providing a regional breakdown of border regions to the old Member States and more distant areas (gravitation theory).
- Controlling for the strong push effect of rural areas by analysing the rural-urban divide.
- Considering the importance of the number of children and of the family structure for migration. This has limitations due to the high proportion of single people within the group of potential migrants.
- Researching the feminisation hypothesis by a more in-depth socio-structural analysis of female migrants.

In methodological terms, a wider use should be made of multivariate models. More countries or clustered groups of countries should be included into the multivariate analysis (e.g. the Baltic States; Bulgaria and Romania; Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary; Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia).

A second avenue within the remit of the Eurobarometer data is an analysis of the reasons for non-migration. The survey offers several questions to analyse this question in more depth.

A third avenue is the possible re-analysis of existing multi-country datasets, such as the surveys from Fassmann and Hintermann (1997), IOM (1999) and the European Commission from 1993. In particular, the re-analysis of the IOM survey seems to be very promising, as it provides the most comprehensive measurement of the potential to migrate.

Finally, policy advice should be based on improved datasets in various ways:
- Establishing a complete picture of migration behaviour with regard to its various forms (temporary, long-term, permanent) and its legal status (official and non-registered).
- Providing data with a longitudinal dimension in order to cope with the dynamics of migration, through panel data, retrospective migration biographies, community level case studies, action research or with the help of regular cross sectional surveys.
- Covering the family dimension better, by interviewing different members of the family, collecting more information on the family or by conducting case studies.
- Analysing in more depth emerging trends like the feminisation of migration and the development of transnational spaces where rotating migration occurs.
- Providing more in-depth information by combining qualitative and quantitative data.
- Giving policy advice for EU institutions, national governments, social partners and NGOs in order to cope with an increasing diversification of the types of migration and an increasing heterogeneity of migrants. Both trends call for new and more differentiated policies.

In conclusion, migration has become an important policy issue in the EU. The results of this study confirm that, in comparison with the hot issue of third country migration, the issue of east–west migration in an enlarging EU is relatively un-dramatic. Challenges exist but they seem manageable for the 'old', the 'new' and the 'still aspiring' Member States of the EU.

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Annex 1: Note on the data

This study is based on Eurobarometer data collected for the European Commission, which has launched a new series of surveys in the 13 countries that are applying for European Union membership. The objective of the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer is to gather information from the future Member States in a way that allows direct comparison with the Standard Eurobarometer carried out in the existing EU. Using this new tool, the Commission is able to provide decision makers and the European public with opinion data that helps them to understand similarities and differences between the EU and the acceding and candidate countries. The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer tracks support for EU membership and changes in attitudes related to European issues in the acceding and candidate countries. In the coming years, a series of Candidate Countries Eurobarometer reports are planned to be released.

This survey was conducted in early Spring 2002 in the 13 acceding and candidate countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey. In Cyprus, the survey only covers citizens living on the southern part of the island. An identical set of questions was asked of representative samples of the population aged 15 years and over in each candidate country. The regular sample in Candidate Countries Eurobarometer surveys is 1,000 persons per country, except Malta and Cyprus (500 each). For this study, a 2000 sample was used in Poland and Turkey to achieve better coverage[112].

In each of the 13 acceding and candidate countries, national institutes associated with and coordinated by the Gallup Organisation in Hungary carried out the survey. The network of institutes was selected by tender. All institutes are members of the 'European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research' (ESOMAR) and comply with its standards. The data shown in this report for each of the acceding and candidate countries are weighted by sex, age, region, size of locality, education level and marital status. The figures given for the acceding and candidate countries as a whole (ACC 13) are weighted on the basis of the adult population in each country. Due to the rounding of figures in certain cases, the total percentage in a table does not always add up exactly to 100%.

Due to the number of interviewees with an intention to migrate, relative to the sample size and the small sample size in some countries, it is not possible to provide a statistically significant country-by-country analysis. Therefore, it was decided to create country clusters. Clustering was done on a pragmatic basis:
- the two candidate countries Bulgaria and Romania, which have similar economic and social structures and where migration trends move in the same direction;
- the three Baltic Countries;
- the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, based on a shared Habsburg central European history and a joint transition experience after 1989. However, important differences remain;
- the two new southern European Member States Cyprus and Malta, as well as Slovenia. These three countries represent the group of the new Member States with the highest standard of living.

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[112] Unfortunately, the author has no information on the response rates.

Poland and Turkey, as the two largest countries of the ACC, have not been clustered, as the survey provides an over-sampling of 2,000 interviews for each country and therefore a sufficient number of interviewees.

Annex 2: Concepts of migration

Selective approach

This annex provides a selective presentation and discussion of relevant concepts of regional migration. It has to be selective in several ways, as it is impossible to give a complete overview on the theoretical foundations of migration, due to the large number of contributions and their wide spread nature[113]. The concepts discussed should support the specific objectives of this study, which are to conceptualise migration attitudes and support a causal analysis of the question of how to explain a specific attitude towards migration. That concepts have to have an explanatory power (a nomological base), which goes beyond pure conceptualisation, classification and typologies[114].

They also need to allow testing of hypotheses with the help of individual survey data. Hence, the main emphasis is on existing micro concepts of migration. Selective macro concepts of migration will only be discussed with the perspective of what extent they provide relevant hypotheses for the attitudes of migrants at the micro level. Lastly, the theories should be useful as a solid basis for relevant policy advice on the issue of regional mobility from the acceding and candidate countries. In this respect, it might be useful to refer back to competing macro concepts in the context of micro-level based policy advice.

The report has used specific parts of the theoretical discussion on migration for its specific purposes. However, there were deliberate limits to the conceptual discussion within this study. The objective of this annex is not to present an integrated migration theory, which is seen by several scholars as one of the major challenges for the future development of migration research.

Due to its focus on migration of people in the acceding and candidate countries towards the EU, the study is not interested in explaining all facets of regional mobility in the acceding and candidate countries[115]. It deals deliberately only with one alternative of regional mobility among other alternatives. However, it is aware that attitudes of migration towards different target areas are closely related to each other. They provide a set of alternatives once regional migration in general is taken into consideration as an option to improve the quality of life[116].

With this emphasis on micro concepts of migration, the study follows a general trend in migration research in the last 20 years, which has put more emphasis on micro theories[117].

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[113] Migration has always been an interdisciplinary subject with contributions in sociology, economics, demography, political science, ethnology, social psychology and other fields (Kalter, 1997).

[114] In addition, the concepts have to be useful in developing hypotheses for a specific kind of migration by focusing on attitudes towards regional mobility from the acceding and candidate countries towards the EU within a wider context of migration, which ranges from intra regional to intercontinental mobility.

[115] A good overview is provided by OECD (2001).

[116] This useful avenue of theoretical reflection on migration will be excluded, however, as the existing empirical data do not provide any information on the relationship between expected utilities and costs of respondents in different target areas of migration.

[117] See, for example, Kalter (1997, pp.15-16)

Migration theory generally deals with three questions: 1) why move? 2) why stay? 3) why do many people never consider moving despite conducive objective conditions?[118]

Classification of theoretical contributions to migration

In order to structure the various theoretical contributions to migration, it is useful to provide a brief classification of these contributions to the debate. Six basic dimensions for classification can be identified:

1. Contributions can be found in various scientific domains. The main distinction is between economic and non-economic theories of migration. Economic theories of migration include relevant macro and micro theories. Those theories have gained a large importance in the current policy debate on migration by estimating expected potentials for migration in general and for emigration into the EU from the acceding and candidate countries in particular. They also provide salient policy advice. Non-economic theories can be found in a wide range of social science subjects. In newer contributions, they cover mainly sociological and socio-psychological aspects[119].

Figure 1: *The three levels of migration analysis*

MICRO **Value or desires and expectancies**	**MESO** **Collectives and social network**	**MACRO** **Macro-level opportunity structures**
Individual values and expectancies - improving and securing survival, wealth, status, comfort, stimulation, autonomy, affiliation and morality	*social ties* - strong ties: families and households - weak ties: networks of potential movers, brokers and stayers; *symbolic ties* - kin, ethnic, national, political, and religious organisations; symbolic communities **content of ties – transactions** obligations, reciprocity, and solidarity; information, control and access to resources of others	*economics* - income and unemployment differentials *politics* - regulation of spatial mobility through nation-states and international regimes; - political repression, ethnic, national and religious conflicts *cultural setting* - dominant norms and discourses *demography and ecology* - population growth; - availability of arable land - level of technology

2. The level of analysis distinguishes between macro, meso and micro perspectives, which are summarised in figure one by Faist (2000). Macro economic neoclassical

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[118] The last question has attracted a lot of attention in micro-theoretical contributions of migration as it provides a challenge to the dominating models of rational choice. 'The biggest problem with the application of a cost-benefit model to human migration many not be the crudeness of the actual calculation, but the fact that many people never make any calculation at all. A great number of non-migrants we interviewed appear to have never given any serious consideration to the thought of moving anywhere' (Speare, 1971, p. 130).
[119] One important objective in this context is to develop a general theory of migration and to integrate it into a general theory of human behaviour. Other approaches can be found in research on human ecology (e.g. Duncan, 1959) and on world systems theory (Wallerstein, 1974). In addition, there are relevant contributions to migration from ethnology, demography and political science.

theories of migration focus mainly on conditions leading to an equilibrium between regional labour markets and focus on the migrant as a supplier of labour. Other macro economic theories question the model of rational choice and argue that international migration is mainly caused by the intrinsic labour demand of modern industrial societies. A good example is the dual labour market theory. The world system theory is another macro approach, which interprets the creation of a mobile population in peripheral non-capitalistic societies as the result of the penetration of capitalist economic relations worldwide[120]. Various institutional theories are also important at the macro level (see Massey et al, 1993, p. 450f). Once migration on the international level has begun, various institutions are established to satisfy the demand created by the large labour supply from the sending countries, and the limited number of workplace and visas usually offered by the receiving countries. This yields, for example, the development of an institutionalised black market and humanitarian support.

Micro economic neoclassical theories see migrants as investors in human capital, as consumers or in the economy of the household as producers of household specific commodities. Neoclassical migration theory has been supplemented in recent years by the so-called 'new economics' of migration, which have added two further dimensions to the debate. They challenge the individualistic assumption of neoclassical micro theory and highlight the importance of the wider family context in the decision-making on international migration. They also stress the importance of the minimisation of risks as a supplementary factor in decision-making beside the expected income maximisation.

In the last 30 years, important micro sociological migration concepts have been developed within the remit of an RREEMM model[121], which is seen by some scholars as the most appropriate rational choice model of human behaviour (De Jong and Fawsett, 1981). It is based on a specific ideal type of person, which can be characterised within a wider utility maximisation model. Sub-models of this approach are the theory of place utility (Wolpert, 1965), the SEU concept and the Habit model[122]. Other important socio-economic micro approaches are the push-pull model of Lee (1972) and the concept of relative deprivation (Stark and Taylor, 1991).

A meso level perspective is provided by network theories, which stress the importance of social networks connecting migrants, former migrants, potential migrants and non-migrants in the origin and destination area through social ties based on family, friendship or shared experience in the community of origin.

3. An additional classification of theoretical contributions is related to different points in time, when the causal analysis of migration behaviour and attitude begins. Most theories analyse the conditions, which initiate the international movement of labour, e.g. wage differentials in neoclassical theory and labour demand based pull factors within the dual labour market theory. Another set of concepts analyses the effect on

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[120] Here, demand factors from developed economies as well as supply factors from peripheral economies are of importance for the explanation of regional mobility.
[121] It defines social actors as: Resourceful, Restricted, Evaluating, Expecting, Maximising, Man.
[122] SEU stands for 'subjective expected utility'.

migration of an ensemble of new conditions arising in the course of migration movements of a larger group of people as an independent cause in itself. This includes e.g. the spread of migration networks, institutions supporting or repelling migrants and the changing social meaning of work in societies with a high proportion of migrants. These aspects are also discussed under the label of 'cumulative causation'.

4. A further dimension focuses on various 'explananda' of migration theory by providing explanations for different types of international migration[123]. The standard orientation is towards a once off long-term migration to another country. Some observers, however, highlight the increasing quantitative importance of only semi-permanent migration, where migrants maintain multiple ties with their home country, sometimes commuting frequently back and forth, and thus creating a transnational social space and a transnational community with a multi-local place of living and working (Faist, 2000).

5. A further dimension still is the capacity of a specific theory of migration to integrate other migration concepts. Neoclassical micro economic theory has tried, through the method of reducing abstraction (Kalter, 1997), to preserve on the one hand its key nomological basis of an income, maximising 'homo economicus', and to integrate, on the other hand, a variety of additional concepts covering the search and information behaviour, and the investment in human capital. Also, the 'new' economic theory of migration tries to encompass the traditional and the enlarged neoclassical theory and concepts on decision-making in families and risk management. Another attempt to integrate several concepts on migration is made in the SEU model, which is strongly related to a sociology based general theory of action. Here, the complete set of neoclassical rational choice concepts is integrated with wider concepts of utility maximisation in an individualistic and family concept, arguing also for an integration of process based migration theories. In the past, however, most concepts of migration, such as the gravity model of Anderson (1955) and the push-pull model of Lee (1972), had a very specific and limited focus and were therefore not able to provide any basis for a theoretical integration.

6. A final distinction should be made between 'real' theoretical contributions, which give a causal explanation of migration behaviour containing at least one general law of human activity (Esser, 1993, p.47); and so-called theories, which provide either classifications, typologies and tautological explanations of migration, or individually plausible hypotheses e.g. in the context of a multivariate statistical model, where a general integrated framework is missing. In this context, it is important to pick up the point by Kalter (1996, p. 34f) that the widely used push-pull model of migration is less a theoretical approach in its own right rather than a suggestive form of a classification of various influence factors. It is based on the idea that migration is caused, on the one hand, by repelling factors in the place of origin (push) and, on the other, by attractive conditions in the place of destination (pull). A push factor becomes relevant when the disadvantage in the country of origin is greater than in the country of destination. A pull factor is important when the advantage in the destination country is greater than the advantage in the country of origin (Deutsche Bank Research, 2003, p. 3) Which factors are included and how these factors are

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[123] An excellent example is provided in the IOM study (1999).

interrelated with the actual migration behaviour remains often un-discussed and has to be supplemented e.g. by micro economic or sociological concepts of migration. The attraction, however, of the push-pull paradigm is its openness to include a variety of very different explanatory variables.

Neoclassical macro models

One of the best-known and still influential models of migration is based on the neoclassical theory of the labour market. According to Hicks, 'differences in net economic advantages, chiefly differences in wages, are the main causes of migration' (1963. p.76). The basic idea is as follows: labour supply and labour demand determine the equilibrium wage on a regional labour market. Migration is in the first instance caused by geographical differences in labour supply and demand. Regions with a large endowment of labour relative to capital have a lower equilibrium wage, while regions with a limited endowment of labour relative to capital are characterised by a high market wage. The resulting wage differential causes migration from one region to the other. The flow of labour is mirrored by the flow of capital from capital-rich to capital-poor countries. This includes also the movement of human capital, with higher qualified workers moving from capital-rich to capital-poor countries to maximise their return on their human capital investment. The major factor is, therefore, wage differentials, measured usually in real terms of difference of purchasing power between regions or countries. A second hypothesis would predict a higher propensity of migration of people with higher levels of qualification.

This first model is based on several assumptions, including full employment, no transport and search costs, perfect information and complete competition within un-segmented labour markets. A second model releases the assumption of full employment within macro models (other assumptions are partly released in neoclassical micro models of migration) and leads to the inclusion of employment, unemployment or job vacancy levels in different target regions as additional explanatory factors for migration[124]. As the potential migrant in his/her decision making process of rational choice is not only interested in the maximisation of current income, but also in the maximisation of long-term future income, the actual or prospective labour market indicator in the target region is a proxy for income opportunities in the future: e.g. the lower the unemployment rate, or the higher the employment rate, the higher is the probability for the migrant to maximise future income[125].

One important hypothesis in this context is that, particularly in poorer regions, potential migrants are less able to carry the costs of migration and therefore refrain from migration as one option to react to low-income prospects. This hypothesis can probably also be extended to individuals or households with high degrees of income poverty and deprivation.

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[124] The standard model is the Harris and Todaro approach (1970).

[125] One empirical problem of the concept of neoclassical migration theory on the macro level is the asymmetric relationship between migration and wage level. As there is a clear positive statistical relationship between high regional wage level and emigration into an area, there is no clear-cut statistical negative relationship between low wage level in areas of origin and high immigration rates.

Neoclassical micro concepts

At the micro level, neoclassical theory explains migration as an investment in human capital. It 'treats migration as an investment increasing the productivity of human resources, an investment which has cost and which also renders returns' (Sjastaad, 1962, p. 83). Within an individual rational choice model aiming at a long-term income maximization, the potential migrant calculates the costs and benefits, expecting a positive net return. The decision to move to another regional labour market is chosen according to the available opportunities to capture a higher wage rate associated with a greater labour productivity. In order to achieve a higher productivity, the potential migrant has to invest in human capital. This includes investment in travel costs, maintenance costs while looking for a job, learning a new language and adapting to new labour market conditions. In order to be included into the theoretical model, all cost factors are transformed into monetary values.

Potential migrants will estimate costs and benefits of different target regions and migrate to those regions with the greatest expected net return over a certain time horizon. 'Net returns in each future period are estimated by taking the observed earnings corresponding to the individual's skills in the destination country and multiplying these by the probability of obtaining a job there…and to obtain an expected destination earnings. Those earnings…are then subtracted from those expected in the community of origin, and…the difference is summed over a time horizon' (Massey et al, 1993, p.434). In this way, the approach of Massey et al puts much emphasis on individual characteristics. It provides, for example, an elegant hypothesis of age-related migration behaviour: the older the potential migrant, the fewer the number of years a migrant has to cash in human capital investments to finance migration. Everything being equal, young people will, therefore, show a higher tendency for migration than older people. Even though the model includes in principle non-monetary factors such as the psychological and social costs of migration, it excludes them out of the concrete calculation and provides no explanation of how the utility of the non-monetary factors relate to the utility of the monetary factors.

The 'new' economics of migration

Since the mid 1980s, some of the assumptions of the neoclassical micro theory have been criticised, as they provided a reduced explanatory power for some relevant real world conditions. Three main aspects have been highlighted within the context of the so-called 'new' economic theory of migration:

1. Behaviour and attitudes of potential migrants are not only formed at the individual level but also at the group level, mainly in the larger family context.

2. The basic rationale for migration is not only aiming at income maximisation but is also influenced by risk assessment and intentions to minimise risk.

3. Potential migrants, particularly in rural and under-developed regions, are constrained by market failures other than the labour market, which have a direct influence on income and risk position of the individual and his family.

Unlike individuals, households have the possibility of diverse risks to their economic well-being by specific allocation strategies of labour within the family. Some family members are engaged in economic activities in the local community, often the head of household,

whereas other members of the family, often younger men, will be sent abroad to foreign labour markets with better employment conditions and higher wages. In the event of a deterioration of local circumstances, e.g. a drought or floods destroying the harvest, outside revenue provides a support for local families.

In developed countries risks of households are usually diversified through access to different insurance systems, including unemployment insurance and overall social insurance systems. This leads to a risk diversification in relation to income and employment but also over the life cycle of an employee and his family. For some potential migrants and their families in sending countries, 'the desire to acquire this insurance may be a primary motivation…to participate in international migration' (Massey et al 1993, p. 438). This supports the hypothesis that a well-developed social security system is an important pull factor of migration.

The new economics of migration question also the assumption that income is a homogenous good, having a constant effect on the utility for different actors across socio-economic groups settings. In contrast, it is 'hypothesised that rural-to-urban migration might be undertaken primarily to improve an individual's or household's comparative income position with respect to that of other individuals or households in the relevant reference group (for example, the village)' (Stark and Taylor, 1991, p. 1163). Seeing some families rapidly improving their income based on migration of family members makes other families lower in the income distribution feel relatively deprived. Hence, workers are sent abroad to reduce their relative deprivation, which further exacerbates income inequality and increases the sense of relative deprivation among the non-migrants. It also implies an increasing likelihood of migration due to changes in income of other households, if they are part of the reference group. This is in contrast to the traditional line of argument that households send workers abroad to improve income in absolute terms[126].

Socio-economic macro models

Having discussed macro and micro aspects of migration from an economic point of view, the focus moves to relevant socio-economic theories, which combine economic and social factors at the macro level. A historically important macro theory of migration is the so-called gravitation theory (Anderson, 1955 and Dodd, 1950). It follows the basic logic of the gravitation law in physics by establishing a relationship between migration and distance: the further the distance between two regions in a migration process, the smaller the volume of migration. Transposed onto the micro level, it would predict a decreasing propensity to migration with increasing distance. It also implies that migration into the EU is less attractive than intra and extra regional migration within the ACC and that migration into the EU is a more attractive option than migrating outside Europe.

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[126] Theories of relative deprivation were strongly supported by empirical studies on migration from Mexico into the United States (Stark and Taylor, 1989). 'Controlling for initial absolute income and the expected gains from migration, the propensity of a household to participate in international migration was directly related to the household's initial relative deprivation' (Stark and Taylor, 1991, p. 1163). One specific risk for a household using an income strategy to reduce its relative deprivation is a substitution of the community of origin as the relevant reference group by the host community. Under this condition, households may fail to reduce relative deprivation, even if their relative income in relation to the income distribution of their community of origin has increased. Migration towards areas with strong social networks from the sending countries may provide a barrier for such a reference group substitution.

The problem from a theoretical point, however, is that 'it describes an empirical observation involving interactions at a distance but fails to provide an understanding of why there should be such interaction' (Speare et al, 1975, p. 165). This explanatory gap could be filled e.g. by human capital theory, if the cost of migration is positively related with distance.

Another macro concept is based on theories of human ecology. It consists of a frame of reference, which is called the ecological complex and has four elements: population, environment, technology and organisation. Its basic idea regards migration as a process, which establishes an equilibrium between the size and structure of a population and its organisational structure. A disequilibrium is mainly caused by changes in technology and environment. Between different alternatives of demographic reactions of the population, migration is given a higher importance in the short run as it is more effective than changing fertility or changing longevity.

These ideas are picked up and integrated in a world systems theory. Several sociologists have connected the origins of international mass migration to the structure of a world market dominated by capitalist production system. Several processes can be identified, which contribute to the creation of a mobile workforce:

- The introduction of a capitalist rational into agricultural production with a strong increase in productivity destroys the basis of a subsistence economy and displaces farmers from their land.

- The increasing extraction of raw materials under global market conditions attracts farmers in peripheral regions from their land by higher wages offered in extracting industries. This undermines traditional systems of reciprocity in agriculture and subsumes ex-peasants under the rule of the national and international labour market.

- Multinational companies establish assembly plants in peripheral regions. The demand for relatively well-paid factory work alienates peasants from their land and integrates them into a potentially mobile workforce.

The application of above to this study would suggest a higher potential and stronger attitude towards migration in more agricultural regions of the acceding and candidate countries, which are increasingly subsumed under the logic of a capitalist production system in the transformation phase to a market economy and in the process of accession to the EU.

Another important factor in the context of globalisation in peripheral regions is the diffusion of ideological links from the centre to their 'hinterlands'. The material subsuming under the rules of a capitalist world market is accompanied by the spread of cultural and ideological values. In the context of this study, it can be safely assumed that western value patterns of mass consumption, lifestyles and standard of living have a strong influence in all of the acceding and candidate countries. These connections are specifically created and reinforced by mass media, advertising campaigns and outlets of EU-based multinational distribution companies in the acceding and candidate countries. This strongly influences the aspiration level in the ACC and increases the perceived difference between the place utility in the ACC and the aspiration level. From an individual perspective, the most important question is which groups in the acceding and candidate countries are influenced the most by these factors and to what extent they develop a gap between a western European aspiration level and their perceived potential to satisfy these aspirations in their home region. One

hypothesis may suggest that younger people in particular are prone to ideological values and new lifestyles of developed market economies of the west and would therefore develop a larger degree of discontent with existing opportunities in their home country.

An additional pull factor within the world systems theory is the development of global cities, which leads to the creation of a strong demand for services from unskilled workers. The resistance of a poorly educated local population in the EU Member States to take up low-paid and socially low valued jobs at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy creates a strong demand for immigrants[127].

Employers in EU countries may also face a general motivational problem to fill unattractive jobs at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy by local workers, as they are combined with a low societal status. Hence, employers may decide to look for employees, e.g. in the acceding and candidate countries, who have fewer considerations regarding status and prestige in their destination country. This attitude of migrant workers is supported by relative deprivation, where the perception of the migrant is not determined by reference groups in the host country but solely by its status and well-being in the home country. A low status job in a receiving country may be a high status job in the country of origin[128].

Socio-economic and socio-psychological models at the micro level

An explicitly individualistic interpretation of the push-pull model is provided by Lee (1972). In his concept, he distinguishes four overarching factors determining migration: factors in the country of origin, factors in the country of destination, existing barriers and individual factors. It is an integrative approach, which includes traditional macro and micro economic factors such as wage and employment as well as additional macro factors such as climate, schooling or the social security system. Barriers of migration are interpreted not only as distance, but also as cultural (language) or legal impediments for migrants. Individual factors encompass basic demographic indicators and indicators related to specific parts of the life course. Thus, age and family status become important explanatory variables for migration.

An important additional component in the model of Lee is the observation that it is not objective conditions in themselves that determine migration behaviour, but their perception by the potential migrant (Lee, 1972, p.120). The final decision to move or to stay is interpreted as the result of the comparison between the different factors in the country of origin and of destination. Based on Lee, this study tested the conflicting hypothesis, whether

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[127] These pull effects in receiving countries are strongly underlined within the context of the dual labour market theory, which argues that migration is caused by a chronic and unavoidable demand for foreign workers of modern industrial societies. One important pull factor is based on a rigid notion about the relationship between occupational status and pay in EU labour markets. If there is a shortage of unqualified labour, a wage increase in such labour markets would trigger a wage increase in the whole labour market in order to sustain existing wage differentials. Attracting local workers by raising entry wages of unqualified jobs is thus expensive and disruptive. A cheaper solution is opening up this labour market segment to migrant workers, which accept the existing low wages without upsetting the current wage differential.

[128] The dual labour market theory also predicts a developing economic dualism with a capital intensive, high paid and high skilled and low unemployment prone primary sector and a volatile, low qualified and low pay secondary labour market. Due to the lack of career prospects and the higher unemployment risk, it may be difficult to attract local workers under certain conditions into the secondary labour market. To fill these shortfalls, companies may turn to immigrants from the ACC.

migration is more influenced by objective conditions or their perception. It also tests the importance of life course variables for migration, e.g. whether married people are more prone to migrate and which phases of the life course are most closely related to a higher probability for migration.[129]

An important socio-psychological model of place utility has been developed by Wolpert (1965 and 1966). Within his model, 'migration is viewed as a form of individual or group adaptation to perceived changes in the environment' (Wolpert, 1965, p. 161). In the tradition of Lee (1972), Wolpert stresses the importance of perception for human behaviour: 'the origin and destination points take on significance only in the framework in which they are perceived by the active agents' (Wolpert, 1965, p. 161). The adaptation process is explained with the help of two theoretical components. Each potential migrant gives his place of living a so-called place utility, which includes the various facets of relevant dimensions and which is summarised as a net utility. This place utility is compared with a specific aspiration level, which is defined by the same dimensions, which determine the place utility. If the place utility falls below the aspiration level, the potential migrant becomes dissatisfied, which may lead to an adjustment process of the current conditions.

At this point, Wolpert makes the assumption that dissatisfaction can lead to different adaptation strategies and that 'other forms of adaptation are perhaps more common than change of residence or job' (1965, p.161). He distinguishes between three basic forms of adaptation: adjusting needs, restructuring the environment and relocating the household.

The question under which circumstances individual dissatisfaction leads to the decision to relocate the household has been important for the empirical part of this study. This level of the decision-making process has to be seen in connection with a second level and the question under which condition households choose between different regional target areas including migration into the EU.

Unlike economic theories of migration, Wolpert moves away from a rational choice behaviour based on the rationale of 'maximisation' to a rationale of 'satisfying'. Consequently, the individual is not choosing the best of all alternatives in the two-level decision-making process, but accepts conditions in the place of living as long as the aspiration level is lower than the perceived place utility[130].

Wolpert also reflects on the selection process of possible target regions which are considered by the potential migrant. He develops the concept of an 'action space', which is defined by the considered alternatives. It is determined by individual needs, previous experiences, including experiences in different forms of regional mobility and personal networks. Choices between different target areas are also restricted by search and information costs. 'A potential migrant will incur these information costs only if he or she has reason to believe that moving will be profitable and will invest in such a search only as

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[129] In theoretical terms, the weakness of Lee's model is the missing conceptual link explaining the precise relationship and order of importance between the four overarching factors and their individual components. It remains unclear how an overall utility function is achieved.

[130] Within his concept, Wolpert also highlights the difficulty of evaluating conditions in the target regions. He assumes that factual migration into the target area may provide for the potential migrant a proxy to establish its place utility. An individual tends to move to places with a higher perceived utility if it is also possible to reduce the level of uncertainty at the same time. 'Thus the flow of population reflects a subjective place utility evaluation by individuals'(Wolpert, 1965, p. 162).

long as the benefits of having more information are perceived to outweigh the costs of gathering it' (Da Vanzo, 1981, p. 95).

This leads to the following hypotheses: firstly, previous experience with regional mobility in general and with migration in particular leads to higher probability of migration in the future. Secondly, the lower the search and information costs for the individual, e.g. through the availability of local networks, the higher is the probability to choose a specific target area.

The SEU model

The push-pull model by Lee and the place utility model by Wolpert are integrated and further developed in the 'subjective expected utility model' (SEU model) of Kalter (1997, 47ff) and De Jong/Fawsett (1981). It is based on the value expectation theory, which is a developed form of utility theory. This model provides an alternative logic to the income maximising 'homo oeconomicus'. It is a specification of a more general theory of social behaviour, which is called the RREEMM model. It defines social actors as: Resourceful, Restricted, Evaluating, Expecting, Maximising, Man[131].

According to this model, an individual selects from a given number of alternatives the one which provides the highest utility. Alternatives are considered at least on three levels: level one is 'move' or 'stay'; level two provides the various target levels according to distance, and level three defines the specific place within the various target levels. The utility value of different alternative actions is a result of a subjective evaluation process. These utilities are combined with a subjective cognition of the probability to reach the given objective with the help of the chosen alternative. Within this general framework, the SEU model of De Jong and Fawsett (1981) includes a large variety of objectives covering wealth, social status, stimulation, comfort, autonomy, social integration, morality and health[132].

In general, the SEU model is open to a step-by-step reduction from the abstract basic action rationales through a set of complex and more realistic assumptions. Hence, it finds an optimal solution between simplicity and a high approximation to reality. SEU theory allows the development of additional conditions without challenging the 'heuristic' core of the theory. It allows for additional assumptions with regard to preferences (costs and utilities), cognition (subjective probability of realisation) and available alternatives. Thus, it is open to development without questioning the general rationale of the RREEMM model[133].

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[131] This model is based, like economic micro theory, on a maximising rational choice model.

[132] Kalter (1997) rightly stresses the advantages of the SEU approach in relation to other micro theories of migration and suggests it should substitute the widely used push-pull model. The SEU model is integrated in a general theory of social action and not just a specific theory for migration. It has the capability to integrate economic, demographic, social, psychological and other individual factors. It is also open for a multi-level approach, integrating macro and meso data into the model.

[133] In a further development, the SEU theory has to consider the phenomena of inertia, which seems to contradict the rational choice paradigm. The starting point is the widespread inertia, which is seen by some scholars as a given psychological factor in migration behaviour (Fairchild, 1925; Lee, 1972). According to Lee, the importance of push and pull factors for migration have to be larger than the existing 'natural inertia' (Lee 1972, p. 119f).

An important application is the so-called cumulative inertia axiom, which can be tested with the Eurobarometer data. It says that the longer a person lives in the same place, the lower the intention to move. This can be interpreted within the logic of the SEU model in the following way: the longer an individual stays in the same place, the higher the place specific investments, which enable the person, everything being equal, to achieve a relatively high place utility[134].

The inertia factor is important for the construction of the dependent variable in the present study and was discussed in the introduction. Speare (1971) for example observes that many people never seriously consider any options to move, as they never made any utility calculations between the existing and optional places of living. Therefore, Speare suggests 'that the next step in trying to build a comprehensive understanding of the process of individual migration may be to investigate factors which may influence whether or not a person considers moving' (1971, p. 130). Hence, he divides the decision making process into several steps: firstly, an initial start-up situation characterised by inertia against migration; secondly, the development of an inclination to regional mobility overcoming the 'natural inertia' and integrating the possibility of migrating into the potentially perceived alternatives for activity. The third step is to develop a concrete intention to migrate by comparing the different alternatives within a rational choice model and giving the target area a higher place utility than the existing place of living. The last step is the actual migration behaviour[135].

The theoretical discussion on the SEU model has left open the important question under which conditions specific groups of actors choose a particular objective which is relevant for their decision to migrate. Without this specification, the SEU model remains an empty shell, without content. One approach, applied in this study, is an empirical reconstruction of the motives for migration.

A more theoretical approach has to try to combine socio-economic conditions of potential migrants with their typical preferences. One way is to define migrants as consumers of regional amenities and as beneficiaries of social security provisions. The hypothesis would be: the higher the importance of regional amenities or social security provision on the preference scale, e.g. due to a lack of availability in the country of origin, the more important are those provisions for migration.

In the centre of the theoretical debate, however, are contributions made around the new economy of the household and its social production function. Conversely to the prevision model, which saw the individual in a consumer role, these models stress the production function of the household. Within this model, utilities can be produced via different commodities. Shield and Shield (1989) distinguish five basic commodities: education, leisure, children and care, activities with friends and others. The household utility is a function of these five commodities. The production of these commodities needs intermediary commodities or resources, including money, time and personal relationships. According to Shield and Shield, the efficiency and availability of resources is related to the

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[134] This relationship will be tested in a follow-up report.

[135] As far as hypotheses for migration are concerned, the basic question is whether the same factors influence all steps of the process, or whether the second step is more strongly influenced by general factors of dissatisfaction with the actual place of living, and the third stage is more influenced by a comparative and wide-ranging rational choice approach.

place of living. 'The decision to move or to stay is determined by the location where the household can produce the best combination of household commodities' (1989, p. 296).

The concept of the social production function leads to an approach to include mainly those variables which are directly related to the life cycle and working life course. In this respect, Kalter (1997, p. 97) suggests the following approach: age, employment status, existence of a permanent partner and presence of children in the household. The empirical analysis examined whether these factors are relevant for migration.

Models on the perpetuation of migration

As said before, it is useful to distinguish between conditions which initiate international movements and conditions perpetuating it across time and space. One import concept is based on the network theory of migration, which relates to the existence of substantial agglomerations of emigrants with a shared community of origin. According to Massey et al, 'migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community of origin' (1993, p. 448).

The existence of these networks increases the propensy of migration as they lower the search and information costs as well as the risk for movement. These networks provide a kind of social capital, which supports job and house searching as well as a limited social integration in the target country. Within the overall migration process, the highest costs are incurred by the first generation of migrants. Later on, 'because of the nature of kinship and friendship structures, each new migrant creates a set of people with social ties to the destination area. Migrants are inevitably linked to non-migrants, and the latter draw upon obligations implicit in relationships such as kinship and friendship to gain access to employment and assistance at the point of destination' (Massey et al, 1993, p.449)[136].

Additional factors of perpetuating migration over time are termed cumulative causation by Myrdal (1956) and Massey. 'Causation is cumulative in that, in each act of migration, decisions are made, typically in ways that make additional movements more likely' (Massey et al, 1993, p. 451). Usually, several main factors are discussed: distribution of income and land, the organisation of agricultural production, culture, distribution of human capital and the social meaning of work in certain segments of the labour market. Cumulative causation is an integrative approach without providing an integrated theory. It includes important elements on relative deprivation, world systems theory (land distribution, agrarian production, culture) and dual labour market theory (social labelling of low paid jobs).

The new dimension in cumulative causation is the regional distribution of human capital. According to Myrdal (1956), sustained emigration from a region bears the risk of its depletion of human capital. This is a process which is paralleled by the accumulation of human capital in the receiving countries. Over time, the transfer of human capital enhances the relative growth of the receiving countries with a further stimulating effect on immigration. Thus, the loss of human capital creates a negative feedback process. For the

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[136] There is also a declining risk combined with the development and structuring of a network. When networks are well developed, they make it virtually risk-free and costless to migrate. In this way migration is seen as a self-sustaining diffusion process.

present study, the hypothesis has been: areas with strong outwards migration in the past are still areas with strong current outward migration.

Hypothesis

In conclusion, this annex summarises the important hypotheses in relation to the intention for migration, which have been developed based on the discussion of the various theoretical contributions.

Neo-classical approach

The following hypotheses are based on a neo-classical approach:

- The higher the actual or expected wage (income) differential between two countries, the higher the propensity for migration[137].

- The lower the unemployment rate (higher the employment rate) in the target country, the higher the expected life long income and the higher the intention to migrate.

- Unemployed people have a smaller relative monetary cost of moving and, on average, higher expected gains. They therefore have a higher probability to migrate.

- The higher the level of qualification and education, the greater the ability to collect and process information, the lower the risk for migration and the higher the propensity for migration.

- The poorer the household or the individual potential migrant, the higher the relative information costs and the lower the propensity to migrate.

- The higher the expected return on human investment in migration, which is the difference between the expected return on migration and the cost associated with migration, the stronger the intention towards migration.

- The older a person, the lower the expected lifetime gains from migration and the lower the propensity for migration.

- The higher the search and information costs due to uncertainty in the place of origin, the lower the intention to migrate.

'New' economics of migration

Here, the following hypotheses can be extracted:

- People from rural areas or with an agricultural background have a higher propensity to migrate.

- Well developed social security systems in the target countries are an important pull factor for migration.

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[137] The wage differential is usually measured as difference in purchasing power.

- The higher the expected reduction of relative income deprivation related to the area of origin through migration, the higher the intention for migration.

- The better developed networks of migrants from their area of origin, the lower the costs and risks of migration and the higher is the probability of migration into this area.

Socio-economic models

These concepts add the following hypotheses:

- The larger the distance between the country of origin and the target country, the lower the propensity for migration.

- People from rural areas or with an agricultural background have a higher propensity to migrate.

- The stronger the influence of values, lifestyles and consumption patterns from potential host countries, the higher the propensity to migrate. This applies, for example, to younger people.

- The more low level and unqualified jobs that are available in the host countries, the stronger the intention for migration.

Socio-economic micro models

- The higher the language barrier, the lower the intention for migration.

- Families, where both partners work, have a lower propensity for migration. Being single has a positive influence on migration.

- The higher the degree of general or domain-specific dissatisfaction with the place of origin, the stronger the intention to migrate.

- The higher the degree of uncertainty with regard to the conditions of the place of origin, the lower the intention to migrate.

- The higher the number of migrants from the place of origin in the target area, the higher its place utility and the stronger the intention to migrate.

- Previous experience with regional mobility leads to a reduction in uncertainty and to a stronger intention for future migration.

SEU model and models of perpetuation of migration

- The longer a person lives in the same place, the lower the propensity to migrate.

- The more a person is dissatisfied with where he lives, the stronger the intention to migrate.

- The stronger the objective and perceived social exclusion of migrants from acceding and candidate countries in the receiving countries, the lower is the propensity to migrate.

- The higher the importance of regional amenities or social security provision on the preference scale, e.g. due to a lack of availability in the country of origin, the more important are those provisions for migration.

- The better the conditions for the production of household commodities in the host country, the stronger the probability to move. In this respect, the intention for mobility is directly related to the working life course and life cycle.

- Areas with strong outwards migration in the past are also those areas with strong current outward migration.

Conclusion

This annex has presented a selective but still wide variety of concepts and theories on migration, which have generated a significant number of well-argued hypotheses for the empirical analysis. The study assumes, following Massey et al (1993), that many explanations are not necessarily contradictory unless one adopts a rigid position, which would assume that causes must operate at only one level. Causal processes relevant to migration may operate on multiple levels simultaneously, and the test of their usefulness is more an empirical than a logical and theoretical task. Even though many conceptual contributions are not necessarily contradictory, they nonetheless carry very different implications for the formulation of scientifically based policy advice. Therefore, as has been done in this report, it is important to analyse in detail the causes for migration which influence the model on which basis effective policy advice can be given.

Table 1A: *Percentage of Persons Expressing Various Intention of Mobility Across Countries*

	Intention to go live and work EU within years*	Intention move within years**	Intention move exclusively non local within years***	Intention move to EU the next years***	Intention to move EU in the next years (as a % future mobile, seco column)****
Bulgaria	17.0	14.4	8.5	4.8	37.7
Cyprus	16.9	12.6	4.7	2.2	19.3
Czech Rep	10.6	15.4	6.0	1.1	8.7
Estonia	16.0	21.1	7.9	1.6	10.1
Hungary	11.6	20.3	6.3	0.8	4.2
Latvia	15.0	17.6	5.8	2.0	13.1
Lithuania	15.9	19.7	6.5	2.5	17.1
Malta	6.6	8.4	4.2	0.3	3.7
Poland	16.4	17.2	8.8	1.8	11.5
Romania	26.1	16.2	5.4	2.8	22.0
Slovakia	12.2	14.3	5.0	2.0	16.4
Slovenia	8.0	19.0	7.7	0.9	5.7
Turkey	34.0	26.9	9.6	0.8	3.3
AC 10	14.1	17.4	7.4	1.5	10.1
ACC 13	23.2	20.5	8.0	1.6	8.9

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
*question Q67 in the questionnaire
**question Q59 in the questionnaire
*** locally (within the same city,town,village). Question Q59 and Q60.b to Q60.e
***question Q60.D in the questionnaire
****question Q60.D (as a % of those having intention to move within 5 years)

Table2A: *Breakdown of Persons by Willingness to Live in Another European Country*
(where the Language is Different from their Mother Tongue) Across Countries

	Very much	**To some extent**	**Not much**	**Not at all**	**All**
Bulgaria	9.4	16.4	14.6	59.6	100.0
Cyprus	5.7	19.6	8.0	66.7	100.0
Czech Rep.	4.5	25.8	19.5	50.2	100.0
Estonia	7.7	22.8	18.9	50.5	100.0
Hungary	6.3	16.5	13.2	64.0	100.0
Latvia	5.2	19.6	21.7	53.5	100.0
Lithuania	9.1	26.2	21.6	43.0	100.0
Malta	4.9	12.2	13.6	69.3	100.0
Poland	8.6	29.2	17.4	44.9	100.0
Romania	17.4	20.7	11.8	50.1	100.0
Slovakia	7.8	30.1	20.1	42.0	100.0
Slovenia	9.1	23.6	22.4	44.9	100.0
Turkey	19.4	19.5	20.2	41.0	100.0
AC 10	7.4	25.8	17.6	49.2	100.0
ACC 13	13.2	22.3	17.6	46.9	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 3A: *Percentage of Persons by Various Intention of Migration Across Countries*

	General Inclination	Basic Intention	Firm Intention
Bulgaria	6.1	4.4	2.5
Cyprus	2.8	2.2	1.6
Czech Rep.	3.2	1.0	0.8
Estonia	3.7	1.5	0.9
Hungary	1.8	0.4	0.4
Latvia	3.2	1.8	0.6
Lithuania	3.5	2.3	0.9
Malta	1.3	0.3	0.1
Poland	3.7	1.6	1.0
Romania	4.6	2.8	1.8
Slovakia	2.1	1.4	0.9
Slovenia	2.1	0.5	0.5
Turkey	6.2	0.8	0.3
AC 10	3.1	1.3	0.8
ACC 13	4.6	1.5	0.9

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 4A: *Percentage of Persons aged 15-65 by Various Intention of Migration Across Countries*

	General Inclination	Basic Intention	Firm Intention
Bulgaria	7.7	5.6	3.2
Cyprus	3.2	2.6	1.9
Czech Rep.	3.8	1.2	1.0
Estonia	4.5	1.8	1.0
Hungary	2.2	0.5	0.5
Latvia	3.7	2.0	0.6
Lithuania	4.1	2.6	1.1
Malta	1.5	0.3	0.2
Poland	4.3	1.8	1.1
Romania	5.8	3.5	2.3
Slovakia	2.5	1.6	0.9
Slovenia	2.4	0.5	0.5
Turkey	6.3	0.8	0.3
AC 10	3.7	1.5	1.0
ACC 13	5.2	1.7	1.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 5A *Breakdown of Persons having General Inclination for Migration by Age Group across Countries*

	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+	All
Bulgaria	46.5	20.0	31.3	2.2	100.0
Cyprus	67.5	32.5	0.0	0.0	100.0
Czech Rep.	65.3	31.5	2.0	1.2	100.0
Estonia	44.9	33.9	19.3	1.8	100.0
Hungary	52.5	34.4	11.3	1.8	100.0
Latvia	45.3	42.2	12.5	0.0	100.0
Lithuania	44.5	41.2	14.3	0.0	100.0
Malta	49.5	17.2	33.3	0.0	100.0
Poland	64.3	27.9	7.8	0.0	100.0
Romania	69.0	22.5	8.5	0.0	100.0
Slovakia	63.4	27.8	3.4	5.5	100.0
Slovenia	59.9	28.5	10.0	1.7	100.0
Turkey	39.8	42.8	13.0	4.5	100.0
AC 10	61.0	30.4	7.9	0.7	100.0
ACC 13	50.9	34.5	12.0	2.5	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 6A: *Breakdown of Persons having Firm Intention for Migration by Age Group Across Countries*

	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+	All
Bulgaria	69.2	1.4	24.1	5.3	100.0
Cyprus	44.7	55.3	0.0	0.0	100.0
Czech Rep.	29.0	71.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Estonia	50.3	40.9	8.8	0.0	100.0
Hungary	53.9	46.1	0.0	0.0	100.0
Latvia	51.4	48.6	0.0	0.0	100.0
Lithuania	52.9	27.5	19.5	0.0	100.0
Malta	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
Poland	47.7	46.8	5.4	0.0	100.0
Romania	77.9	13.4	8.7	0.0	100.0
Slovakia	50.4	49.6	0.0	0.0	100.0
Slovenia	21.0	41.8	30.0	7.2	100.0
Turkey	33.1	53.6	13.2	0.0	100.0
AC 10	45.6	49.3	5.0	0.1	100.0
ACC 13	56.8	32.4	10.0	0.8	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 7A: *Percentage of Persons having General Inclination for Migration by Age Group Across Countries*

	15-24	25-39	40-54	55+
Bulgaria	18.2	5.3	8.0	0.4
Cyprus	10.8	3.5	0.0	0.0
Czech Rep.	10.3	4.2	0.2	0.1
Estonia	7.5	5.1	3.1	0.2
Hungary	6.6	2.7	0.8	0.1
Latvia	7.9	5.0	1.6	0.0
Lithuania	9.0	4.8	2.1	0.0
Malta	3.8	0.9	1.5	0.0
Poland	11.9	4.0	1.1	0.0
Romania	19.5	4.5	1.6	0.0
Slovakia	7.1	2.3	0.3	0.4
Slovenia	6.6	2.3	0.8	0.1
Turkey	8.3	7.3	3.8	2.2
AC 10	10.1	3.7	1.0	0.1
ACC 13	10.5	5.5	2.3	0.5

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 8 A: *Breakdown of Persons having General Inclination for Migration by Gender across Countries*

	Male	Female	All
Bulgaria	63.0	37.0	100.0
Cyprus	53.5	46.5	100.0
Czech Rep.	38.5	61.5	100.0
Estonia	51.6	48.4	100.0
Hungary	27.2	72.8	100.0
Latria	52.5	47.5	100.0
Lithuania	51.8	48.2	100.0
Malta	52.6	47.4	100.0
Poland	63.6	36.4	100.0
Romania	51.6	48.4	100.0
Slovakia	39.4	60.6	100.0
Slovenia	50.7	49.3	100.0
Turkey	70.7	29.3	100.0
AC 10	53.7	46.3	100.0
ACC 13	62.2	37.8	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 9A: *Breakdown of Persons having Firm Intention for Migration by Gender across Countries*

	Male	Female	All
Bulgaria	48.8	51.2	100.0
Cyprus	37.1	62.9	100.0
Czech Rep.	63.4	36.6	100.0
Estonia	53.8	46.2	100.0
Hungary	76.0	24.0	100.0
Latvia	19.4	80.6	100.0
Lithuania	65.4	34.6	100.0
Malta	100.0	0.0	100.0
Poland	48.1	51.9	100.0
Romania	56.9	43.1	100.0
Slovakia	67.8	32.2	100.0
Slovenia	85.7	14.3	100.0
Turkey	84.2	15.8	100.0
AC 10	54.7	45.3	100.0
ACC 13	58.3	41.7	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 10A: *Percentage of Persons having General Inclination for Migration by Gender across Countries*

	Male	Female
Bulgaria	8.3	4.2
Cyprus	3.1	2.4
Czech Rep.	2.7	3.5
Estonia	4.1	3.3
Hungary	1.1	2.4
Latvia	3.6	2.9
Lithuania	3.9	3.2
Malta	1.3	1.2
Poland	5.0	2.5
Romania	5.2	4.2
Slovakia	1.9	2.4
Slovenia	2.3	1.
Turkey	8.6	3.7
AC 10	3.6	2.7
ACC 13	5.9	3.3

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 11A: *Breakdown of Persons having General Inclination for Migration by Terminal Education Age across Countries*

	Primary (Up to 15 years)	Secondary (16-19 years)	Tertiary (20+ years)	Still studying	All
Bulgaria	20.3	40.6	15.4	23.7	100.0
Cyprus	0.0	0.0	18.5	81.5	100.0
Czech Rep.	2.1	28.2	22.1	47.6	100.0
Estonia	3.6	34.7	26.9	34.8	100.0
Hungary	20.6	28.7	14.6	36.2	100.0
Latvia	4.9	33.2	18.8	43.0	100.0
Lithuania	0.0	27.7	47.7	24.6	100.0
Malta	10.4	29.9	59.7	0.0	100.0
Poland	3.2	28.9	15.4	52.6	100.0
Romania	17.2	32.0	11.3	39.5	100.0
Slovakia	1.8	42.5	11.9	43.8	100.0
Slovenia	2.9	26.3	22.2	48.7	100.0
Turkey	37.2	23.1	18.9	20.7	100.0
AC 10	4.5	29.3	18.5	47.6	100.0
ACC 13	22.0	27.8	17.4	32.8	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 12A: *Breakdown of Persons having Firm Intention for Migration by Terminal Education Age across Countries*

	Primary (Up to 15 years)	Secondary (16-19 years)	Tertiary (20+ years)	Still studying	All
Bulgaria	22.7	31.1	16.5	29.7	100.0
Cyprus	0.0	0.0	31.4	68.6	100.0
Czech Rep.	0.0	30.5	40.5	29.0	100.0
Estonia	0.0	21.1	50.7	28.2	100.0
Hungary	0.0	22.1	69.1	8.8	100.0
Latvia	0.0	10.2	42.5	47.3	100.0
Lithuania	0.0	34.9	37.5	27.6	100.0
Malta	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Poland	0.0	28.1	23.2	48.7	100.0
Romania	19.8	18.7	26.9	34.6	100.0
Slovakia	0.0	74.8	6.3	18.9	100.0
Slovenia	0.0	0.0	79.0	21.0	100.0
Turkey	20.5	69.2	0.0	10.3	100.0
AC 10	0.1	30.2	31.0	38.7	100.0
ACC 13	11.5	30.3	24.7	33.5	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 13A: *Percentage of Persons having General Inclination for Migration by Terminal Education Age across Countries*

	Primary (Up to 15 years)	Secondary (16-19 years)	Tertiary (20+ years)	Still studying
Bulgaria	4.6	5.8	4.8	15.0
Cyprus	0.0	0.0	3.4	16.6
Czech Rep.	0.5	1.7	3.7	11.5
Estonia	1.9	2.9	3.0	8.6
Hungary	1.0	1.4	1.9	7.1
Latvia	2.2	2.5	1.7	10.9
Lithuania	0.0	2.5	4.4	7.3
Malta	0.4	0.9	9.8	0.0
Poland	0.6	2.5	2.7	13.3
Romania	3.3	3.4	2.6	22.6
Slovakia	0.2	1.6	2.1	8.0
Slovenia	0.3	1.5	2.0	5.8
Turkey	3.6	7.4	15.1	11.6
AC 10	0.7	2.1	2.8	11.3
ACC 13	2.7	3.5	4.8	12.7

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 14A: *Breakdown of Persons having General Inclination for Migration by Employment Status across Countries*

	Employed	Unemployed	Student	Other Inactive	All
Bulgaria	35.3	31.0	23.7	10.0	100.0
Cyprus	40.8	0.0	59.2	0.0	100.0
Czech Rep.	37.6	0.0	62.4	0.0	100.0
Estonia	39.1	17.1	33.9	9.9	100.0
Hungary	37.9	24.1	36.2	1.8	100.0
Latvia	41.0	21.2	33.7	4.1	100.0
Lithuania	57.5	24.0	11.9	6.6	100.0
Malta	84.2	0.0	0.0	15.8	100.0
Poland	18.9	26.2	52.7	2.2	100.0
Romania	27.5	5.6	49.7	17.2	100.0
Slovakia	52.2	5.7	42.1	0.0	100.0
Slovenia	39.5	14.5	46.0	0.0	100.0
Turkey	35.1	32.8	17.6	14.5	100.0
AC 10	28.9	20.5	48.4	2.2	100.0
ACC 13	32.1	25.1	32.1	10.7	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 15A: *Breakdown of Persons having Firm Intention for Migration by Employment Status across Countries*

	Employed	Unemployed	Student	Other Inactive	All
Bulgaria	9.4	38.1	29.7	22.7	100.0
Cyprus	69.4	0.0	30.6	0.0	100.0
Czech Rep.	17.7	0.0	82.3	0.0	100.0
Estonia	61.0	10.8	28.2	0.0	100.0
Hungary	53.9	37.4	8.8	0.0	100.0
Latvia	54.6	23.4	22.0	0.0	100.0
Lithuania	41.6	45.1	13.3	0.0	100.0
Malta	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0
Poland	14.0	40.4	45.6	0.0	100.0
Romania	18.2	6.4	53.5	21.9	100.0
Slovakia	77.1	5.7	17.2	0.0	100.0
Slovenia	51.5	27.4	21.0	0.0	100.0
Turkey	26.5	57.7	6.6	9.1	100.0
AC 10	27.3	31.5	41.1	0.1	100.0
ACC 13	21.9	28.7	38.4	11.0	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 16A: *Percentage of Persons having General Inclination for Migration by Employment Status across Countries*

	Employed	Unemployed	Student	Other Inactive
Bulgaria	6.6	8.8	17.2	1.6
Cyprus	2.3	0.0	12.8	0.0
Czech Rep.	2.1	0.0	13.6	0.0
Estonia	2.9	7.9	8.6	1.3
Hungary	1.8	5.6	7.1	0.1
Latvia	2.7	5.4	10.4	0.5
Lithuania	4.1	6.9	3.9	0.9
Malta	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.4
Poland	2.0	7.1	14.4	0.2
Romania	4.0	2.9	25.9	1.6
Slovakia	2.5	1.2	8.0	0.0
Slovenia	1.9	4.3	6.3	0.0
Turkey	7.1	12.1	11.6	2.1
AC 10	2.2	5.9	12.0	0.2
ACC 13	4.1	8.7	13.7	1.2

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 17A: *Breakdown of Persons having General Inclination for Migration by Marital Status across Countries*

	Married/Cohabiting	Single	Widowed/Separd./Divo	All
Bulgaria	55.6	38.3	6.1	100.0
Cyprus	22.3	77.7	0.0	100.0
Czech Rep.	16.9	80.7	2.4	100.0
Estonia	38.1	48.5	13.4	100.0
Hungary	39.3	49.5	11.3	100.0
Latvia	42.5	42.1	15.5	100.0
Lithuania	47.7	44.1	8.2	100.0
Malta	44.1	48.7	7.1	100.0
Poland	16.3	81.2	2.5	100.0
Romania	35.2	64.1	0.7	100.0
Slovakia	15.2	76.6	8.2	100.0
Slovenia	22.9	68.7	8.4	100.0
Turkey	52.7	45.5	1.7	100.0
AC 10	21.9	73.4	4.7	100.0
ACC 13	41.0	56.1	2.8	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 18A: *Breakdown of Persons having Firm Intention for Migration by Marital Status across Countries*

	Married/Cohabiting	Single	Widowed/Separated/Divorced	All
Bulgaria	44.9	53.7	1.4	100.0
Cyprus	38.0	62.0	0.0	100.0
Czech Rep.	8.5	86.9	4.6	100.0
Estonia	49.7	50.3	0.0	100.0
Hungary	91.2	8.8	0.0	100.0
Latvia	15.7	67.8	16.5	100.0
Lithuania	36.0	64.0	0.0	100.0
Malta	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Poland	21.9	73.8	4.3	100.0
Romania	15.4	84.6	0.0	100.0
Slovakia	6.3	93.7	0.0	100.0
Slovenia	14.3	78.5	7.2	100.0
Turkey	30.7	69.3	0.0	100.0
AC 10	26.0	70.4	3.6	100.0
ACC 13	26.5	71.8	1.7	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 19A: *Percentage of Persons having General Inclination for Migration by Marital Status across Countries*

	Married/Cohabiting	Single	Widowed/Separeted/Divorced
Bulgaria	5.0	14.4	2.4
Cyprus	0.9	10.6	0.0
Czech Rep.	1.0	9.3	0.5
Estonia	2.5	6.7	2.0
Hungary	1.3	4.9	0.8
Latvia	2.3	7.1	1.9
Lithuania	2.8	8.2	1.5
Malta	0.7	1.7	0.8
Poland	1.0	9.2	0.8
Romania	2.3	16.5	0.2
Slovakia	0.5	6.3	1.1
Slovenia	0.7	4.7	1.2
Turkey	4.9	10.4	1.9
AC 10	1.2	8.2	0.9
ACC 13	3.0	10.1	1.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002

Table 20A: *Breakdown of Persons Having General Inclination for Migration by Main Motives across Countries*

	not satisfied with current home	Do not like people in area	work reasons	family/priv reasons	financial reasons	All
Bulgaria	12.8	3.5	7.6	11.0	65.0	100.0
Cyprus	0.0	0.0	47.4	52.6	0.0	100.0
Czech Rep.	15.2	0.0	23.4	36.6	24.8	100.0
Estonia	16.8	3.1	28.9	19.7	31.5	100.0
Hungary	1.5	9.3	43.1	15.2	30.8	100.0
Latvia	12.0	4.3	34.6	26.0	23.1	100.0
Lithuania	11.9	1.8	30.0	16.2	40.1	100.0
Malta	0.0	0.0	32.3	54.1	13.6	100.0
Poland	12.7	6.7	42.7	18.4	19.5	100.0
Romania	15.2	4.3	13.2	18.5	48.8	100.0
Slovakia	16.0	0.0	39.3	16.0	28.7	100.0
Slovenia	15.2	7.1	23.1	30.2	24.5	100.0
Turkey	6.9	4.8	41.2	12.2	34.9	100.0
AC 10	12.4	4.8	37.4	21.8	23.6	100.0
ACC 13	10.0	4.7	34.8	15.9	34.6	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Results standardized to 100%

Table 21A: *Breakdown of Persons Having Firm Intension for Migration by Main Motives across Countries*

	not satisfied w current home	Do not li people i area	work reasons	family/priv reasons	financial reasons	All
Bulgaria	14.9	0.0	8.8	6.7	69.5	100.0
Cyprus	0.0	0.0	34.8	65.2	0.0	100.0
Czech Rep.	24.6	0.0	20.9	30.7	23.8	100.0
Estonia	21.7	7.1	32.5	6.6	32.2	100.0
Hungary	0.0	0.0	35.3	0.0	64.7	100.0
Latvia	8.7	3.8	33.3	14.2	39.9	100.0
Lithuania	8.6	0.0	32.9	0.0	58.5	100.0
Malta	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0
Poland	14.2	4.2	42.4	15.8	23.5	100.0
Romania	14.1	0.0	4.1	17.0	64.8	100.0
Slovakia	23.2	0.0	30.8	15.2	30.8	100.0
Slovenia	0.0	18.8	17.2	32.2	31.9	100.0
Turkey	12.8	3.0	40.2	16.0	28.0	100.0
AC 10	15.7	2.7	35.1	17.8	28.7	100.0
ACC 13	14.7	1.9	26.0	16.2	41.2	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Results standardized to 100%

Table A: *Breakdown of Persons Having General Inclination for Migration by Main Motives and by Gender across Countries*

		not satisfied with current home	Do not like people in area	work reasons	family/priv ate reasons	financial reasons	All
Bulgaria	Male	16.1	4.7	9.1	7.4	62.7	100.0
	Female	3.1	0.0	3.2	22.1	71.7	100.0
Cyprus	Male	0.0	0.0	62.1	37.9	0.0	100.0
	Female	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
Czech Rep.	Male	11.2	0.0	31.1	28.8	28.9	100.0
	Female	17.8	0.0	18.3	41.7	22.1	100.0
Estonia	Male	19.1	3.1	30.7	17.4	29.7	100.0
	Female	13.7	3.2	26.3	22.7	34.1	100.0
Hungary	Male	0.0	0.0	25.1	18.3	56.5	100.0
	Female	2.1	12.9	50.0	14.1	21.0	100.0
Latvia	Male	11.1	5.8	41.2	24.1	18.0	100.0
	Female	12.9	2.9	28.4	27.9	28.0	100.0
Lithuania	Male	9.1	3.1	35.0	8.1	44.6	100.0
	Female	15.7	0.0	23.2	27.1	34.1	100.0
Malta	Male	0.0	0.0	47.4	32.6	19.9	100.0
	Female	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
Poland	Male	11.1	6.8	47.9	14.0	20.1	100.0
	Female	15.4	6.4	34.2	25.5	18.5	100.0
Romania	Male	9.4	2.2	14.0	13.2	61.1	100.0
	Female	21.6	6.5	12.4	24.3	35.2	100.0
Slovakia	Male	23.7	0.0	22.9	24.5	29.0	100.0
	Female	11.6	0.0	48.6	11.2	28.5	100.0
Slovenia	Male	14.1	8.6	15.6	33.3	28.4	100.0
	Female	16.4	5.2	31.9	26.6	19.9	100.0
Turkey	Male	4.5	4.5	41.6	11.8	37.7	100.0
	Female	13.0	5.7	40.4	13.2	27.7	100.0
AC 10	Male	11.2	4.9	41.7	17.2	25.0	100.0
	Female	13.8	4.7	32.7	26.9	22.0	100.0
ACC 13	Male	7.5	4.4	36.8	13.1	38.3	100.0
	Female	14.3	5.2	31.5	20.9	28.2	100.0

Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 April, 2002
Results standardized to 100%